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THE BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL WAR OF 220-217 B. C.

In this paper no attempt is made to discuss all the causes of the Social War (War of the Allies). Such an undertaking would be far too large for one article, since it would entail an inquiry into the history of practically every state in Greece in that period. My aim is more modest. There are three subjects in particular which I wish to investigate: first, the political background of the Social War; second, the political affiliations of Messenia in these years, for in the relations of Messenia to the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, I believe, is to be found probably the most fundamental cause of the Social War; and third, the violent prejudices of Polybius whenever he is treating any opponent of the Achaean League. Evidence for Polybius' bias will appear on almost every page of this paper.

Polybius¹ begins his discussion of the causes of the Social War with the following remarks:

Αἰτωλοὶ πάλαι μὲν δυσχερῶς ἔφερον τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὑπαρχόντων δαπάνας, ὡς ἂν εἰθισμένοι μὲν ζῆν ἀπὸ τῶν πέλας, δεόμενοι δὲ πολλῆς χορηγίας διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀλαζονείαν, ἣ δουλεύοντες αἰὲ πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, οὐδὲν οἰκείον, πάντα δ' ἡγούμενοι πολέμια. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ἕως Ἀντίγονος ἔζη, δεδιότες Μακεδόνας ἦγον ἡσυχίαν. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκεῖνος μετέλλαξε τὸν βίον, παῖδα καταλιπὼν Φίλιππον, καταφρονήσαντες ἐζήτουν ἀφορμὰς καὶ προφάσεις τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπιποκῆς, ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ ταύτης ἀρπαγὰς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ νομίζοντες ἀξιοχρεῶς εἶναι σφᾶς πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.

¹ IV, 3, 1-3.

I have quoted this passage in full to illustrate at the outset Polybius' rabid prejudice against the Aetolians.² This prejudice and the concomitant partiality for the Achaean League and Aratus must constantly be borne in mind, for they distort Polybius' whole account of the causes of the Social War and of the war itself. The reasons for this war were more complex than Aetolia's lust for plunder, and, in order to have any understanding of them, it will be necessary to trace the course of history in Greece from 229 B. C. Such a survey must inevitably concentrate upon certain aspects of the Cleomenic War.

I

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

The situation in Greece in 229, thanks to the labors of many scholars, has become reasonably clear. Macedon was struggling for her very existence. The Dardanians were pouring in from the north, and to the south, Thessaly—probably supported by the Aetolians—was in revolt.³ Philip, the son of Demetrius II who had died early in this year,⁴ was too young to cope with the emergency. Therefore the Macedonian army assembly made Antigonus Doson, the son of Demetrius the Fair, guardian, and before long he was proclaimed king.⁵

The Aetolian League in the first few months after the death of Demetrius II reached its greatest extent.⁶ It incorporated Hestiaeotis, Thessaliotis, and the rest of Achaea Phthiotis, and,

² Walek, *Rev. de Phil.*, XLIX (1925), pp. 33-34, is scarcely exaggerating when he calls Polybius' picture of the Aetolians little better than a caricature; cf. W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, p. 208. This whole paper will show that I cannot agree with the judgment of F. W. Walbank, *Aratos of Sicyon* (Cambridge, England, 1933), p. 11, that "almost everything Polybios says against the Aetolians can in fact be easily justified."

³ Justin, XXVIII, 3, 14; cf. Plut., *Arat.*, 34, 5. See Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 748; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, IV, 1, p. 638.

⁴ Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), pp. 254-258.

⁵ F. Granier, *Die Makedonische Heeresversammlung* (München, Beck, 1931), pp. 123-126; P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 393-395.

⁶ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 748; for the latest treatment of this question, see R. Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1937), pp. 253-259.

by extending from the Gulf of Pagasae to the Ambracian Gulf, completely barred the Macedonians from any land route to southern Greece. In the Peloponnese also Aetolia had a strong foothold, for she was in close relations with Elis, Messenia, Phigalea, and the four Arcadian cities, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Tegea, and Caphyae.⁷ In addition, the alliance with the Achaean League, made shortly after the death of Antigonos Gonatas, was still in effect.⁸

The Achaean League, too, did not fail to profit by the confusion into which Macedon had been thrown. For many years Aratus had been driving tyrants—usually supported by Macedon—out of the various cities of the Peloponnese and attaching these cities to the Achaean League. In the years 229-228 he succeeded in putting an end to the last tyranny in the Peloponnese. There was no longer any Macedonian influence south of the Isthmus, and Aratus had finally achieved what had been his aim for a score of years. The Achaean League now “embraced Achaea, Sicyon, Corinth, Megara, Argos, the Argolid and the coastal cities, Aegina, Megalopolis and the larger part of Arcadia.”⁹ The goal of Aratus undoubtedly was to include

⁷ Fortunately we are not concerned with the exact relations between the Aetolians and these peoples. The Aetolians had been on close terms with Elis since at least the middle of the third century (Polyb., IV, 5, 4; 9, 10; cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240; Swoboda, in *R.-E.*, V, s. v. “Elis,” 2410-2413). With Messenia they had a long-standing alliance (Polyb., IV, 6, 11). As a result of a decree of the Aetolian League, the Messenians voted *isopoliteia* with Phigalea ca. 244 (Ditt., *Syll.*³, 472; cf. Flacelière, *ibid.*; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI [1936], pp. 66-71). In 221 B. C. Polybius, IV, 3, 6, speaks of Phigalea as *συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς*. In the period under consideration Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Tegea were, according to Polybius, II, 46, 2, *τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευομένας τότε πόλεις*, and the same is probably true of Caphyae (Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 4). For the vexed problem concerning the date at which these cities became members of the Aetolian League, see A. Ferrabino, *Il Problema dell' Unità Nazionale nella Grecia Antica. I. Arato di Sicione e l' Idea Nazionale* (Firenze, 1921), pp. 292-293; P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 409-411; Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), p. 251, n. 6.

⁸ Polyb., II, 44, 1. The Achaeans and Aetolians co-operated in trying to help the Corcyraeans against the Illyrians at the battle of Paxos in the first half of 229 (Polyb., II, 9, 8-9; 10, 1; see Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII [1930], p. 250).

⁹ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 750.

the whole Peloponnese in the Achaean League,¹⁰ but grave difficulties stood in the way. First, as mentioned above, the Aetolian League had considerable influence in the Peloponnese and second, and more important, there was Sparta. The age old traditions of Sparta gave little promise that she would relinquish any of her independence and individuality by joining a federation like the Achaean League, no matter how excellent it might be.

Such was the situation in 229, but very rapidly it became better for Macedon and worse for Aetolia. Antigonos Doson acted with extreme vigor. He at once put an end to the Dardanian invasion and in 228 succeeded in recovering Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis.¹¹ Thus Aetolia suddenly and unexpectedly found that Macedon once again had a strong ruler. Much to her chagrin she realized that any attempt to expand northward would involve great difficulties and dangers. Conditions in the Peloponnese also were becoming less favorable to her because of the rapid and ambitious growth of the Achaean League. Was Aetolia to be prevented from further expansion by Macedon in the north and by the Achaeans in the south?

There is little doubt, then, that Aetolia's ambitions had received a rude rebuff by 228. Consequently the passage in Polybius (II, 45), which tells that the Aetolians out of envy for the prosperity of the Achaeans joined hands with Antigonos Doson and Cleomenes for the purpose of partitioning the cities of the Achaean League, at first glance seems sufficiently plausible. Further consideration, however, makes the formation of this triple alliance seem so incredible that it will be necessary to investigate at some length the relations to one another of Macedon, Aetolia, Sparta, and the Achaean League.

The date of this supposed alliance is the first point to be ascertained. The passage in Polybius apparently refers to the year 228, for it follows immediately on the sentence which speaks of the incorporation of Argos, Hermione, and Phlius in the

¹⁰ Cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 3, 4.

¹¹ See my paper, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIII (1932), pp. 126-155, especially pp. 140-143. My contention, which was overlooked by Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 253 ff. and chapter VII, has been accepted and confirmed by S. Dow and C. F. Edson, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 165-168, and by P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 396 and 407-408.

Achaean League in 229.¹² It also describes Doson as *κυριεύοντα μὲν τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἀσφαλῶς*, a description which could refer only to a time after he had driven back the Dardanians and recovered Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis—therefore not before 228.¹³ Now in 229 we know that the Aetolians were still allied with the Achaeans.¹⁴ Plutarch¹⁵ tells us this, and also it was in this year that the two leagues together sent aid to the Corcyraeans, Apollonians, and Epidamnians, and fought a losing battle against the Illyrians at Paxos.¹⁶ Thus in 229 both the Achaeans and Aetolians were hostile to Macedon, for the Illyrians were allies of that kingdom.¹⁷ According to Polybius, however, in the following year the situation was changed. The Aetolians abandoned the Achaeans and made common cause with the two worst enemies of the Achaean League, the Macedonians and Cleomenes.¹⁸

¹² Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 750.

¹³ P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), pp. 24-25; cf. S. Dow and C. F. Edson, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁴ The alliance between the Achaeans and Aetolians dates from the death of Antigonos Gonatas (Polyb., II, 44, 1). Under the circumstances the alliance was natural, for both leagues were actuated by hatred and fear of Macedon, the Achaean League, because Demetrius II was trying to uphold his father's policy of tyrants in the Peloponnese (Polyb., II, 44, 3), the Aetolian League, because Demetrius II, having married Phthia, the daughter of Olympias of Epirus, was trying to prevent the Aetolians from wresting away the Epirot share of Acarnania (see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 744).

¹⁵ *Arat.*, 34, 5.

¹⁶ Polyb., II, 9-10; see Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), p. 250.

¹⁷ Demetrius II had come to terms with Agron in 231 (Polyb., II, 2, 5). We do not know whether this understanding was immediately renewed by Doson. Nevertheless it is correct to say that Illyria and Macedon were friends in 229, because Acarnania was in alliance with Illyria (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10; 10, 1), and Acarnania was on the best of terms with Macedon; see Polyb., II, 2, 5; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 251; E. Oberhummer, *Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum* (München, Ackermann, 1887), pp. 156-160.

¹⁸ The inevitable hostility between the Achaean League and Sparta is well described by E. A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, 2nd ed. (London, 1893), pp. 338 ff. The addition of Megalopolis and Argos to the League in 235 and 229 respectively naturally increased this hostility owing to the long-standing grievances between Sparta and these two cities. Obviously Macedon had no liking for the League which was responsible for driving all Macedonian influence out of the Peloponnese.

One thing is certain. Even if the Aetolians attempted to form this triple alliance, they did not succeed. Max Klatt¹⁹ long ago saw this, adducing, among other proofs, such convincing ones as the following: (1) Sometime after Cleomenes' revolution in the autumn of 227²⁰ envoys from Megalopolis at the instigation of Aratus went to Doson to ask for help in case the Aetolians should lend assistance to the Spartans.²¹ In their speech the Megalopolitans referred only to the possibility of a coalition between the Aetolians and Spartans; not a word was said about any triple alliance. In fact, if this triple alliance had been formed, it is highly improbable that the Megalopolitan envoys would ever have gone to Macedon. (2) If the Aetolians had been in alliance with Cleomenes, certainly he would not have spoken so bitterly about them as he did in the course of his revolution.²² (3) If the Aetolians had been in alliance with Cleomenes, Aratus would not have called on them for help in the winter of 225/224.²³

Thus it is obvious that Polybius made an error when he stated that an understanding was reached between the Aetolians, Doson, and Cleomenes. There is still the question, however, whether the Aetolians ever attempted to form such an alliance. The evidence is decidedly against such an assumption. First, it is hard to conceive of the Aetolians making such a proposition to Doson after the defeat they had experienced at his hands in his recovery of Thessaliotis and Hestiaeotis in 228.²⁴ Second, Polybius (II, 47, 3-9), contradicting his former statement, implies that the Aetolians did not negotiate with Macedon when he says that after Cleomenes' successful revolution in 227, Aratus, dreading the audacity of the Aetolians, decided to anticipate them in an approach to Doson. Aratus had to make this approach secretly so as to avoid being outbidden by the Aetolians and Cleomenes. Thus in 227 we find, contrary to Polybius'

¹⁹ *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Achäischen Bundes. Erster Teil. Quellen und Chronologie des Kleomenischen Krieges* (Berlin, Haack, 1877), pp. 41-42. I have amplified Klatt's remarks somewhat.

²⁰ For the date, see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 754; Beloch, IV, 1, p. 702.

²¹ Polyb., II, 47-49.

²² Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6.

²³ Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 758.

²⁴ See above, p. 132 and n. 11.

previous statement (II, 45), that the Aetolians had as yet made no overtures to Antigonus.²⁵

The mention of Aratus' approach to Antigonus Doson brings us to the much debated subject of the negotiations between the Achaean League and Macedon. Polybius' treatment (II, 47-52) of these negotiations is notoriously confusing, but a careful analysis of them is essential to a proper understanding of the years under consideration. In order to clarify the following

²⁵ P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 409-411, argues on the basis of Ditt., *Syll.*³, 501, that Doson was trying to stir up trouble for the Achaean League. This inscription from Tegea concerns the conferring of *proxenia*, *isopoliteia*, etc. by the Tegeans upon Agesandros, son of Nicostratos, a Thessalian from Scotussa in Pelasgiotis—hence the Macedonian part of Thessaly. Treves accepts the date 229/228 as given in Dittenberger. He agrees that Tegea along with Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae passed from the Aetolians to Cleomenes between 229 and 228. He argues that Doson in his treaty with the Aetolians either advised or commanded them to cede these cities to Cleomenes. The Aetolians would be compensated for renouncing a base in the Peloponnese by expansion in Thessaly and to the west. By this move Doson would damage the accord between the Achaeans and Aetolians and would arouse hostility between the Achaeans and Sparta. This in turn would lead to the Cleomenic War which was bound to be profitable to Doson. For various reasons, of which I list a few, I cannot accept Treves' ingenious interpretation of this inscription. (1) The date 229/228 is only conjectural (see *I. G.*, V, 2, 11). (2) Even supposing that the date 229/228 is correct, the granting of *isopoliteia*, etc. to an unknown Thessalian need not be such a significant matter. (3) A full refutation of Treves' theory is to be found in Polybius, II, 46. In this chapter Polybius first speaks of the transfer of Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae (for Caphyae, see Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 4) from the Aetolians to Cleomenes, and then he goes on to say that after this (*κατὰ τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους*) Cleomenes began to fortify the Athenaeum in the Belbinate (cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 1-2). There is general agreement among scholars (e. g., Beloch, IV, 1, p. 697; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 753; Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 73, 192; W. H. Porter, *Plutarch's Aratus* [London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1937], p. LXVI), however, that Cleomenes took the Athenaeum in summer 229. Thus it is clear that the four Arcadian cities passed to Cleomenes *at the latest* in early summer 229. At this date Macedon was suffering from the chaos which followed on the death of Demetrius II, and was in no position to give orders to the Aetolians who were engaged in seizing large parts of Thessaly. Treves himself (p. 407; see also Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII [1935], p. 25) does not date the peace between Macedon and Aetolia until 228. Consequently we can be certain that Doson had nothing to do with the Spartan acquisition of Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae.

discussion, it will be helpful to paraphrase Polybius' account of the first embassy sent to Doson (II, 47-50).—When the (Cleomenic) war had now been going on for some time, in the conduct of which Cleomenes, who had staged his revolution, was showing great energy, Aratus, fearing the audacity of the Aetolians, determined to ruin their plans. He decided if possible to reach an understanding with Doson. He felt that this ought to be done secretly in order not to have Cleomenes and the Aetolians as competitors and so as not to discourage the Achaeans as a whole by calling on outside help. He selected two Megalopolitans—Nicophanes and Cercidas—, his guest friends, to be his confidential agents. Since Megalopolis had been hard hit by the war and also since the relations between that city and Macedon had been friendly for generations, the choice was a natural one. It was easily arranged that these two men should be appointed envoys by Megalopolis. They then proceeded to Doson, after having received permission from the Achaeans and private instructions from Aratus. They demonstrated to the king the danger first for the Achaeans and then for himself which would arise from an alliance between the Aetolians and Cleomenes. After expatiating on the unbridled ambitions of these two parties, they begged him to consider whether it would not be wiser for him to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes with the aid of the Achaeans and Boeotians than to abandon the Achaeans and consequently have to fight in Thessaly for the Macedonian kingdom against the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans. They said that the Achaeans would try to oppose Cleomenes alone, but, if the Aetolians should attack them and fortune should desert them, they urged him to go to their aid. Aratus would attend to the necessary terms. Antigonus wrote a letter to the Megalopolitans, promising assistance if the Achaeans gave their permission.²⁶ The ambassadors returned to Megalopolis, and the city was greatly pleased at the king's letter. Sometime later at a meeting of the Council of the Achaean League, the Megalopolitans urged the Achaeans to summon Antigonus at once. The Achaeans were of the same opinion. Then Aratus, who had heard privately from Nico-

²⁶ This shows that the embassy was not an official one from the Achaean League, but an exclusively Megalopolitan one. See Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-366.

phanes and Cercidas of Doson's good will towards him and the League, arose and persuaded the Achaeans to try to save themselves by their own efforts, but, if that proved impossible, then to summon the Macedonians—.²⁷

Obviously the question of the date of this Megalopolitan embassy is important. I believe that it was after the Spartan revolution, as Polybius (II, 47, 3 ff.) says. Before proceeding any further, however, I must give my reasons for discarding the date assigned by Walbank²⁸ who has revived with some changes the views of Ferrabino.²⁹ Walbank contends that the envoys were dispatched in September 229. He is impressed by the emphasis Polybius places on the Aetolian menace and maintains that the speech of the envoys to Doson (II, 49), which stresses the dangers to the Achaean League—and subsequently to Macedon—of an Aetolo-Spartan alliance, makes nonsense if dated winter 226/225, as it usually has been, but “is admirably adapted to the situation in autumn 229.”

P. Treves³⁰ has shown some of the improbabilities inherent in assigning the year 229 as the date for the beginning of negotiations between Aratus and Antigonos. Quite correctly he calls attention to the fact that the Achaean League did not declare war on Cleomenes until 228 after Aristomachus had become *strategos*. In the autumn of 229 there was no diplomatic break between the Achaeans and Aetolians which, according to Polybius, was the cause of the appeal to Macedon. Furthermore, it would be ridiculous for Polybius to insist so vehemently on the necessity of seeking aid from Macedon if war with Cleomenes had not yet been declared. Certainly Aratus was not going to turn to Doson unless he was absolutely forced to do so.

To make Treves' arguments still clearer, I shall enlarge upon his objections and add some further ones of my own. (1) In 229 Megalopolis had not suffered sufficiently from the undeclared war with Cleomenes to warrant Polybius' description of her evil plight (II, 48, 1-3). Cleomenes had fortified the Athenaeum in the Belbinate—a district in dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta; that was the nearest approach to actual warfare which

²⁷ The embassy had achieved Aratus' purpose; he now knew that in case of necessity he could rely on Doson for assistance against Cleomenes.

²⁸ *Aratos*, pp. 74 ff.; 190 ff.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-77; 255-262; 295.

³⁰ *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), pp. 24-25.

had occurred save for Aratus' rather laughable failure to take Tegea and Orchomenos.³¹ It is true that probably in this year the Aetolians had acquiesced in Cleomenes' seizure of the four Arcadian cities—Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae. Since these cities had belonged to the Aetolian League,³² it might be argued that the Aetolian acceptance of the new situation meant that it had reached some understanding with Sparta. I might also suggest, however, that the Aetolians were at the time so busy trying to win over Thessaly from Macedon³³ that they would have been unable to prevent Cleomenes even if they had so desired. Possibly, as has been suggested many times,³⁴ the Aetolians were glad to strengthen a rival of the Achaean League, but it has already been shown³⁵—and will be shown again—that they made no alliance with Sparta. Without doubt the acquisition by the Spartans of this wedge between Megalopolis and Argos must have been highly disturbing to the Achaeans. Still, to maintain that in 229 Cleomenes was a serious menace to the Achaean League is to base arguments on events which happened several years later. In 229 Cleomenes had as yet done nothing to distinguish himself. He had won no great victories, and the ephors, who were still in control of the Spartan government, were afraid of war with the Achaean League and were restraining him.³⁶ In short, there was nothing in the situation of 229 to justify an appeal from the Achaean League—or from any of its members—to Macedon.

(2) Another reason against the contention that Aratus sent an embassy to Doson in 229 lies in the relations between the Achaeans and Macedon in that year. In the spring of 229 the Achaeans and Aetolians together had fought against the Illyrians and Acarnanians, allies of Macedon, at the battle of Paxos.³⁷ Thus in spring 229 the Achaeans were still allied with the Aetolians and still at war with Macedon. It seems strange if a few months later the Achaeans should be asking Macedon for help against the Aetolians.

³¹ Polyb., II, 46, 5; Plut., *Cleom.*, 4.

³² Polyb., II, 46, 2; Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 4. See above, p. 131 and n. 7.

³³ See above, p. 130.

³⁴ E. g., Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 753; Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-343.

³⁵ See above, pp. 132-134.

³⁶ Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 3.

³⁷ See above, p. 133 and n. 17.

(3) The improbability of such an embassy in 229 can be made even clearer. It was after the death of Demetrius II early in 229 that Aratus, by causing their tyrants to resign, was busily incorporating Argos, Hermione, and Phlius in the Achaean League,³⁸ and the negotiations for the liberation of Athens were going on from 229 to 228.³⁹ It is an extraordinary idea, to say the least, that Aratus should simultaneously be destroying Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese and in Athens, and be requesting Macedonian help (with the knowledge that Doson would insist on obtaining Acrocorinth).⁴⁰ There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson took place after Cleomenes' revolution, as Polybius (II, 47, 3 ff.) very clearly says. It might be added that considering the desperate straits of Macedonia in 229⁴¹—Dardanian invasion, Thessaly in revolt, Athens and various Peloponnesian cities breaking away from her—there would be as much likelihood in assuming that Doson asked the Achaeans for help as that Aratus turned to Doson.

It cannot be denied, however, that there is a problem in Polybius' account of the Achaean negotiations with Doson. First he says (II, 47-50) that, after Cleomenes had staged his revolution, Aratus sent the Megalopolitan envoys to Doson. This embassy resulted in an understanding between Antigonus and the Achaeans. The Macedonian king was to bring help if the Achaeans by themselves could not hold out against the Spartans and Aetolians (that there really was no question of any Aetolian interference will be demonstrated more clearly later). Then Polybius (II, 51, 2-7) speaks of a second embassy sent by the Achaeans to Doson after Ptolemy, abandoning the Achaean League, began to support Cleomenes, and after the Spartan king had been victorious near the Lycaenum,⁴² at Ladoceia,⁴³ and at Hecatombaeum.⁴⁴ The first two of these battles occurred before Cleomenes'

³⁸ Polyb., II, 44, 3-6; Plut., *Arat.*, 34-35.

³⁹ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 748-749; Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 189-190.

⁴⁰ Polyb., II, 51, 6; cf. 49, 9; 50, 8. See Porter, *op. cit.*, p. LXXIV. Ferrabino's arguments, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72 and 262, that Aratus expected Doson to be willing to aid him without receiving any territorial reward, have no foundation in fact.

⁴¹ Cf. M. Cary, *C. R.*, XLVIII (1934), p. 37.

⁴² Date 227; Plut., *Arat.*, 36; *Cleom.*, 5.

⁴³ Date 227; Plut., *Arat.*, 36-37; *Cleom.*, 6.

⁴⁴ Date 226; Plut., *Arat.*, 39; *Cleom.*, 14.

revolution in 227. Since Polybius on this occasion mentions events which had occurred before Cleomenes' revolution, it might seem as if he were confusing this second embassy with that of the two Megalopolitans, Nicophanes and Cercidas. I think not, and I believe that a simple explanation of this seeming confusion can be given.⁴⁵

After the Spartan revolution in the fall of 227,⁴⁶ the two Megalopolitans at Aratus' instigation went to Doson and reached a partial understanding with him. This was before the battle of Hecatombaeum, but after the battles of the Lycaenum and Ladoceia. This last encounter in the territory of Megalopolis was a bad defeat for the Achaeans and in it Lydiades was killed. Thus Polybius' remark (II, 48, 1-3; cf. 55, 2-3), that the Megalopolitans were hard hit by the war at the time Aratus planned the first approach to Macedon, undoubtedly refers to the period shortly after Ladoceia. This first embassy must be dated between the fall of 227 and the spring of 226.⁴⁷ After hearing the report of the envoys, Aratus, now feeling confident that in case of necessity he could rely on Antigonos, persuaded the Achaeans to try to carry on the war by themselves. Then in the course of the year 226 occurred the bad Achaean defeat at Hecatombaeum. Aratus was desperate. Polybius, wishing to emphasize the terrible position in which Aratus found himself, very naturally enumerates the major disasters which Cleomenes had brought upon the Achaean League.⁴⁸ Two of these battles had occurred before the Spartan revolution, but Polybius, in his effort to demonstrate what a menace Cleomenes was, mentions Lycaenum and Ladoceia as well as Hecatombaeum. By this dramatic technique Polybius gives the impression that there was only one possible solution for the plight of the Achaeans and that was to summon Doson—τότ' ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν

⁴⁵ Cf. Beloch, IV, 1, p. 707, n. 1.

⁴⁶ See above, n. 20.

⁴⁷ Polybius unfortunately is particularly vague at this point in his use of technical terms, but Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. LXXII-LXXIII, is undoubtedly correct in his suggestion that the two Megalopolitans received permission to go to Doson at the autumn *synodos* of 227 and made their report before the spring *synodos* of 226. See below, n. 164.

⁴⁸ Cf. Walter Bettingen, *König Antigonos Doson von Makedonien*, Inaug. Diss. (Jena, Weida i. Th., Thomas and Hubert, 1912), p. 36, n. 3; also P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), p. 27.

ἡνάγκαζε τὰ περισσώτα καταφύγειν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον.⁴⁹ At this point Polybius compresses his account excessively as is evident from his devoting less than a page to the events from the time of Hecatombaeum in 226 to the desertion of Corinth to Cleomenes in the winter of 225/224.⁵⁰ In fact, no official Achaean embassy was sent to Doson until the Achaeans voted to do so at the spring meeting in 224. Polybius himself (II, 51, 5-7) states that after Hecatombaeum there was a delay in sending envoys to Doson because the Achaeans could not agree to surrender Corinth to him and they knew that he would not come to their aid unless he received that city. Another reason that no official embassy could be dispatched at this time was that the Achaeans were negotiating with Cleomenes from the morrow of Hecatombaeum until early summer 225.⁵¹ Aratus was undoubtedly negotiating privately with Doson in this period. Plutarch⁵² tells us that at this time the most important matters between him and Doson were settled, and this knowledge helps us to understand why Aratus so confidently destroyed any hope of a reconciliation with Cleomenes. The rest of the year 225 was a series of triumphs for Cleomenes, and in the winter Corinth voluntarily deserted to him. This defection, however, removed the last difficulty about summoning Antigonus, and at the spring meeting at Aegium the Achaeans voted to call him to their assistance.⁵³

This interpretation of the negotiations seems to me the only acceptable one. Polybius distinctly says that Aratus' first approach to Doson was after the Spartan revolution. The embassy of the two Megalopolitans must have occurred between autumn 227 and spring 226.⁵⁴ Admittedly the sources for this period

⁴⁹ Polyb., II, 51, 4.

⁵⁰ For the date see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 758.

⁵¹ Plut., *Arat.*, 39; *Cleom.*, 15; 17; cf. Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. LXXIV-LXXV.

⁵² *Cleom.*, 17, 1.

⁵³ Polyb., II, 52, 1-4; Plut., *Cleom.*, 19; *Arat.*, 42.

⁵⁴ It may be well to quote the lines in which Polybius specifies the time at which Aratus decided to send the Megalopolitans to Doson (II, 47, 3)—ἥδη δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν τοῦ πολέμου προβαίνοντος, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένους τότε πατριὸν πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος καὶ τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλως, προὐρώμενος Ἀρατος τὸ μέλλον κτλ.—There is nothing in this passage to justify the interpretation that the words χρωμένον κτλ. refer to the period after Hecatombaeum or to the year 225. Polybius is giving the motive for

are bad, but, if we reject the testimony of Polybius, we enter the realm of pure speculation. Hence I cannot agree entirely with the chronology for the years 229-225 as given by Dow and Edson in a recent study.⁵⁵ They have adopted Tarn's⁵⁶ date of early 225 for the initial negotiations of the Achaean League with Antigonus. They have made, however, an important observation (*op. cit.*, p. 179, n. 1) about these negotiations by pointing out that the Megalopolitan envoys in their speech to Doson implied very clearly that at that time Boeotia was friendly to Macedon. When Doson set out for Caria, however, Boeotia was hostile to Macedon—hence friendly to the Aetolian League. It will be recalled that the Boeotians did not attack Antigonus when his fleet was grounded at Larymna, and Polybius informs us that as a result of this episode Boeotia soon went over to Macedon.⁵⁷ It is clear, then, that the first Achaean embassy must be dated after the Carian expedition. Dow and Edson have given a new date, 226, for this event. But since to me the evidence in Polybius is conclusive that the first embassy occurred between fall 227 and spring 226, it seems necessary to return to the traditional date of 227 for the Carian expedition.⁵⁸

This is not the place to undertake a long discussion of the reconstruction of the events of the years 229-225 as given by Dow and Edson, but in a few remarks I believe it can be shown that the date of autumn 227 to spring 226 for the initial Aratus-Doson negotiations can be fitted into their system at the expense of only a few changes. Their arguments (*op. cit.*, pp. 172-176) to explain Eusebius' statement that Doson ruled for twelve years—namely that Eusebius erroneously added three years as *epitropos* to the reign of nine years—seem sound. They believe that the

the first embassy by saying—the war already lasting for some time, and Cleomenes having destroyed the ancestral constitution and having changed the lawful kingship into a tyranny, and also conducting the war energetically—. The present participle *χρωμένον* is parallel to *προβαλνόντος*. The fact that Cleomenes after the revolution was engaged in improving the Spartan army (Plut., *Cleom.*, 11) naturally contributed greatly to Aratus' alarm and to his decision to try to reach an understanding with Doson.

⁵⁵ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 163-180; chronological table, p. 179.

⁵⁶ *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 756.

⁵⁷ Polyb., XX, 5; see Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

⁵⁸ Beloch, IV, 2, p. 549; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 722 and 752.

proclamation of Antigonus as king must be connected with the suppression of the revolution in Macedon. These two events they place in late summer or autumn 227. Since they assign (*op. cit.*, p. 165, n. 1) the death of Demetrius II to April 229, Doson's *epitropeia* lasted for two years and at least five or six months, which could well be called three years. They ascribe the Carian expedition to 226. This date, they argue (*op. cit.*, pp. 168-172), gives a motive for the Athenian decree, passed late September or October 226, in honor of the philosopher Prytanis of Carystus who had undertaken for Athens a mission to Doson. The Athenians, worried by the Carian expedition, realized that they must reach a definite understanding with Macedon.

I suggest the following emendations to their chronology. The revolution in Macedon occurred in early summer 227. I see no reason for assuming that it was a prolonged affair. Unfortunately the passage in Justin (XXVIII, 3, 11-16) gives scanty information. A probable cause of the sedition is as follows.⁵⁹ The Macedonians had been fighting constantly since 239. The proposed Carian expedition in 227 was the final straw, and the army mutinied.⁶⁰ Doson by his firmness suppressed the sedition just as Philip V quieted an incipient mutiny on a smaller scale in the year 218.⁶¹ After the restoration of order Doson was proclaimed king. Since I am not convinced by the arguments of Dow and Edson for dating the death of Demetrius II in April 229, but prefer Holleaux's date of February or March 229 for this event,⁶² the proclamation of Antigonus as king about July rather than late summer or autumn really does not reduce the time of Doson's *epitropeia* at all. It would still be two years and about five or six months. Thus I maintain that Doson set out on his Carian expedition in the summer of 227, probably in July.^{62a} As explained above, Boeotia went over to Macedon as a result of the Larymna episode. Hence Boeotia would have been allied with Macedon at the time of the embassy of Nicophanes and Cercidas.

⁵⁹ The victories of the federal movement throughout Greece may well have been a contributing factor; see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 751.

⁶⁰ There is nothing in Justin's account against the assumption that the "seditio minax" was merely an army mutiny rather than a country-wide revolution.

⁶¹ Polyb., V, 25.

⁶² *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), pp. 254-258.

^{62a} See below, n. 164.

A word should be added about the embassy sent by Athens to Antigonos in the autumn of 226. Dow and Edson claim that the Carian expedition is the only known motive for Prytanis' mission. The following suggestions, I believe, are pertinent. It is probably true that the Athenians were alarmed by the Carian expedition, but that does not signify that they immediately sent an envoy to Antigonos. And there are other reasons why Athens should have been disturbed at this time. Without doubt it had become known that Aratus had sent envoys to Doson between fall 227 and spring 226. Athens could not have looked with indifference on the possibility of the Macedonians once again appearing in southern Greece. After the Achaean defeat at Hecatombaeum in 226, the probability that Doson would bring aid to the Achaeans seemed even more imminent. The anxiety arising from Doson's expected appearance in the Peloponnese and from his Carian expedition explains satisfactorily the Athenian embassy to the Macedonian king.

After this discussion of Aratus' negotiations with Antigonos we must return to Polybius' statement that the Aetolians in 228 formed an alliance with Doson and Cleomenes to partition the cities of the Achaean League. It has already been shown⁶³ that the Aetolians in reality never formed this alliance and in all probability never even attempted to do so. An endeavor must now be made to explain why Polybius' account of the Cleomenic War, although it mentions not a single aggressive act of the Aetolians, definitely creates the impression that they were a serious menace to the Achaeans in these years. I believe that a satisfactory explanation can be given—at least as satisfactory as the meagre condition of the sources permits.

In the years 229 and 228 Aratus had little or no cause to be concerned about the Aetolians. It is true that it was probably in 229 that Aetolia apparently acquiesced in Cleomenes' seizure of her Arcadian cities, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae,⁶⁴ which can be construed as an anti-Achaean act,⁶⁵ but to offset this it should not be forgotten that it was in the spring of this same year that the Aetolians and Achaeans fought as allies at the battle of Paxos.⁶⁶ The Aetolian policy at this time

⁶³ See above, pp. 132-135.

⁶⁴ See above, p. 138.

⁶⁵ Beloch, IV, 1, p. 697; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 753.

⁶⁶ See above, p. 138.

can perfectly well be explained by the fact that they were too much occupied in central and northern Greece to interfere in the Peloponnese, for it was in the years 229-228 that they acquired large parts of Thessaly from Macedon and then lost most of them again.⁶⁷ It is not known whether a formal peace was concluded between Macedon and Aetolia, but in any case open hostilities seem to have ceased by the end of 228. The establishment of some sort of truce between the two powers, however, is far from implying that they immediately began to act as allies in an attempt to partition the Achaean League.⁶⁸ Aratus' appeal to the Aetolians for help against Cleomenes⁶⁹ in the winter of 225/224 is proof that they had done nothing openly hostile to the Achaeans, for if he had known that they had formed, or even attempted to form, an alliance with Macedon and Cleomenes against the Achaeans, as Polybius (II, 45) says they did, naturally he would not have appealed to them.⁷⁰ On the other hand the Aetolian refusal to send aid shows that the good relations between them and the Achaeans which had existed during the reign of Demetrius II had really come to an end. One reason that the Aetolians would not help Aratus was undoubtedly their fear of Macedon.⁷¹ Another was that they probably were glad to see the Achaeans hard pressed by Cleomenes. They did not want any power to become too strong in the Peloponnese. Certainly they did not want Cleomenes to become complete master of that region. Evidence for the poor relations between Sparta and the Aetolians is seen in the ill-natured way in which Cleomenes spoke of them in the course of his revolution⁷² and in their failure to furnish him any support throughout the war.⁷³

Thus Aratus had no sound reason to fear any hostile moves from Aetolia and Macedon. The real object of Aratus' fear was,

⁶⁷ See above, pp. 130-132.

⁶⁸ Polybius, IV, 3, 2, admits that the Aetolians made no move against the Achaeans when he says—οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ἕως Ἀντίγονος ἔζη, (the Aetolians) δεδιότες Μακεδόνας ἤγον ἡσυχίαν. This passage also shows clearly that there was no alliance of any sort between the Aetolians and Antigonus.

⁶⁹ Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2.

⁷¹ See above, n. 68.

⁷⁰ Cf. Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

⁷² Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6.

⁷³ If the Aetolians had not been determined to remain neutral in this war, they undoubtedly would have aided their ally Elis when that country was invaded by Aratus in 227 (Plut., *Cleom.*, 5).

of course, Cleomenes. Not only was the Spartan king winning many victories, but also there was a large element in the Achaean League which was openly well-disposed to him. These adherents of Cleomenes apparently were not exclusively from the masses—hoping for social revolution such as Cleomenes had achieved in Sparta—, for it seems that some of the leading men in the Achaean League were leaning towards the Spartan king because of dissatisfaction with Aratus.⁷⁴ Aratus, however, was adamant in his refusal to come to terms with Cleomenes. As we have seen, from the autumn of 227 he was carrying on negotiations with Doson. Scholars, while attempting to explain Aratus' decision, have frequently sought to excuse and justify his conduct.⁷⁵ Admitting that he may have been jealous of Cleomenes, they argue that he was striving to prevent the spread of social revolution, and that Macedon seemed the best safeguard against such a movement. Now it is true that the constitution of the Achaean League had many oligarchic elements,⁷⁶ and it is obvious that Aratus was opposed to any such measures as redistribution of land and cancellation of debts. Still, too much emphasis must not be placed on Aratus' fear that Cleomenes would carry out such measures throughout the Peloponnese. Cleomenes had revived Sparta by his revolution and certainly he was not interested in strengthening other states in like manner. To do so would thwart his purposes.⁷⁷ Much has also been said to show that Aratus, with his back to the wall, was convinced that alliance with Macedon—even if at the cost of a certain amount of liberty—promised a better lot for the Achaean League than submission to Cleomenes. There is no question that Cleomenes was aiming at the hegemony of the Peloponnese;⁷⁸ he wished to regain for Sparta at least some of the prestige it had lost at Leuctra. This Spartan hegemony would naturally spell the end of the grand days of the Achaean League. Such a scheme of things was the very opposite of what Aratus wanted since his

⁷⁴ Plut., *Cleom.*, 17, 3.

⁷⁵ E. g. B. Niese, *Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten* (Gotha, 1899), II, p. 322; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 706-707; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 756-757.

⁷⁶ Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 28; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 739.

⁷⁷ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 759; Niese, II, pp. 322-323.

⁷⁸ Plut., *Cleom.*, 15, 1; *Arat.*, 41, 3.

goal was to include Sparta and the whole Peloponnese in the Achaean League.⁷⁹

I shall not attempt to answer the unanswerable question as to whether Aratus was, or was not, justified in bringing the Macedonians once again into the Peloponnese. But I do feel that the attempts to justify Aratus' decision have a tendency to go too far. He, if anyone, knew the disadvantages of being under the Macedonian aegis. Had he not devoted his life to driving tyrants out of the Peloponnese—the majority of whom had been supported either by Gonatas or by Demetrius II? Polybius (II, 47, 5 ff.) is merely trying to vindicate his hero when he says that Aratus felt that he could trust Doson. The very fact that the Macedonian king refused to bring aid to the Achaeans until he was promised Acrocorinth⁸⁰ shows that fundamentally Doson's ideas were not so different from those of his predecessors.⁸¹ Hence I believe it is a mistake to minimize the part that jealousy of Cleomenes played in Aratus' decision. For years Aratus had been the first man in the Achaean League—in fact, in the whole Peloponnese—and he could not endure to resign this position of pre-eminence to another and younger man. If Cleomenes became hegemon there would be no place for Aratus in the new order of things, but, if Cleomenes were crushed by Macedonian help, then Aratus could still be the most prominent figure in the Peloponnese, even if dependent on Macedon. But most outstanding man he had to be at any cost. He had demonstrated this before in his rather unsavory opposition to Lydiades.⁸² Plutarch⁸³ emphasizes this almost pathological streak of jealousy in Aratus. It is true that Plutarch here is drawing on Phylarchus, the eulogizer of Cleomenes, but we shall never obtain a clear picture of Aratus' motives if we consider only the Polybian account which is admittedly derived from Aratus' Memoirs.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Plut., *Cleom.*, 3, 4-5.

⁸⁰ Polyb., II, 51, 6; 52, 4; Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 6; 41, 4.

⁸¹ Doson's determination to maintain control of the Peloponnese is further attested by his keeping and garrisoning Orchomenos (Polyb., IV, 6, 5-6; Plut., *Arat.*, 45, 1) and Heraea (Polyb., II, 54, 12-13; Livy, XXVIII, 8, 6; XXXII, 5, 4), and by his quartering troops in the Peloponnese under Taurion—*τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων* (Polyb., IV, 6, 4).

⁸² Plut., *Arat.*, 30, 3; 35; 37; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 749-750.

⁸³ *Cleom.*, 16.

⁸⁴ Polyb., II, 56, 2.

One point is clear. After Cleomenes' revolution Aratus became convinced that the Achaean League would probably need outside help if it were to resist successfully the Spartan king. Macedon seemed the most likely source of assistance.⁸⁵ Granting that Aratus was morally convinced that the presence of the Macedonians was preferable to submission to Cleomenes, it is manifest that he needed cogent reasons to justify his appeal to Doson. There were too many elements in the Achaean League which were favorable to Cleomenes and opposed to Macedon to permit Aratus to take this step unless he could produce persuasive arguments for its necessity. If he were not careful he would lay himself open—whether justly or not is immaterial—to the accusation of being motivated by jealousy of Cleomenes. His endeavors not to assume the sole responsibility for turning to Macedon, but to share it with the Megalopolitans, show very clearly that Aratus realized that he was treading on dangerous ground.⁸⁶ He knew perfectly well that the advent of the Macedonians would mark the end of the *de facto* liberty of the Achaeans. We may be sure, therefore, that Aratus, before turning to Doson, disseminated as much propaganda as he could to justify his step. To him were due the rumors that Aetolia was joining with Macedon and Cleomenes to partition the Achaean League—rumors which, although they had no sound foundation, might well inspire terror. Despite the fact that the Aetolians did not raise a hand against the Achaeans at this time, Aratus spread the report that they really were the chief trouble makers, that they were responsible for goading Cleomenes on. As the outstanding man in the League and by means of his oratorical ability, he was in a strong position to influence public opinion, and the Spartan acquisition of the Aetolian cities, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae, gave him excellent material with which to work. Such statements he incorporated in his Memoirs in his endeavor to

⁸⁵ About this time Ptolemy Euergetes abandoned the Achaean League and began to support Cleomenes (Polyb., II, 51, 2; cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 93; 200). Later the Aetolian League and Athens refused aid to the Achaeans (Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2).

⁸⁶ It is true that Megalopolis, because of its good relations with Macedon (Polyb., II, 48, 2), was the logical city to send envoys, but Polybius emphasizes very clearly Aratus' desire for secrecy (II, 48, 4) and his wish to avoid sole responsibility (II, 50, 5-9).

defend his appeal to Macedon.⁸⁷ Now Polybius tells us himself⁸⁸ that for the history of the Cleomenic War he relied on Aratus' Memoirs, preferring them to the account of Phylarchus which was too pro-Spartan.⁸⁹ Consequently, if we always bear in mind the all-important fact that Polybius is following Aratus' attempted justification of his highly questionable actions, we can understand perfectly the otherwise incomprehensible statements about the policy of the Aetolians during these years. This policy was one of remaining utterly aloof from the struggle which was going on in the Peloponnese. They sent aid neither to the Achaeans nor to Cleomenes. Undoubtedly they were well pleased to see the two chief powers of the Peloponnese tearing one another to pieces. When Doson agreed to assist the Achaeans, they

⁸⁷ For the above discussion (pp. 145-148) I am much indebted to some valuable remarks in Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 359, and in I. M. J. Valetton, *De Polybii Fontibus et Auctoritate Disputatio Critica* (Societas Artium Disciplinarumque Rheno-Traiectina, J. W. Leeftang, 1879), pp. 154-157.

⁸⁸ II, 56, 1-2; cf. 40, 4; also Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 7-8.

⁸⁹ It is true that Polybius says just before he begins his account of the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson that Aratus in order to keep his plans secret was forced to do and say many things quite contrary to his real purpose. Polybius (II, 47, 11) adds the words—*ὦν χάριν ἐν τούτων οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατέταξεν*—. At first glance these words seem to support Walbank's contention (*Aratos*, pp. 12, 191) that for the Megalopolitan embassy Polybius did not follow Aratus but rather the Megalopolitan traditions with which, as son of Lycortas, he naturally was familiar. I cannot agree with this assumption for several reasons. First, Polybius (II, 56, 2) says expressly that he is following Aratus for the history of this period. Second, Polybius (II, 47, 11) does not say that Aratus omitted the account of the Megalopolitan embassy in his Memoirs, but only failed to mention some matters—*ἐν τούτων*—. These omissions on the part of Aratus and the fact that Polybius' first two books are merely an introduction—*προκατασκευή* (I, 3, 8-10)—to his history explain satisfactorily why the account of the negotiations with Macedon is somewhat confused. It is also hard to see why the Megalopolitan tradition should vary from Aratus' version. The two Megalopolitan envoys to Doson were *πατρικὸι ξένοι* of Aratus (Polyb., II, 48, 4), and in their interview with the Macedonian king they spoke almost exclusively *κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις* (Polyb., II, 48, 8). Thus the account which later Nicophanes and Cercidas spread throughout Megalopolis was undoubtedly based on the description of the state of affairs which Aratus had given them—and in that description much emphasis was placed on the danger threatening from the supposed understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes.

were disappointed,⁹⁰ not because of any particular partiality for Cleomenes, but because they realized that he would probably be crushed by the combined force of the Macedonians and Achaeans. As a result, the Achaeans, even if partly under the Macedonian aegis, would become more predominant than ever in the Peloponnese, and obviously that would not please the Aetolians. Their refusal to allow Doson to advance southward by way of Thermopylae in 224, although strictly within their rights as a neutral power,⁹¹ nevertheless shows that they were ill-disposed to the coalition against the Spartan king.

II

SOME IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

In the first part of this paper an attempt has been made to show that Polybius' account of the decade preceding the Social War is not entirely reliable. This unreliability lies in certain malicious and groundless accusations and insinuations against the Aetolians which he transferred from Aratus' Memoirs to his own History. The result is that Polybius' whole account of the Cleomenic War—which forms the essential background to the Social War—conveys the impression that the Aetolians were so hostile to the Achaeans that the outbreak of the Social War was merely the logical development of their enmity and machinations. The Social War, however, owed its origin to circumstances other than the depravity of the Aetolians. With the background afforded by the preceding pages we are now ready to examine some of the immediate causes of the conflict which was soon to embroil all Greece except Athens. Once again we must not let Polybius' great reputation as a scientific and impartial historian blind us to his unreasoning prejudice against the enemies of the Achaean League.

Despite the neutrality of the Aetolians during the Cleomenic War, there is no doubt that its outcome was highly unsatisfactory

⁹⁰ Polyb., II, 50, 5.

⁹¹ Polyb., II, 52, 8; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 758. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 280, suggests very sensibly that the alarm felt in Aetolia over the defection to Macedon of Boeotia, Opuntian Locris, and Phocis between 227 and 224 probably contributed to the determination not to interfere in a war of uncertain issue.

to them. Not only was Cleomenes thoroughly defeated at Sellasia and forced to flee to Egypt, but the position of their enemies was greatly strengthened. In the course of the war Antigonos Doson had formed, and assumed the leadership of, the Hellenic League, the membership of which comprised the Achaeans, Epirotes, Phocians, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians.⁹² To this list should be added the Euboeans and Spartans,

⁹² Polyb., II, 54, 4; IV, 9, 4; cf. Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 6. Since the Hellenic League played an important rôle in Greek history for some years, it is worth while to note when the various states entered into alliance with Macedon. Boeotia, which had for years been vacillating between Aetolia and Macedon, definitely became a Macedonian ally in 227, the year of Doson's Carian expedition (see above, pp. 142-143; cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280). Boeotia at this time included either the whole or part of Hypocnemidian (Opuntian) Locris. For our purposes we need not concern ourselves with the vexed question whether all Hypocnemidian Locris belonged to Boeotia or whether part of the country had the separate status of ally of Macedon (see Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 429-433; Klaffenbach, *Klio*, XX [1925], pp. 68-88; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 280, n. 3). The Epicnemidian and Ozolian Locrians at this time belonged to the Aetolian League (Klaffenbach, *ibid.*). Megara also belonged to the Boeotian League, having left the Achaean League, with its permission, when Cleomenes blockaded the Isthmus and thus isolated her (Polyb., XX, 6, 8; see Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 433-434). The date of the Phocian alliance with Macedon is much disputed (Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 376; 402-403; 529; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 248, n. 3; 286-287). For our purposes it is sufficient to know that the alliance was in effect certainly by 224, although Aetolia still controlled certain Phocian cities such as Drymaea, Tithronium, and, of course, Delphi (Polyb., IV, 25, 8). All Thessaly, save Achaea Phthiotis, was reconquered by Macedon in 228 (see above, p. 132). According to Polybius, IV, 76, 2, its status was that of a subject rather than of an ally. The Acarnanians, since the beginning of the expansion of the Aetolian League, had been in close relations with Macedon (Oberhummer, *op. cit.*, p. 176). Good relations still existed in 231, for it was then that Demetrius II sent the Illyrian Agron to aid Medeon against the Aetolians (Polyb., II, 2, 5). In 230, for self-protection, the Acarnanians formed an alliance with the Illyrians (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10), in this policy following the lead of Macedon. Epirus had become an ally of Macedon on the occasion of the marriage of Demetrius II to Phthia (P. Treves, *Rend. Linc.*, Ser. VI, VIII [1932], p. 183). With the overthrow of the Epirot monarchy between 235 and 231 (Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 747; Beloch, IV, 1, p. 635) the new republic allied itself with the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues (Polyb., II, 6, 1), but in 230, lacking confidence in the aid these two leagues could furnish, it abandoned that alliance and together with Acarnania

although it is impossible to say whether the former should be reckoned as allies or subjects of Macedon.⁹³ The Spartans were treated generously after their defeat, but were compelled to join the Hellenic League.⁹⁴ Since the chief rival of the Achaeans in the Peloponnese had been humbled, it looked as if Aratus might some day be able to achieve his aim of incorporating that whole region in the Achaean League. The only allies left to the Aetolians south of the Isthmus were the Messenians,⁹⁵ the Eleans,⁹⁶ and the Phigaleans,⁹⁷ and of these the Messenians had long been threatening to ally themselves with the Achaeans and Macedonians—that is, to join the Hellenic League.⁹⁸

Thus after Sellasia the Aetolians found themselves in an extremely unfavorable position, for they were completely surrounded by a hostile alliance.⁹⁹ In whatever direction they might hope to expand they were confronted by members of the Hellenic League. To the north were Thessaly, Macedon, and Epirus, to the east, Boeotia, Phocis, and Hypocnemidian Locris, to the west, Acarnania, while to the south, the Achaean League supported by Macedon was by far the strongest power in the Peloponnese. The Aetolians, contrary to the accusations of Polybius, had remained entirely neutral during the Cleomenic War, but they had not profited by that neutrality. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that their interference in the Peloponnese in 221 after the death of Doson was motivated by more than their love for plunder, as Polybius would have one believe. They could not run the risk of having the Peloponnese totally blocked to their enterprises. It must, moreover, have seemed a particularly opportune time for interference, because they knew that the Achaeans had neglected all military preparations since Sellasia,¹⁰⁰ and also they were convinced that nothing was to be feared from the

formed one with the Illyrians, thus once again coming into close relations with Macedon (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10). It was probably at this time that Ambracia and Amphilochia broke away from Epirus and joined the Aetolian League (Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 384-385; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 252).

⁹³ Niese, II, p. 336. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 759, and Beloch, IV, 1, p. 712, classify the Euboeans as allies.

⁹⁴ Polyb., II, 70, 1; see Beloch, IV, 1, p. 718.

⁹⁵ Polyb., IV, 3, 9; 6, 11.

⁹⁶ Polyb., IV, 5, 4.

⁹⁸ Polyb., IV, 5, 8.

⁹⁷ Polyb., IV, 3, 6.

⁹⁹ Cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb., IV, 7, 6-7; Plut., *Arat.*, 47, 1-2.

seventeen year old Philip V who had succeeded Doson as king of Macedon.¹⁰¹

Polybius, as we have seen in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper, lays all the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities on the Aetolian lust for plunder. When we take into account the evil plight of the Aetolians in 221, however, we are in a position to realize that other factors may have been influencing them. Polybius himself unconsciously admits that they had reason to be disturbed by developments in the Peloponnese when he says that Dorimachus was sent to Phigalea on a public mission (*κατὰ κοινόν*)—professedly to guard the city but in fact to spy on Peloponnesian affairs.¹⁰² The choice of Phigalea as a lookout was natural, for the city was either a member of the Aetolian League or at least an ally,¹⁰³ and it was an excellent base for operations in Messenia.¹⁰⁴ And Messenia was unquestionably the state in which Aetolia was primarily interested at the time.

Polybius¹⁰⁵ gives the following account of Dorimachus' actions. While he was at Phigalea a band of brigands gathered around him to whom he gave permission to plunder in Messenia, a friend and ally of Aetolia. The Messenians complained, and finally Dorimachus was forced to give them satisfaction. On his return to Aetolia, he persuaded his friend Scopas and other leading Aetolians that it would be profitable to make war on the Messenians. He maintained that it would be easy to find an excuse since the Messenians had long been wronging the Aetolians by threatening to join in an alliance with the Achaeans and Macedonians. In short, the reason for the Aetolian expedition which followed was the one which, according to Polybius, inevitably motivated the Aetolians, namely, passion for plunder, in this particular case coupled with indignation at a personal insult inflicted by the Messenians on Dorimachus.

To understand the real reasons for the Aetolian policy in Messenia we must investigate, in so far as the scanty sources permit, first the relations between the Messenians and the Aeto-

¹⁰¹ Polyb., IV, 3, 3; 5, 3.

¹⁰² Polyb., IV, 3, 5-7.

¹⁰³ Polyb., IV, 3, 6, implies the former, IV, 79, 5, the latter.

¹⁰⁴ This is clear from Polyb., IV, 31, 1; cf. M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les Monarchies Hellénistiques au IIIe Siècle avant J.-C.* (Paris, 1921), pp. 196-197; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI (1936), pp. 66-68.

¹⁰⁵ IV, 3, 5-5, 10.

lians, and then the relations between the Messenians and the Achaeans. In the year 244 or shortly thereafter the Aetolians entered into close ties with Phigalea and Messenia.¹⁰⁶ The alliance between the Aetolians and Messenians was natural since at the time the former were engaged in an anti-Spartan policy¹⁰⁷ and, as is well known, the latter were almost invariably hostile to Sparta. In the ensuing years, however, the Aetolian attitude changed. Worried over the thriving condition of the Achaean League, they were glad to see Cleomenes appear as its rival. The Aetolians remained neutral, as we have seen, during the Cleomenic War, but obviously they were much disappointed by its outcome. Not long after the death of Antigonus Doson, the Spartans and Aetolians began to negotiate concerning an alliance.¹⁰⁸ If we ask ourselves whether the Messenians would have reacted to developments in the Peloponnese in the same way as the Aetolians, the answer must be in the negative. The rise of Cleomenes to power must have alarmed them greatly. He was clearly trying to restore Sparta to her pristine hegemony in the Peloponnese, and the Messenians must have realized that his ambitions were a menace to their independence. Thus it is not surprising that the relations between Aetolia and Messenia were far less good in 221 than they had been in 244. It is true that Polybius¹⁰⁹ says that the Aetolo-Messenian alliance was still in effect in 221, but he frequently speaks of alliances as still existing when in truth they had really ceased, although they may not have been formally annulled.¹¹⁰ Now if the Messenians were

¹⁰⁶ Ditt., *Syll.*³, 472. For their long-standing alliance with the Messenians, see Polyb., IV, 6, 11; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 733; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 620-621; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI (1936), pp. 64-71.

¹⁰⁷ King Agis of Sparta had marched out in 241 to help Aratus against the Aetolians (Plut., *Agis*, 13-15; *Arat.*, 31). After the execution of Agis in 241, many of his supporters fled to Aetolia. In the following year the Aetolians, using the desire to restore the exiles as an excuse, invaded Laconia and did great damage (Polyb., IV, 34, 9; IX, 34, 9; cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6; 18, 3). For these events see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 734, 743-744; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 626-629; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-243.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb., IV, 16, 5; 22-24; 34-36.

¹⁰⁹ IV, 3, 9; 6, 11; 15, 10.

¹¹⁰ E. g. in IV, 15, 10, Polybius speaks of the Aetolo-Achaean alliance as still being in existence. Such a statement is absurd when one re-

drifting away from the Aetolians, it is highly probable that they were drawing closer to the Achaeans. To this subject we must now turn.

The first evidence which can be gleaned from the sources for good relations between the Messenians and the Achaean League is that after Cleomenes captured Megalopolis in the winter of 223/222, the Megalopolitans sought refuge in Messene.¹¹¹ This fact, when it is considered in conjunction with Messenia's fear of Cleomenes, leads me to wonder why scholars have either rejected¹¹² or neglected Pausanias' statement (IV, 29, 9) that the Messenians fought on the Achaean side at Sellasia. It is true that there are two objections to crediting Pausanias. The first is that Polybius in his rather detailed account of the battle (II, 65-69) does not list them as participants, but it should be noticed that he does not mention the Phocians and Thessalians who, as members of the Hellenic League, presumably were present. The fact that the Messenians did not belong to the Hellenic League at this time might help to explain Polybius' failure to speak of them. The second objection is that, when the Messenians applied for admission to the Hellenic League,¹¹³ it seems strange, if they had aided the allies at Sellasia, that no mention was made of this fact. On the other hand the readiness of the allies to receive the Messenians into the League,¹¹⁴ despite the probability of such action leading to war with the Aetolians,¹¹⁵ might be argued as showing that the allies felt an obligation toward Messenia.

Notwithstanding such objections as these, there are strong reasons to believe that the Messenians aided the Achaeans at Sellasia. This assumption harmonizes well with their reception of the Megalopolitan fugitives and with their fear of Cleomenes. It also gives a motive (more plausible than that Philip II had done likewise over a hundred years before) for the presentation to Messenia of Denthaliatis¹¹⁶ which Doson took away from

members that the Aetolians had just badly defeated the Achaeans at Caphyae. See my paper, *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 32-34.

¹¹¹ Polyb., II, 61, 4; 62, 10. Plut., *Cleom.*, 24, 1; *Philopoemen*, 5; Pausanias, IV, 29, 7-8.

¹¹² Niese, II, p. 412, n. 1.

¹¹⁴ Polyb., IV, 16, 1.

¹¹³ Polyb., IV, 9, 2; 15, 2.

¹¹⁵ See below, pp. 162-163.

¹¹⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 43; cf. Beloch, IV, 1, p. 718.

Sparta after the battle. The presence of the Messenians at Sellasia and their acquisition of Denthaliatis also help to explain the hostility of the Spartans towards them.¹¹⁷

In any case, whether we accept Pausanias' statement or not, it is clear that long before Dorimachus began to interfere in Messenia, the Messenians were turning towards the Achaeans. When Dorimachus was giving reasons to justify an Aetolian attack on the Messenians, he said that they had for long been wronging the Aetolians by offering to join the Achaeans and Macedonians.¹¹⁸ Polybius as usual refuses to admit that the Aetolians had any grievance. He maintains that the Aetolo-Achaean alliance was in effect even after the battle of Caphyae¹¹⁹ and hence the Aetolians should have had no objection to their allies, the Messenians, becoming allies also of the Achaeans. Such a statement is absurd.¹²⁰ That alliance, formed early in the reign of Demetrius II,¹²¹ had definitely come to an end in the Cleomenic War. This is proved by the Aetolian refusal to aid the Achaeans¹²² and to permit Doson to go south by way of Thermopylae.¹²³

There is only one possible explanation of the Messenian situation. In the course of the Cleomenic War and the period immediately thereafter the Messenians and Aetolians were gradually drifting apart. This was natural since the former, as usual, adhered to their anti-Spartan policy while the latter, as a result of the flourishing condition of the Achaean League, were leaning more and more towards Sparta. Polybius¹²⁴ says that in 221 and 220 the Aetolo-Messenian alliance was still in effect. So it may have been *de iure*, but *de facto* it was almost defunct. This misunderstanding between the Aetolians and Messenians gave Aratus' a golden opportunity, and he was not the man to fail to capitalize on such a chance. When Polybius (IV, 5, 8) says that the Messenians had for long been promising to join in alliance with the Achaeans and Macedonians, it is impossible not

¹¹⁷ Polyb., IV, 5, 4. It might be remarked that Polybius, IV, 5, 5, does not imply that the Messenians did not fight at Sellasia. The passage merely states that Messenia was not ravaged in the course of the Cleomenic War.

¹¹⁸ Polyb., IV, 5, 8.

¹¹⁹ IV, 15, 9-10.

¹²⁰ See above, p. 154 and n. 110.

¹²¹ See above, p. 133 and n. 14.

¹²² Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2.

¹²³ Polyb., II, 52, 8.

¹²⁴ IV, 3, 9; 6, 11; 15, 10.

to recognize the work of Aratus. This was not the first time that he had weaned an ally from an enemy.¹²⁵ Thus the reason for the dispatch of Dorimachus to Phigalea is manifest. He was supposed to undermine the pro-Achaean party in Messenia and to try to restore that country to the Aetolian fold. Aetolia, hemmed in as she was by the Hellenic League, could not afford to allow an old ally—even if at present disaffected—to join her enemies. To the Aetolians, the Achaean interference in Messenia was an out and out hostile act, and it was unquestionably this interference which was one of the prime causes of the Social War.¹²⁶

There is no need to repeat Polybius' tirade against Dorimachus.¹²⁷ It is clear that Dorimachus was able to achieve nothing constructive in Messenia, for the pro-Achaean party there, trusting in Achaean support,¹²⁸ was too strong for him. But his mission had not been wholly in vain. He had acquired first-hand information about the Achaean intrigues and, when he returned to Aetolia, he made a full report to Scopas who, according to Polybius, was more influential than the *strategos* Ariston. Polybius¹²⁹ claims that Dorimachus was so infuriated at the Messenians that by various arguments he won over Scopas and his friends to his way of thinking, and that this group of men alone was responsible for making war on the Messenians, Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians. Scholars in general have tended to agree with Polybius.¹³⁰ It should be remembered, however, that Polybius is never willing to admit that the Aetolians had a legitimate motive for their actions. We have seen above that he concealed the evidence for Achaean interference in Messenia. On this particular occasion it suited his purpose better to lay all the blame for ensuing events on a small group of men, for, if he had blamed the Aetolian League as a

¹²⁵ Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 ff., maintains that Megalopolis was responsible for interfering in Messenia. Despite his elaborate arguments, it seems to me more logical to see here the activity of the leading man in the Achaean League.

¹²⁶ Niese, II, p. 411, n. 1, has shown that the Messenian towns, Pylos and (probably) Cyparissia, belonged at this time to the Achaean League.

¹²⁷ IV, 3, 5-4, 9.

¹²⁸ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹²⁹ IV, 5.

¹³⁰ E. g. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 763-764; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 719-721; Niese, II, pp. 409, 423.

whole, it would have been harder to hide the fact that the Aetolians had a reasonable grievance against the Achaeans. Without doubt Dorimachus and Scopas were the leading spirits in the aggressive policy which was adopted, and certainly there was an anti-war party in Aetolia,¹³¹ but the election of Scopas¹³² as *strategos* for 220/219 shows very clearly that the Aetolian people approved the course of action he and his friends had been advocating. It seems safe to state, therefore, that by 221 the Aetolians realized that it was imperative for them to take the offensive at last. Their neutrality during the Cleomenic War had been disastrous to them, for in the course of this war the Hellenic League had been formed with the result that the Aetolians were completely surrounded by enemies who were all in alliance. Now one of these enemies—the Achaeans—was trying to entice Messenia from them. It was high time for the Aetolians to act, for soon it would be too late.

As war was not actually declared between the Hellenic League and the Aetolians until the summer of 220, for the sake of completeness the intervening events will have to be traced briefly. Since my aim is not to discuss all the causes of the Social War but merely to emphasize that the political affiliations of Messenia were a fundamental contributory factor to the outbreak of hostilities, we need linger only over those episodes in which that country was involved. Polybius¹³³ says that Scopas and his friends, persuaded by the arguments of Dorimachus, immediately made war on the Messenians, Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians. They seized a royal Macedonian ship near Cythera and sold both ship and crew. They pillaged the coast of

¹³¹ Polyb., IV, 36, 2.

¹³² Polyb., IV, 27, 1. There are various other passages in Polybius, of which I need mention only two, which prove that the Aetolian League as a whole approved of the policy of Dorimachus and Scopas. (1) When Dorimachus was inciting Scopas to an aggressive policy against Messenia, he spoke of how popular such a policy would be with the *πληθος τῶν Αιτωλῶν* (IV, 5, 6). (2) After the battle of Caphyae the Aetolian assembly (an extraordinary meeting; see M. Holleaux, *B. C. H.*, XXIX [1905], p. 363, n. 2) voted to maintain peace with the Achaeans only on condition that they abandoned their alliance with the Messenians (IV, 15, 8-9). This resolution shows very clearly that the Aetolians had no intention of resigning Messenia; in other words they gave a vote of approval to Scopas and Dorimachus.

¹³³ IV, 5, 10-6, 2.

Epirus and tried to seize Thyrium in Acarnania. Unfortunately Polybius merely enumerates these events and consequently it is difficult to explain their significance. The Aetolians, we know, felt they had nothing to fear from Philip, the seventeen year old king of Macedon,¹³⁴ and they probably were convinced that without the support of Macedon the efficacy of the Hellenic League was a thing of the past. Their enterprises may well have been intended to put the Symmachy to the test.

In the Peloponnese events moved rapidly. The Aetolians seized a fort called Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, but before long were ousted by Timoxenus, the Achaean *strategos*, and by Taurion, the Macedonian general left behind by Doson to supervise affairs in the Peloponnese. Then shortly before Aratus became *strategos* in May 220 the Aetolians once again invaded the Peloponnese. They raided the territory of Patrae and Pharae and proceeded to Phigalea whence they made an incursion into Messenia.¹³⁵

At the spring meeting of the Achaean *synodos* the members from Patrae and Pharae registered their complaints against the Aetolians, and an embassy from Messenia arrived begging for help. The Achaeans voted that aid should be sent to the Messenians and that the *strategos* should assemble the troops of the League. This levy was to decide what course of action should be followed.¹³⁶ The decision of the council shows clearly that the Achaeans had no intention of leaving Messenia to the Aetolians. Polybius does not say specifically that an Achaeo-Messenian alliance was proposed at this time, but the vote to send assistance can hardly be interpreted otherwise. The council could only propose an alliance; it was the function of the *synkletos*—in this case the levy acting in that capacity—to ratify the proposal.¹³⁷

It was Aratus who undertook the task of mustering the Achaean troops. He was especially exasperated at the Aetolians and entered upon the office of *strategos* five days before the proper date.¹³⁸ In obedience to his orders the Achaean forces assembled at Megalopolis. Once again the Messenians appeared and this time they asked to be admitted to the Hellenic League. This request could not be granted by the Achaean assembly, for natu-

¹³⁴ IV, 3, 3; 5, 3.

¹³⁵ Polyb., IV, 6, 3-12.

¹³⁶ Polyb., IV, 7.

¹³⁷ Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129; Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 233-234.

¹³⁸ Polyb., IV, 7, 8-11.

rally the admission of new members was the business of the Symmachy as a whole.¹³⁹ It seems that it was the Achaean council rather than the assembly which was competent to propose the admission of new members. In any case it was the former which, at its next meeting, passed the resolution to send envoys to the various allies about this matter.¹⁴⁰ The Achaean levy, however, did ratify the Achaeo-Messenian alliance which had been proposed shortly before by the council.¹⁴¹ Since it was realized that there was a pro-Aetolian party in Messenia, the Messenian envoys were ordered to leave their own sons as hostages in Sparta. The purpose of this stipulation obviously was to prevent the Messenians from coming to terms with the Aetolians and to bolster the wavering loyalty of the Spartans to the Hellenic League.¹⁴²

After the Achaean levy had passed these resolutions Aratus sent a message to the Aetolians ordering them to evacuate Messenia and not to set foot on Achaean territory. The Aetolians, alarmed by the mustering of the Achaean troops, decided to obey.

¹³⁹ Polyb., IV, 9, 1-4.

¹⁴⁰ Polyb., IV, 14, 1; 15, 1-2; cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁴¹ The following evidence certainly implies that the alliance was ratified: after this meeting Aratus ordered the Aetolians to evacuate Messenia (Polyb., IV, 9, 7). Polybius (IV, 15) informs us that the Achaean council at its next meeting charged the *strategos* to aid Messenia in case of another Aetolian invasion, that the Achaeans did not abandon the Messenians, that the *strategos* informed the Messenians how many troops they should contribute, and that the Aetolians voted to maintain peace with the Achaeans provided they gave up the Messenian alliance. This evidence, it seems to me, completely disproves Ferrabino's contention (*op. cit.*, pp. 129-130) that Aratus rejected the Achaeo-Messenian alliance because he preferred to have Messenia become a member of the Hellenic League. It is quite true that by this step Aratus hoped to involve the whole Symmachy in the war against Aetolia, but the admission of Messenia to the Hellenic League did not preclude a special alliance between the Messenians and the Achaeans. Ferrabino himself (p. 129) admits that every member of the Symmachy could form separate alliances.

¹⁴² Polyb., IV, 9, 5; cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 116. Since Polybius makes no further mention of these hostages, Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, p. 131) may be correct in saying they were not given, but he is wrong in maintaining that the Achaeans did not support the Messenians (see above, n. 141). I cannot agree with his arguments (pp. 128, 149) that Aratus in this matter of the hostages was offering Sparta a "political mortgage" on Messenia. In his desire to placate Sparta Aratus certainly was not going to throw Messenia into the arms of the Aetolians.

The Aetolian *strategos* Ariston, who was at Cyllene in Elis, was requested to send the transports to Pheias, an island off the coast of Elis. After two days the Aetolians, heavily laden with booty, departed from Messenia. Aratus waited two days and then, thinking the Aetolians were going to sail from Pheias, dismissed all save 3000 foot and 300 horse of the Achaeans. With these forces and with Taurion's soldiers he marched toward Patrae with the idea of keeping watch on the Aetolians.¹⁴³ Polybius' narrative for the next few chapters (10-13) is confusing.¹⁴⁴ Fortunately for our purposes it is unnecessary to investigate the motives which were actuating the Achaeans and Aetolians at this time. The following events alone need concern us. The main body of the Aetolians, for reasons which are not clear, after having dispatched the booty marched into Arcadia. At Caphyae they inflicted a bad defeat on the Achaeans commanded by Aratus. Then they proceeded through the Peloponnese and, after making an attempt on Pellene and plundering the territory of Sicyon, they departed by the Isthmus.

Shortly after these events a meeting of the Achaean council was held.¹⁴⁵ The disaster at Caphyae had convinced the Achaeans that they alone could not oppose the Aetolians.¹⁴⁶ Therefore it was resolved to send envoys to the various members of the Hellenic League asking for help and also for admission of the Messenians to the Symmachy. The *strategos* was instructed to levy 5000 Achaean foot and 500 horse with which to assist the

¹⁴³ Polyb., IV, 9, 7-10, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Polybius (IV, 10, 3-10), in brief, says that Dorimachus, fearing lest the Achaeans should attack him while embarking, sent off the booty and then marched into Arcadia. Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, pp. 132 ff.) has pointed out the contradictions in Polybius' account of events from the Aetolian departure from Messenia through the battle of Caphyae. He maintains that Aratus attacked the Aetolians while embarking and that consequently the only path of escape left to them was through Arcadia. This theory is hard to accept, for it seems most unlikely that Aratus with a small army would have marched through Elis, an ally of Aetolia. Walbank (*Aratos*, p. 117) follows Polybius when he writes: "But meanwhile distrust of the Achaeans, and a desire to provoke their depleted army, caused Dorimachus to change his plans." There is an obvious *non sequitur* here. If the Aetolians "distrusted" the Achaeans, one would have expected them to sail off with their booty rather than to invade Arcadia.

¹⁴⁵ Polyb., IV, 14, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

Messenians in case of another Aetolian invasion. These resolutions were carried out. The envoys were sent and Aratus enrolled the stipulated number of Achaeans. In conformity with the decree of the council he also ordered the Messenians and Spartans to contribute each 2500 foot and 250 horse.¹⁴⁷

Shortly after the meeting of the Achaean council, the Aetolian assembly convened.¹⁴⁸ The Aetolians voted to remain at peace with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians and with all the other states. With the Achaean League also they voted to maintain peace provided the Achaeans abandoned their alliance with Messenia. These resolutions show that the Aetolians at the time were trying to avoid becoming involved in a struggle with the Symmarchy as a whole, but that they were as determined as ever that the Achaeans should keep out of Messenia. Polybius waxes very indignant over the Aetolian decree. He claims that the Aetolians were allies of both the Achaeans and Messenians and consequently that it was highly unreasonable for them to object to the Achaean-Messenian alliance.¹⁴⁹ As usual he is attempting to paint the Aetolians in as dark colors as possible. We have seen above ¹⁵⁰ that the Aetolo-Achaean alliance was dead. The true situation was that the Achaeans, now enemies of the Aetolians, had won the Messenians over from the Aetolians. Naturally the Aetolians considered this an hostile act and a legitimate *casus belli*. Their one aim now was to destroy the alliance between the Achaeans and Messenians. By voting to maintain peace with the rest of the Symmarchy they were hoping to bring it to pass that the Hellenic League would abstain from the struggle in the Peloponnese.¹⁵¹

Their hopes seemed to be partly justified by the replies of the

¹⁴⁷ Polyb., IV, 15. Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, p. 139) claims that the resolution to assist the Messenians was in anticipation of their admission to the Hellenic League. It is more logical to explain this resolution and the levying of Messenian troops on the basis of the Achaean-Messenian alliance (see above, p. 160 and n. 141). Ferrabino (*ibid.*) and Walbank (*Aratos*, p. 120) are certainly correct in saying that the smallness of the Achaean levy shows that the Achaeans were counting on support from the Symmarchy.

¹⁴⁸ Polyb., IV, 15, 8. This was an extraordinary meeting; see n. 132.

¹⁴⁹ Polyb., IV, 15, 8-11.

¹⁵⁰ See above, p. 156 and n. 110.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

various members of the Symmachy to the Achaean envoys.¹⁵² The allies agreed to receive Messenia into the Hellenic League, but they voted to remain at peace with Aetolia. This has been called a weak move,¹⁵³ but it was not as weak as it seems at first glance. The Aetolians had voted to make war on the Achaeans unless they abandoned the Messenian alliance, but now the Messenians, in addition to being allies of the Achaeans, had also become members of the Hellenic League. Thus the demands of the Aetolians had not been met, and, if they carried out their threat to attack the Achaeans, the Hellenic League was bound to go to the assistance of one of its members. After the next Aetolian invasion Philip wasted no time in marching to the Peloponnese in answer to Aratus' appeal.¹⁵⁴ Since the Aetolians had returned home after the Caphyae incident, possibly Philip hoped they would remain quiet for a while; in any case he did not wish to appear as the aggressor in a general Hellenic War.¹⁵⁵

The Aetolians, although not desiring hostilities with the Hellenic League as a whole, had no intention of abandoning their enterprises in the Peloponnese. Their *strategos* Ariston remained at home and stated that he was keeping peace with the Achaeans—a rather ineffectual conciliatory gesture towards the Hellenic League.¹⁵⁶ Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, however, set forth with a large force.¹⁵⁷ They proceeded through Achaea and seized the Arcadian town Cynaetha.¹⁵⁸ Ferrabino¹⁵⁹ has given a probable explanation of the motives behind this Aetolian undertaking. Cynaetha had been for long the victim of

¹⁵² Polyb., IV, 16, 1-3. Polybius speaks only of the Epirotes and Philip, but undoubtedly the other allies followed the lead of Macedon.

¹⁵³ Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 120.

¹⁵⁴ Polyb., IV, 19, 1; 22, 1-7.

¹⁵⁵ See the pertinent remarks of M. Nicolaus, *Zwei Beiträge zur Geschichte König Philipps V von Makedonien*, Inaug. Diss. (Berlin, Ebering, 1909), pp. 19-20.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹⁵⁷ Polyb., IV, 16, 11-17, 2. Shortly before this Aetolian invasion Demetrius of Pharos and Scerdilaïdas had sailed from Illyria and made an attack on Pylos. The Aetolians had co-operated with them in this undertaking (Polyb., IV, 25, 4; IX, 38, 8). After failing in their attempt, Demetrius had sailed to the Cyclades, but Scerdilaïdas had agreed to join the Aetolians in invading Achaea (Polyb., IV, 16, 6-11). For the activity of the two Illyrians in these years, see my paper, *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 24-39.

¹⁵⁸ Polyb., IV, 17-18.

¹⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 142-144.

social revolution. At the time under consideration the anti-revolutionary Achaean party was in control. The Aetolians had entered into negotiations with the revolutionists and with their collaboration they gained control of the town. Thus the Aetolians were attempting to weaken the Achaean League by supporting the movement for Social Reform in the Peloponnese. This policy of the Aetolians naturally brought them into close relations with Sparta where the faction of Cleomenes was still strong; in fact, shortly before this time a secret alliance had been made between the two states.¹⁶⁰

From Cynaetha the Aetolians marched to Cleitor. Failing to persuade this town to abandon the Achaeans and form an alliance with them, they attacked it, but without success. Then they returned to Cynaetha which they offered to their ally Elis. When the Eleans refused the gift, the Aetolians kept the town for themselves. On hearing of the approach of the Macedonians, however, they burned it and then advanced to Rhium whence they returned home.¹⁶¹

It was in the course of this Aetolian invasion that Aratus appealed to Philip for help.¹⁶² The limits of this paper have now been reached. With the assembling of the delegates from the various members of the Symmachy at Corinth, the issues which we have been discussing assume a Panhellenic complexion. Suffice it to say that, after numerous accusations had been brought against the Aetolians, war was unanimously declared.¹⁶³ My purpose throughout has been to illustrate Polybius' violent prejudice against the Aetolians and partiality for Aratus and the Achaean League. This bias has greatly impaired the accuracy of his account of the years under consideration. In his treatment of the Cleomenic War, the entirely unwarranted impression is created that the Aetolians were a serious menace to the Achaeans, and thus Aratus' appeal to Antigonus Doson is made to appear both inevitable and right. The only cause for the Social War which Polybius gives is the ungovernable passion of the Aetolians for booty. The Achaean intrigues in Messenia are not even mentioned. Admittedly, other factors ultimately contributed to the declaration of war by the Hellenic League against the Aetolians, but there seems to be little room for doubt that one

¹⁶⁰ Polyb., IV, 16, 5.

¹⁶¹ Polyb., IV, 19.

¹⁶² Polyb., IV, 19, 1.

¹⁶³ Polyb., IV, 25.

of the important causes of the Social War—and in many ways the most fundamental one—was the natural resentment of the Aetolians at the way in which Aratus had induced the Messenians to abandon them for an alliance with the Achaeans.¹⁶⁴

JOHN V. A. FINE.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

¹⁶⁴ The latest work on the Achaean assemblies, which I did not see until after this paper was written, is by André Aymard, *Les Assemblées de la Confédération Achaïenne* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1938). I am not completely convinced by his arguments that the *synodos* as well as the *synkletos* was only a primary assembly. See the pertinent remarks of M. Cary, *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), pp. 154-155. It has seemed wise to let my references to the Achaean council stand rather than to lengthen my paper unduly by entering into a controversy which, after all, is largely irrelevant to the matters under discussion.

F. W. Walbank, who has read this article in manuscript, has written me that in his forthcoming biography of Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge University Press) he has attempted to show that Doson could have been ready to sail for Caria by May 227. If his arguments are sound—and from his letter I gather they are—, May is certainly preferable to July as a date for the departure of this expedition. Nevertheless, I still believe that July is a possible date since we have no evidence that Doson was planning an extensive campaign.

THE FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

(Continued from p. 53.)

5. The contrast between Aristotelian logic and Platonic dialectic

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a) Apart from the faithful observation and analysis of phenomena it is the "logos," the terms of human language, in which Aristotle seeks the very source of truth. Thus he is the father of "logic," the originator of "philology" and of the historical research of the following generations³⁰ but at the same time of all the barren scholasticism of words. The definitions on which Aristotle bases the ideas are nothing but nominal definitions as they naturally result from the analysis of the human language. Thus the logic by which Aristotle replaces Platonic dialectic is of necessity a mere logic of concepts, i. e. of nouns, of their classification into genera and species and of the subsumption of the individual under them. As a natural system this logic has a certain justification in organic nature, yet it is restricted to the realm of thinking which alone remains if the peculiarity of mathematical thinking as immediate truth is denied and reduced to the mere abstraction of concepts. Plato, in proving the hypothetical character of all science which consciously or unconsciously bases all its knowledge upon ultimate axioms, refers to mathematical thinking as a model. Aristotle, on the other hand, sees only the circumscribed result of scientific thinking, as if one could understand and define its objects in isolation and could deduce one proposition from another.³¹ In every scientific, especially in every mathematical definition, however, an unknown is not simply reduced by analysis to a known but different unknown concepts are determined at once in their mutual relation. Yet, if one were to try according to such an "analytical" logic to take the single concepts of a mathematical definition³²

³⁰ Cf. A. Boeckh, *Enzyklopaedie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (1877), p. 12.

³¹ Cf. e. g. Aristotle, *Anal. Prior.* 46 b 29; *Anal. Post.* 74 a 25; *Metaphysics* 1025 a 32; 1086 b 35.

³² As an example of a mathematical definition compare that of the irrational which is put by Plato in the *Theaetetus* (148 A, cf. 148 D) as a model of a truly scientific definition. Concerning the importance of the verbal context for the *logos* cf. also *Sophist* 263 A.

out of their verbal context and to define each of them separately as an individual noun through genus, species, and differentiae, one would kill the very nerve of mathematical thought.

It was an insight, fundamental for the understanding of mathematics, that its definitions deal with relations and that, consequently, the nominal logic of attributes and classes is not sufficient for comprehending the peculiarity of mathematical propositions. It is in just this particular sense that Plato recognized the relation as the basic concept of mathematics: a substantial concept (as for instance "finger") is undialectical and no problem for thought.³³ But what appears to the senses at the same time with its exact contrary, as does the great and small, the basic concept of mathematics, that is dialectical and evokes the soul thereby from sensual perception to pure thought. It is, then, through the idea of the "one" and of the "equal" (i. e. through the *πέρας* of the *agathon*) that from the mere relativity of the great and small and its *ἄπειρον* there comes to be measure and thereby definite number (*Philebus* 23 C-26 B, especially 25 A; D).

Platonic dialectic, thus discovering that hypotheses and relativity are the basic principles of mathematics and of science in general, is in itself a merely hypothetical treatment of the philosophical *ἀρχαί*. Whereas the Pythagoreans held the "odd" and "even" (or the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*) to be the ultimate principles of being which the Eleatics again found in the "identical," "immovable one," Plato demonstrates that all the *ἀρχαί* are mere hypotheses and traces them back to the idea of the *agathon* as the only *ἀννóθετον*. The single *εἶδη*, thus revealed to dialectic in their relation to each other and to the *agathon*, begin to shift and to become only grades of the dialectical process which leads to the *agathon*.³⁴

In place of this hypothetical dialectic Aristotle sets up his

³³ *Republic* 523 B-524 D; a "finger," in its phenomenal appearance is always in the same way "finger," a "man," "man" (cf. also *Parmenides* 130 B-C, *Phaedrus* 263 A, *Republic* 603 D). Concerning the Platonic concept of relativity cf. *Republic* 438 B, 479 B; *Charmides* 168 E; *Phaedo* 102 B; cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1088 a 21 ff.

³⁴ *Republic* 511 B; cf. *Philebus* 16 ff.; *Sophist* 251-264; *Parmenides* 137-166, etc. Concerning the interpretation of *Republic* 509 ff. cf. v. Fritz, *Philologus*, LXXXVII (1932), pp. 149 ff. and Dehn, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, IV, 1 (1937), p. 4.

metaphysics as the doctrine of the ἀρχαί. Since he denies the idea of the *agathon* (*Eth. Nic.* I, 4), which for Plato is the very link by which all the εἶδη and all the individual things are united into "one" (*Phaedo* 99 C), he acknowledges only a multiplicity of ultimate principles which, through the inductive analysis of being, appear to him as ultimate ἀρχαί (*Eth. Nic.* 1098 b 3; *Metaphysics* I, 3; IV, 2; *Physics* II, 3, 7; *Anal. Post.* 76 a 31). Only in so far as all these have an "analogous" relation to the one nature of being, do they belong to a unified science, metaphysics (*Metaphysics* 1003 a 33-b 14; 1066 b 10; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 27; cf. pp. 41, 52, *supra*). For him every branch of science, then, has its own ἀρχαί from which it must deduce apodeictically everything else according to the rules of his logic, and it is very characteristic that instead of the Platonic idea of the *agathon* to him the ἀρχὴ ἀννρόητος is the formally logical law of contradiction.

According to this general conception of science as a system to be constructed on definitions and deduced from them Aristotle's logic of science and mathematics is basically a logic of subsumption and classification, i. e. of the formal ordering of scientific propositions which, in reality, can be attained only through an entirely different and truly productive process of thinking.

b) Since in the dialogues of Plato's later period, especially in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, a certain preference for terminological divisions (διαίρεσις) is to be found, scholars have thought to see here a development from the dissimilar dialectic of the early Socratic dialogues to that kind of classificatory logic which is so important for Aristotle.³⁵ To be sure, besides "epagoge," "diaeresis" is the most essential part of Plato's dialectic, but this diaeresis is more than a method of classification and different from it, its principal aim being the distinction between idea and phenomena.³⁶ Here, then, it is not a matter of dividing certain genera into coördinate species of equal value but, on the contrary, of distinguishing wholly different grades of existence which

³⁵ Cf. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, pp. 54 ff.


³⁶ This distinction is described by Socrates in the *Parmenides* as the real task of Platonic dialectic (διαίρεισθαι) χωρὶς αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, . . . χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων . . . μετέχοντα 129 D, 130 B; cf. 133 D; cf. also *Republic* 476 A ff.; *Gorgias* 467 E; *Sophist* 253 D, 259 D, etc.

are related to one another as idea to reality, as the ever constant state of idea (στάσις) to the changeable state of the perceptible things (κίνησις).

The things within our human world are entirely separated from the divine world of ideas: it is the name alone that they have in common; they are "homonymous," as Plato himself says (*Parmenides* 133 D; *Phaedrus* 266 A; *Philebus* 57 B-D; cf. p. 35 *supra*). This difference between idea and phenomenon is compared in the *Phaedrus*³⁷ to the bilateral construction of the body: although we call our left hand a hand just as we do our right hand, yet the left hand is only "homonymous," in every respect a counter-image and inferior to the right one; and every part into which each of them can be subdivided has the same essential character as the whole. In the same way is the sphere of the human world a homonymic counter-image of the divine idea, and each of these two realms is subdivided again according to the same proportion as regards their truth and non-truth, but in another dimension as it were.³⁸

³⁷ 265 E ff. This passage, as Stenzel also points out (*op. cit.*, p. 62), represents the same diaeresis as the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*.

³⁸ I. e. κατὰ μῆκος not κατὰ πλάτος (*Sophist* 266 A). What is meant by this expression follows from Aristotle (*De Caelo* 299 b 23; cf. Simplicius, *ad loc.*, p. 574, 25 ff.) and can best be explained by a diagram:



This diagram shows at first sight how every part of the divine sphere is reflected by one of the human. The highest concept of existence is the concept of "technē." The demiurgic technē is divided into the "divine" (AC) and into the "human" (A'C') in the dimension of

This dichotomy, therefore, as Plato himself expressly states (*Politicus* 262 C ff.), is not a merely logical one, so that the parts of the division are opposed to one another only according to logical contradiction, as A and non-A, but it is an objective contradiction, such as between "odd" and "even," or "right" and "left."³⁹ It is the contrast between true existence, idea, and the non-existence of mere appearance. All the subdivisions reflect over and over again this original difference which is implied in the idea itself (cf. p. 46 *supra*). The individual ideas are to the original idea of the one *agathon* "in regard to their truth and non-truth" as the objects of this visible world are to their origin, the sun (*Republic* 509 ff.).

It is evident that this "hypothetical diaeresis" (Aristotle, *Anal. Prior.* 46 b 29; *Anal. Post.* 91 b 17) of the Platonic dialectic is aiming at something entirely different from Aristotle's classificatory logic. Aristotle from the point of view of his syllogistic opposes it as insufficiently conclusive just because of its hypothetical character. It is, therefore, not true at all that in these dialogues Plato developed his dialectic in the direction of the Aristotelian logic.

Of a different meaning though are those merely facetious divisions in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, the wittiness of which is based on the very fact that they overlook every difference of rank and thus bring together the most heterogeneous things. Or will one really believe that Plato is serious in defining the sophist as a fisherman who fishes for pupils or as a merchant who trades in knowledge or in subordinating under the species of hornless, tame bipeds who live in flocks the men with whom the statesman has to deal? It is expressly stated here (*Politicus* 266 C) that it is most ridiculous to ascribe men to the noblest and to the lowest species and that this method here is no more concerned about the sublime than about its opposite (cf. also *Sophist* 227

breadth. Each one of them is again subdivided according to whether it produces real things or only their images in a different dimension, that of "length," just as in the *Republic* (509 ff., 534 A) a line is divided by mathematical diaeresis according to a certain proportion "in regard to its truth and non-truth": $AD:DC = A'D':D'C'$. Every part of the human sphere is thus a counterpart of one of the divine sphere.

³⁹ Cf. the Pythagorean system of contradictions (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 986 a 22 and Ross, *ad loc.*).

B). Nature, above all organic nature, however, is the very realm where this classificatory division of species is scientifically justified. In the morphology of plants and animals it has its place up to the present day, and it was already practiced by ancient physicians.⁴⁰ Within this domain Plato, too, doubtless acknowledged the value of this method which was cultivated so much by his pupils.⁴¹

It is certainly true that in his later period after the *Theaetetus* Plato included the sphere of empirical reality, of nature, in his considerations to a much greater extent than before.⁴² But that does not prove, as has been claimed, a complete change of his philosophical point of view. Even at the end of the *Sophist*, the dialogue in which this method plays such an important part, Plato reveals through the concept of the divine demiurge beyond this region of existence the realm of the idea itself, of the *agathon*, after which it is fashioned. We see, then, that even here in his latest period the whole sphere of nature, the empirical world, for him remains absolutely separated from the real existence of the transcendent ideas.⁴³ It is true, as Aristotle from his point of view of continuity objects to the Platonists⁴⁴ that here being falls into different episodes "like a bad tragedy"; but it is this conception of being which forms the very essence of Plato's philosophy. He is the first and only philosopher of the classical Greek period to see the absolute good, God, beyond this world which he considers, therefore, to be merely created (*Timaeus* and *Sophist* 265 C ff.). Thereby he transgresses, in fact, the boundary of the peculiarly Greek notion

⁴⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus* 270 B; Mnesitheus, frags. 3 and 4 *apud* Galen, XI, 3, K.; Dietz, *Scholia ad Hippocratem et Galenum*, I, p. 238. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* (1938), pp. 9 and 87, note.

⁴¹ Cf. Speusippus, frags. 5 ff. Lang; Epicrates, *F. C. A.*, II, 287 K., and above all Aristotle in his *Historia Animalium*.

⁴² Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 13 ff.; Stenzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff. and pp. 46, 53 *supra*. The indifference of the classificatory method towards the value of the diverse things which are combined here under one term would hardly be appropriate for Socrates whose philosophy is concerned with the ethical alone and pays so little attention to nature (*Phaedo* 96 ff.; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987 b 1); therefore this method is attributed to the Eleatic.

⁴³ Cf. p. 48 *supra*.

⁴⁴ E. g. to Speusippus (*Metaphysics* 1076 a 1; 1090 b 19); cf. Alexander, *Metaphysics*, pp. 815, 28; 179, 22 and Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 4 a 14.

to which the world, nature itself, is God, and anticipates the Christian conception of the world, though in a specifically Greek form. It is for this reason that the transcendence of the idea remains incomprehensible even to his direct pupils. All of them and particularly Aristotle return to the limits of the Greek conception of being, nature.

6. The Platonic doctrine of the so-called ideal numbers and its criticism by Aristotle

It has always been a difficulty for the interpretation of Aristotle's criticism of Plato that that form of the doctrine of ideas which Aristotle has in mind in which the ideas are numbers is not easily found in the preserved Platonic dialogues. What Aristotle refers to apparently is the other form of Platonic philosophy with which he became acquainted in the Academy through Plato's lectures (cf. pp. 41 f. *supra*). These speculations, no doubt, were Plato's chief interest during the last years of his life, as even after his death they were the focus of his pupils' philosophizing; Aristotle was right, therefore, in saying that for these Platonists philosophy had become identical with mathematics (*Metaphysics* 991 b 13; cf. 995 a 6; 1078 b 10; 1084 b 24), whereas Plato himself wanted mathematics to be studied only for the sake of the other, i. e. the idea of the *agathon* (*Republic* 531 D; 533 B). Thus the doctrine of the ideal numbers has been used as a new argument to show that Plato in his old age taught an entirely new philosophy, even different from that which is known from his later dialogues, and that Aristotle conceived his own theories in criticizing this late Platonic philosophy.

Aristotle begins the account of this Platonic doctrine, which he gives in the *Metaphysics*, with clear words (987 b 18): "Since the ideas are the cause (of existence) for the other things, their elements are the elements of everything that exists. As matter, the "great" and "small" are principles, as form of existence, however, the "one." For the ideas, the numbers, consist of them (i. e. the "great" and the "small") by means of participation in the one." Therefore, the ideas are numbers (cf. also *De Anima* 404 b 24; *Metaphysics* 1091 b 26; *Physics* 209 b 33) and they consist, like numbers, of two elements of existence, on the one hand of the "one" as the true existence (*Metaphysics*

1087 b 15), on the other hand of its opposite which Aristotle here calls the "great" and "small" or the *δὺς ἀόριστος*, in other places the "indefinite" (*ἄπειρον*), "many" and "few," the "unequal," "relative," "other" or "non-being" (cf. *Metaphysics* 1087 b 16, 25; 1089 a 25, b 4-11; 1088 a 15, 21; 1091 b 32; 1092 b 32, etc.). That, however, is exactly the same conception of the dialectical structure of existence in general that we find not only in the dialogues of Plato's late period⁴⁵ but also as early as in the *Republic* (525 A) and in the *Phaedo* (102 B ff.), the only difference being that Aristotle expresses it in terms of his ontology whereby it assumes a coloring not quite adequate to its original intention. That Aristotle actually does not mean to give any other doctrines is proved by his unmistakable reference to its discussion in the *Sophist* (237-240; 256-260; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1089 a 1 and the commentators, *ad loc.*).

New is only the term *δὺς (ἀόριστος)* which Aristotle uses here as elsewhere for the other element of the idea.⁴⁶ Aristotle explains that Plato assumed this "other" nature (apart from the one) to be a "two," because from it the numbers, "except the first, can easily be produced (*γεννᾶσθαι*) as out of a mold (*ἐκμαγείον*)." ⁴⁷ This element, however, as Aristotle says, is the

⁴⁵ Cf. *Philebus* 16 C ff.; 24 ff.; *Sophist* 237 ff.; *Parmenides* 130 B, and pp. 45 f. *supra*.

⁴⁶ According to Aristotle this term was coined by Plato in that lecture "On the *agathon*" (cf. frag. 28, Rose²).

⁴⁷ *Metaphysics* 987 b 33. The arithmetic of the Pythagoreans as well as that of Plato is a dyadic system, its principle being the divisibility of number into two equal groups, the "odd" and the "even" (cf. Plato, *Laws* 895 D; *Politicus* 262 E; *Phaedo* 104 A; *Gorgias* 451 A; *Charmides* 165 E; *Theaetetus* 185 D; *Republic* 510 C; *Parmenides* 143 C; *Protagoras* 356 E; *Hippias Major* 302 A; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 986 a 17; 990 a 9; *Categ.* 12 a 6; *Anal. Post.* 73 a 40; *Metaphysics* 1004 b 10; 1084 a 2, etc.). In this system, moreover, the prime numbers are taken as a sub-species of the odd (*Parmenides* 143 C; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1084 a 3 ff.; Alexander, *Metaphysics*, p. 769, 20; Speusippus, frag. 4, 25 Lang). The whole series of number is deduced from these two basic forms, the "odd" and the "even." Since the Pythagoreans and Plato reduced physical body to mathematical body and again the mathematical dimension to numbers as the very substance of everything, the "odd" (or the *ἑ*) and the "even" (the *δύς* or the *δὺς ἀόριστος*) become the ultimate elements (*στοιχεῖα*) of all things. These elements, in turn, are identified with the essential characteristics of the limit (*πέρας*) as the form and of the limitless (*ἄπειρον*) as the matter of things. For Plato the numbers are

same principle of the *ἄπειρον* which the Pythagoreans too assume, only that Plato wanted to indicate the twofoldness of the relativity of the "great" and "small," i.e., the *δύο ἄπειρα* (cf. *Metaphysics* 1088 a 15; *Physics* 203 a 15, 206 b 28). This thought is well known to us especially from the *Philebus*, in the terms of which Porphyry actually explains it (*apud* Simplicius, *Physics*, p. 453, 31 Diels). And if Aristotle says, furthermore, that Plato here differs from the Pythagoreans only in so far as he assumed, according to his dialectical method, that the numbers thus derived from these two elements are separated from the particulars, i.e. that they are transcendent ideas, this is also in accordance with the *Philebus* (15 ff.) and with the *Republic* (525 ff., cf. p. 49 *supra*) .

Plato assumes three absolutely separate regions of existence: the true existence of the idea, the empirical existence of the sensible world, and in between the two the realm of the mathematical (cf. p. 50 *supra*). In the Socratic dialogues he had discussed the idea of the *agathon*; in the *Timaeus*, as also in the *Philebus*, he had shown on the other hand how this world through the "medium" and "bond" of the mathematical becomes an image of the true idea; in order to complete the contour of his philosophy in every direction there still remained for him to prove that this middle realm of the mathematical again is an image of the idea and of the *agathon* as outlined in the *Republic* (509 ff.; cf. *Phaedo* 99 C). With this philosophy he has dealt, however, in none of the writings which are preserved, but only in those famous lectures "On the *agathon*."⁴⁸

However important this doctrine of the ideal numbers must

ideas because they consist of the *στοιχεῖα τῶν πάντων* (*Metaphysics* 987 b 16). The production of numbers out of these two elements and their transcendent existence, then, is the chief object of Aristotle's criticism. A more detailed study of these mathematical doctrines in their relation to the development of Greek philosophy I hope to publish soon.

⁴⁸ Here Plato treated, according to Aristotle (Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* II, 30 M): "of the numbers, of geometry, of astronomy, and finally of the fact that the principle of limit is the one good." Aristotle in his *Physics* 209 b 15 mentions these doctrines as the "unwritten" (*ἄγραφα*), and they were certainly intended to remain unwritten, as Plato in the *Phaedrus* (276 A ff.) and in the *Seventh Epistle* (cf. p. 37 *supra*) requires for such philosophical discussions. It was thus against his intention that Aristotle and other pupils published them (cf. Simplicius, *Physics*, pp. 151, 6 and 453, 25).

have been for the philosophizing of Plato himself and of the Academy during the last period of Plato's life, it nevertheless cannot have supplanted but must rather have supplemented his original conception of the *agathon* which is referred to even by the title of these lectures. Aristotle's criticism makes it recede rather into the background. Merely by representing these thoughts as a purely theoretical doctrine he deprives them of their very core, i.e. of their relation to the very self of the philosopher, to the unity of acting and thinking in which alone that idea of the *agathon* is realized as the ultimate origin of everything.⁴⁹ Moreover, where *Socrates in the Platonic dialogues* occasionally proposes such a speculation of numbers a tone of sceptical self-irony is never missing which introduces them as poetry, as inspiration of the Muses or as old fables;⁵⁰ they cannot be taken quite seriously if confronted with the ultimate criterion of this incomparable conscientiousness with regard to truth. It is hard to believe, therefore, that Plato in those lectures should have propounded his doctrine of numbers, as for instance that curious production of numbers out of the "one" and the "indefinite two," as dogmatically as Aristotle makes it appear, without at the same time making clear its necessarily hypothetical character.⁵¹

⁴⁹ We must remember what Plato says in the *Seventh Epistle* (341 B) in regard to such systematic outlines of his philosophy: "That certain people have written about these things, I know, to be sure, but what they are they do not even know of themselves." This may refer also to such a report as the Aristotelian concerning the doctrine of the ideal numbers: what is lacking there is the Socratic principle, that consciousness of the philosopher himself whose existence is determined by the *agathon*, in whom alone for Plato these thoughts acquire their essential meaning and intrinsic truth (cf. also *Epinomis* 988 B and *Sophist* 267 B).

⁵⁰ Cf. e.g. the discussion of the so-called "nuptial number" in the eighth book of the *Republic* (545 D) or the Pythagorean theory in the *Philebus* (16 C, 20 B ff.).

⁵¹ In fact, the other hearers of these lectures, such as Xenocrates (frag. 54 Heinze) and Speusippus (frag. 54 Lang), regard the Platonic production of numbers as mere "hypotheses." In like manner Aristotle takes in its literal meaning what by Plato was meant to be mere hypothesis or mythical simile, as for instance the creation of the world in the *Timaeus* (29 B) or the doctrine of *anamnesis* in the *Meno* (81 A ff.), and he turns his criticism against it as against a doctrine in the strictest sense of the word (*De Caelo* 280 a 30; *De Anima* 430 a 23, and the commentators *ad loc.*). In *Metaphysics* 1093 a 5, according to

What is really at the bottom of this concept of the generation of numbers is the notion of that reduction of the numbers and ideas in general to the two ontologically basic elements of the "one" and the "multiplicity" (of the "limitless" and the "indefinite two," cf. p. 46 *supra*). The true essence of this concept is clear even through its Aristotelian reproduction: everything in so far as it is "one being" has in itself the imprint of the *agathon*, God, and thereby reflects the true character of the original idea to which it owes the origin of its being.⁵² Everything that is is one only through its partaking of the idea of the *agathon* which harmonizes and "binds together" the multiplicity into unity (*Timaeus* 31 C ff.; *Gorgias* 507 E; *Laws* 757 A; *Republic* 525 E; *Philebus* 20 C ff., etc., cf. pp. 45 f. *supra*). In itself everything would be without unity and consistency, falling apart into infinity as mere dimension of matter and space the bottom of which can never be touched even with the most extensive bisection—it would be the fathomless abyss of non-being which appears as the resulting remainder of every bisection⁵³ as that which is in between two "ones."⁵⁴

Syrianus' interpretation (*ad loc.*, p. 190, 12), Aristotle is referring to such speculations as that of the nuptial number and takes them for strictly dogmatic (compare also *Metaphysics* 1092 b 26 with *Philebus* 25 ff.). Likewise he understands the generation (*γένεσις*) of numbers as a real one (*Metaphysics* 1088 b 14-35; 1091 a 12-27; 1091 b 24), although he must admit that Plato talked about this generation in the same hypothetical way as in the *Timaeus*, i.e. merely θεωρησαι ἐνεκεν (*Metaphysics* 1091 a 28), in a way similar to those who draw geometrical figures διδασκαλίας χάριν (*De Caelo* 280 a 1, and the commentators *ad loc.*).

⁵² That the *agathon* is the *ἐν* itself and that, therefore, "every unity becomes a kind of *agathon*" is unambiguously testified to by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1091 b 14-15; 988 a 10; *Eth. Nic.* I, 4) for him who hesitates to draw this conclusion from the Plato passages themselves discussed above.

⁵³ Thus Porphyry, *apud* Simplicius, *Physics*, p. 453, 36 ff. Diels. This Platonic conception of the insubstantiality of matter which is made manifest through its infinite divisibility was used by Augustine (e.g. *De immortalitate animae* 12, *De genesi* II, 8; IV, 13; *Epistulae* III, 2) to show that the material world in itself is nothing and owes its being only to its being created by God, which is the condition of its consistency.

⁵⁴ This becomes manifest first in the number "two" in which each "one" of the two ones is one: "For in the 'two' the unity first falls

What to naïve appearance seems most certain and sound, the continuum of this solid corporeality, vanishes before the exact thought into the insubstantial relativity of "being other" and "non-being" as its real truth (cf. e. g. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 992 b 2; 1092 b 1; *Physics* 187 a 15; 189 b 15, etc.). It is just this in which the philosophical profundity and truth of the Platonic thought consists: this world—for that "dyad" of the more and less, expressed in our language, is nothing else than the idea of the world just as that "one" is the idea of God—this world in its true being can be in fact only hypothetical relativity without real substance, if it is determined by merely mathematical laws to the degree which astronomy and harmonics had already recognized at that time (cf. e. g. *Republic* 530 ff.).

Aristotle, on the contrary, who holds by "the phenomena" and interprets them according to common sense, cannot imagine a mathematical, quantitative definition or, in general, a relation without a fundamental, solid substance of which the relation is only a predicate (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1088 a 15; 992 b 1; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 21; *Metaphysics* 990 b 17). In the different forms of the logico-grammatical "predication,"⁵⁵ in the "category," he believes that he grasps the true metaphysical structure of being in general. To him there are as many kinds of "predication" as there are kinds of being, i. e. ways in which within the individual substance the idea proceeds from mere potentiality to material realization (cf. p. 52 *supra*). Thus for him even the idea is predicated as a *quale* as it were, not different from "the white" for instance, i. e. as an accident (*συμβεβηκός*) always in reference only to one particular basic substance (*Categ.* 3 b 18; *Physics* 186 a 25; *Metaphysics* 1087 b 34, etc.); the idea in itself is non-being (*Metaphysics* 1087 a 1, cf. 1088 b 3). By means of this doctrine of categories he tries to refute Plato's conception of the transcendence of the idea (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1089 a 1-1090 a 2); and it was for this purpose probably that Aristotle first developed

asunder (in the two ones between which gapes nothingness)." For Plato, therefore, as for the Pythagoreans (cf. Ross *ad loc.*) the "two" is the true "idea of the line" and thereby of dimension in general (*Metaphysics* 1036 b 12, and Alexander, *ad loc.*, p. 512, 37).

⁵⁵ Cf. the *πρώσεις* *Metaphysics* 1089 a 26 and the interpretation of Brentano (*Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* [1862], pp. 85 ff.).

this theory of categories as a logical instrument.⁵⁶ While for Plato the idea is the being of God, absolutely separated from the particulars which only partake of it, for Aristotle it is inherent in them, even in the sense of categories. While for Plato the fundamental notions⁵⁷ serve to separate everywhere being from appearance, idea from particular, the Aristotelian categories are meant to express just the inseparable unity of idea and individual substance, the inherence of the idea in the subject.

7. The contrast between Plato's and Aristotle's conception of νοῦς

Against our interpretation that the transcendence of the idea is quite foreign to Aristotle one objection may have already presented itself: does Aristotle not expressly define the νοῦς which to him is the εἶδος εἰδῶν, the essential and highest principle of his philosophy, God himself, as transcendent, as χωριστός (*De Anima* 430 a 17; 413 b 26; *Metaphysics* 1078 a 22, etc.)? The νοῦς enters the human soul θύραθεν, from without (*De Gen. Animal.* 736 b 28; 744 b 21) and, similar to the Platonic idea, is in itself the unmoved principle which simply as object of *eros* moves the world and everything in it (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 1 ff.). Νοῦς is the divine into which man himself must be transformed during his life in order to become immortal as far as possible (*Eth. Nic.* 1177 b 26), just as for Plato it is the goal of life to become similar to God. Reminiscences of Platonic formulations are unmistakable here. Has Plato's transcendent idea not been replaced by Aristotle's νοῦς? ⁵⁸ The picture which Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (XII, 7) draws of his philosophy reminds us of that of the Platonic *Timaeus*. Here, as there, the world has in itself its true principle of life, and it is its νοῦς which directs it in its movement. Also with Plato the soul of the world, of this "visible god," is conceived as luminary ether

⁵⁶ Concerning the Aristotelian theory of categories cf. v. Fritz, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XL (1931), pp. 449 ff.

⁵⁷ E. g. the five γένη or εἶδη of the *Sophist* 254 D: the "identical" and the "different," "rest," "motion," and "being" in general; cf. the other antinomies such as "similar" and "dissimilar," "one" and "two," "like" and "unlike" in the *Theaetetus* 185, *Timaeus* 37 A, etc.

⁵⁸ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 230 and 245, etc.

which surrounds and pervades the globe of the fixed stars (*Timaeus* 34 B; cf. *Republic* 616 B), and the *voûs* is inherent in the soul as its higher principle (*Timaeus* 30 B; *Sophist* 249 A; *Philebus* 30 C, etc.).

But whereas for Plato in the *Timaeus* above the soul and its *voûs* there is still the world of the idea as the true god toward which the glance of the *voûs* is directed, for Aristotle this highest grade of being is lifted off, as it were. Here the ideas are reduced to thoughts of the *voûs*, God, which He thinks in thinking Himself (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 20). For Plato the ideas are in the "super-celestial region," and the *voûs* has to ascend, therefore, beyond the heaven in order to behold the ideas there above (*Phaedrus* 247 C; cf. *Republic* 508 C ff.); for Aristotle the soul and its *voûs* are the very place of the ideas,⁵⁹ which are not above the *voûs* but within it. The *voûs*, then, is for Plato not the highest being, but beyond it⁶⁰ stands, as cause of every being and all truth, the idea of the *agathon* which "illuminates" the *voûs* in its turn, thereby creating its power (*δύναμις*) of thinking and understanding; for Aristotle, on the contrary, the *voûs* is the *δύναμις* or "the idea of the ideas" (*De Anima* 432 a 2; 429 a 15).⁶¹ For Aristotle the *voûs* is transcendent only in so far as it is the true substance which is presupposed by all other (*Topics* 135 a 1; *Metaphysics* 1028 a 34), as the Beyond of the merely sensible perceptible, the unmoved origin of all motion. But it is just for this reason that it is nothing but the true substance, the God of this world.⁶² Although the *voûs* is conceived as the unmoved God who moves the world merely as an object of its *eros*, as the teleological cause of the world, similar to the Platonic idea, yet, on the other hand, He is the immediate source of all

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 a 27 (*τόπος εἰδῶν*), cf. Asclepius, *Metaphysics*, p. 69, 19.

⁶⁰ Aristotle (frag. 49 Rose²) only once mentions the Platonic conception of the divinity as *ἐπέκειντά τι τοῦ νοῦ* as it follows from the quoted passage of the *Republic* (509 B) and cites it as another possible conception of God besides his own (cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 163).

⁶¹ With Plato it is the *ἐν* which is the idea of ideas, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 988 a 10.

⁶² I. e. of this sphere of fixed stars with which are coördinated almost as His equals or to which are subordinated the other similarly visible gods of the different spheres with their respective *voûs*; and it is this Olympic Pantheon to which Aristotle refers the words of the *Iliad* (B 204) *εἰς κοίλαρος ἔστω*, cf. *Metaphysics* 1076 a 4.

its movement and at the same time the true matter of its basic substance. The different "causes" (*telos*, substantial form, motion, and matter) as distinguished by Aristotle coincide in the actual subject-object identity of the *voûs* (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 20; *De Anima* 430 a 2). The *voûs* is thus the divine core of nature, its architectonic intelligence⁶³ which produces all organic growth, its true entelechy and energy. This God, then, although He dwells in the ether and is superior to the change of the terrestrial world, and in that respect is transcendent, yet is finally immanent in nature as its true substance.

This system, to be sure, is an impressive rational construction in which everything is harmonized without a breach, as Aristotle boasts against Plato.⁶⁴ The movement of the world has for Plato its origin—and that is decisive, as the Aristotelian criticism

⁶³ *De partibus animal.* 645 a 9 ff. ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις; for other passages cf. Bonitz, *Index*, 174 b 14 ff.; cf. also p. 53 *supra*.

⁶⁴ The transcendence (δαίμονια ὑπερβολή) of the *agathon* is explained by Socrates in the *Republic* (509 D) through that line which is divided according to an "analogy" of which the single sections symbolize the different realms of being; each of these sections is to be thought of as being divided according to the same analogy, down to the *ἄτομον εἶδος* (cf. p. 169 *supra*). The true meaning of this simile lies in the fact that the *agathon* itself does not occur in any of these sections of being. It is expressed only through this "bond" of the (geometrical) "analogy" which as unity ties all being together into one (*Timaeus* 31 C; cf. *Phaedo* 99 C). God, as the transcendental good, can be known only by analogy. Thus, everywhere He is to be grasped only by similes; but in everything, even in the sensible, a likeness of Him can also be recognized (cf. Syrianus, *Metaphysics*, p. 162, 1). Only dialectic succeeds in approaching Him Himself (*Republic* 533 A; *Epistle* VII, 341 C, 344 B). Aristotle, on the contrary, denies this transcendent idea of the *agathon* with the characteristic argument that man, even granted that it exists, cannot attain it anyhow (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 32). The transcendent idea of the *agathon* is replaced by him with the *ὅν* as ultimate *ἐν* (*Metaphysics* 1033 a 32-b 34; 1054 a 13; 1091 b 20, etc.), i. e. "God or the *voûs* (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 24) as the true "substance" and "energy" of the world (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 22), as *ens perfectissimum* which is not the *agathon* but which is preëminently *ἀγαθόν* besides the other *ἀγαθά* (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 19; 1091 b 15; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 24; cf. p. 182 *infra*). The many *agatha* are "one" however only in so far as they all, like the *ὅν*, "analogically" are related to "*ἐν*," namely to the substance (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 26). Thus the Aristotelian system culminates in the ontological principle of the "analogia entis" which is opposed to that of Plato which may be called "analogia boni."

rightly emphasizes—in an entirely different principle, separated from the idea of the *agathon*, namely in the soul, in the life of the universe, in the daemonic spontaneity of its “self-movement.”⁶⁵ We may add that the passages in the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, from which we drew Plato’s opinion about the position of the *νοῦς* within the gradation of being, are not meant by Plato as ἀληθὺς λόγος, as Aristotle evidently takes them and to which he opposes his own system as another dogmatic doctrine, but as a symbolic myth. Even concerning this principal discussion of the transcendent *agathon* in its relation to the *νοῦς* and its object, being, Socrates in the *Republic* (506 C; 509 C) admits that he is speaking as of something about which he really has no knowledge and that he is saying what seems likely to him at the moment. What Plato is sure of is only this μέγιστον μάθημα of the *agathon* as the ultimate, no longer hypothetical, principle of all thinking and being, wherefrom he concludes the necessarily hypothetical character of all thinking as well as of its objects, the ideas,⁶⁶ and the hypothetical dialectic as the true philosophical method. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the *νοῦς* itself is the highest principle and comprehends therefore in comprehending itself (“imme-

⁶⁵ Cf. *Phaedrus* 245 C ff.; *Laws* 895 A ff.; *Timaeus* 34 ff., and p. 53 *supra*; cf. also Aristotle, *Topics* 140 b 4; *De Anima* 404 a 21; *Metaphysics* 1071 b 37, etc.

⁶⁶ Natorp has already stressed, to be sure, the hypothetical character of the Platonic idea; but by interpreting the ideas, in the manner of the Neo-Kantians, merely as “suppositions of thought” (*Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 150 and *passim*; but cf. second edition, pp. 467 ff.) as merely logical principles, as laws rather than things, he completely reverses the Platonic conception. The individual idea is indeed hypothesis for Plato, not because it is assumed only by thinking, but because it is really posited by the principle of the *agathon*, by God Himself (i. e. the *φντοουργός* of the idea in the mythical metaphor of the *Republic* [597 D]). The individual idea is posited together with the other ideas in the unity of being, i. e. the world of the ideas, the image of which is the unity of this heaven (cf. p. 45, n. 13 *supra*); therefore it can be understood only in relation to them and to the *agathon*, i. e. as hypothesis. The subjective interpretation of the Neo-Kantians is here entirely out of place. And the same is true of the concept of transcendence: the *agathon* is not transcendent only in the sense that it is beyond thinking and subjective consciousness, but also in the sense that its supposition lies beyond all being, i. e. beyond all definite, perceptible existence in general.

diately" and through "contact," just as does sense-perception the sensible) those ultimate truths from which everything else is concluded and through which it is mediated (*Metaphysics* 1051 b 24; 1072 b 20; *Anal. Post.* 72 a 7; 84 b 39; 100 b 8; cf. also Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 9 b 15). The *voûs* itself, even here, is the true being, and as the *ens perfectissimum*, as God, it is, though not the *agathon*, yet essentially *agathon* (cf. p. 168 *supra*). Thus from this highest point of the system the completely different character of the Aristotelian doctrine becomes manifest.

It is true, the passages in which Aristotle celebrates the *voûs* as the divine principle of the world undoubtedly recall by reason of their hieratic language similar phrases of Plato and therefore probably belong to Aristotle's earlier period;⁶⁷ yet, this fact does not provide an argument for the assumption that Aristotle at that time still adhered to the Platonic doctrine of ideas or at least was sympathetic to it.⁶⁸ Nor is this proved by his early exoteric writing which seemed indeed to emphasize less strongly his opposition to Plato.⁶⁹ It is not in accordance with the conception of Attic urbanity, constantly required by Plato himself for philosophical discussions, to bring the controversies of the school into the open in such popular writings intended for a wider circle.

Plato, as we saw, never changed in regard to his fundamental philosophical conception of God as the transcendental good.⁷⁰ For a philosopher like Plato for whom the realization of his own ἀρετή is the necessary presupposition for the knowledge of the true being, of the agathon, this being can remain only transcendent idea, because it is recognized by the philosopher as just that which he himself is not and which he, being conscious of his own limitations, of his own non-being and ignorance, is able therefore to conceive. That implies, however, Plato's irreconcilable opposition to the Aristotelian concept of philosophy as a

⁶⁷ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 230, cf. pp. 228 and 248.

⁶⁸ Cf. Appendix *infra*.

⁶⁹ Cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 23-102; but cf. also frags. 8 and 9 Rose² and H. G. Gadamer, *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), p. 155.

⁷⁰ If the *Sixth Epistle* is genuine, Plato himself "as an old man" would have expressly stated it there in a way similar to that of the *Seventh Epistle* (cf. pp. 36 ff. *supra* and Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 178).

merely theoretical science of being which is able to know the world and the objects in it, even those of ethics, through the logical analysis of their phenomenal appearance, and to comprehend and teach them through general concepts which are equally true for everybody.

It proves the greatness of Greek philosophy that there even this ultimate philosophical contrast which we recognize throughout the history of philosophy found its classical expression. Not that any true philosopher could ever lack entirely either of these two poles—in the tension of this contrast between theoretical objectivity and ethico-religious existence philosophy in general has its place. But the point is which one of these two poles is decisively accentuated; Aristotle is the most imposing representative of that attitude of purely theoretical objectivity and faithful phenomenological observation which are the chief characteristics of the descriptive sciences of nature and of philologico-historical research. Without Plato, however, there would not exist what since has been and alone should be called philosophy: that power of thought which is able to change man in his innermost existence by stimulating his moral volition together with his desire for the knowledge of exact science.

ERICH FRANK.

APPENDIX.

According to Jaeger, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, particularly in three passages, confesses himself to be still a Platonist (cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 190 ff. and following him Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 406):

1) 1086 b 14: δ δὲ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν . . . καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν ἐλέχθη πρότερον, λέγωμεν νῦν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κεχωρισμένας, . . . ἀναιρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥς βουλόμεθα λέγειν. Jaeger (p. 194) translates: "Wenn man die Existenz für sich seiender Wesenheiten nach Analogie der sinnlichen Einzeldinge bestreitet (wie dies Aristoteles selbst tut), so hebt man die οὐσία in dem Sinne wie wir Platoniker sie verstehen, auf." The difficulty in question is that which in the third Book (1003 a 6; cf. Alexander, p. 787, 8) is thus formulated: πότερον καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς λέγομεν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἢ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι (cf. p. 52 *supra*). It is obvious that in the passage the words οὐσίαν, ὥς βουλόμεθα λέγειν cannot mean the Platonic conception of οὐσία which Aristotle here actually refutes and declares to be μὴ οὐσία (1087 a 1); it is rather, as in the

third Book, the Aristotelian conception of the *τόδε τι* (thus also Alexander, *ad loc.*, p. 787, 18). This explains also the expression *βουλόμεθα λέγειν* or merely *λέγειν* (1003 a 7): "As we (in opposition to Plato) intend to understand it."

2) 1091 a 31: *ἀπορίαν μὲν ταύτην, πότερόν ἐστὶ τι ἐκείνων οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὕστερογενῆ.* Jaeger paraphrases this: "Wir Platoniker setzen an die Spitze der Philosophie und den Anfang der Welt das Gute an sich . . . oder höchste Gut, . . . Speusipp dagegen das Gute . . . als am Ende des Prozesses sich selbst verwirklichend"; in this way Aristotle, as Jaeger states, claims that he himself is more truly Platonic than Speusippus. In fact, Aristotle is in agreement with Plato in so far as he too puts the *agathon* as the "arche" at the beginning; however, in the following he desires to show not this accord with Plato but rather the impossibility (*δυσχέρεια*) of the Platonic concept of the *agathon* from which he as well as Speusippus starts, although the latter draws wrong conclusions from it. Also in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1096 b 5; cf. *Metaphysics* 1093 b 11) Aristotle refutes the Platonic *agathon* with similar arguments, in order to declare the opinion of Speusippus, on the contrary, to be more plausible. Even Jaeger's interpretation of *οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν* is not entirely impossible here; still it seems more likely to me that this emphatic expression, its obvious meaning taken into consideration in 1086 b 19, is meant by Aristotle to express here too: "The *agathon* itself as *we* (in opposition to Plato) intend to understand it."

3) 990 b 17: *ὅλως τε ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν λόγοι, ἃ μᾶλλον εἶναι βουλόμεθα οἱ λέγοντες εἶδη τοῦ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι.* That, to be sure, is the reading of Codex E and of Asclepius alone, whereas A, b, Γ, Alexander, and the identical passage of Book XIV, 4, 1079 a 14 read *βούλονται*. Jaeger, however (pp. 192-3, following Blass), deletes the *οἱ λέγοντες εἶδη* in E as an interpolation from the parallel passage in Book XIV and interprets, accepting the reading of E: "Sie heben dasjenige auf, dessen Existenz wir Platoniker in noch höherem Grade für wichtig halten als die der Ideen selbst, nämlich die Prinzipien der Ideen." Aristotle would, then, adhere to that Platonic doctrine of the *ἀρχαί* of the ideas which he attacked most ardently in the immediately preceding chapter 6 and in the following paragraphs. That is hard to believe. This difficulty disappears, to be sure, if one reads *βούλονται* with Alexander and the majority of the manuscripts. If, however, for general reasons of textual criticism the *βουλόμεθα* of E and Asclepius seems preferable in this case, we must interpret the first person plural here as in the other places of the first and third Books, namely that Aristotle wants to express by it *οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν*, as he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096 a 13: "Since friendly men have introduced the forms" (thus also Alexander, *Metaphysics*, pp. 78, 1; 106, 9; 196, 23). But if there these Platonic opinions seemed to him to belong to the family as it were, still there as here he refutes them expressly, that is, he does *not* sympathize with them, not to mention the fact that by "we" he does not mean so much to identify himself with Plato himself (except perhaps in 991 b 7) as rather with

his pupils, the Academicians (cf. Jaeger, *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik* [1912], p. 32) like Xenocrates and Speusippus. For it is only for them (and for Aristotle) that the denial of ideas and their replacement by *πολλὰ ἀρχαί* (1028 b 18; Asclepius, *ad loc.*; cf. 1075 b 37, etc.) as well as the denial of the idea of artefacts (991 b 6; 990 b 11; cf. Ross, *ad loc.*) or of the relative as a separate *γένος* (990 b 16) can be valid. It was probably on account of these difficulties (as developed here by Aristotle) that Speusippus and Xenocrates, as Aristotle frequently emphasizes (1091 a 37; cf. p. 172 *supra* and 1090 a 2; 1086 a 2, etc.), had been led to abandon the Platonic conception of ideas. For, even though he does not completely succeed in carrying them along with his radical conclusions, yet he obviously wanted to do so. The first person plural probably is taken over from the special treatise *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* (cf. Karpp, *Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 391) which was written, perhaps, while Plato was still alive and from which this whole passage in Books I and XIII is but an excerpt (cf. p. 47, n. 16 *supra*). In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1138 b 23), however, he uses the first person plural also in quoting a Platonic definition of virtue which he opposes some pages later 1144 b 22-27.

From all these arguments it follows that in the passages quoted by Jaeger Aristotle does not necessarily still adhere to the Platonic idea, even though he may certainly have been still conscious of his community with the Academy.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBES ANTIGONIS AND DEMETRIAS.

In honor of Demetrios Poliorketes and his father, Antigonos, the Athenians added two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, which, in this order, were placed at the head of the list of twelve tribes. They were officially instituted in the Athenian year 307/6 B. C. some time after the fifth prytany.¹ As recently as the publication of Dinsmoor's *Archons of Athens* (p. 450), the maximum number of demes assigned to the two Macedonian tribes was twenty-four; two, and perhaps more, incorrectly. Recent material from the Athenian Agora has revealed four new demes for these two tribes, and it is now possible to add still two more as well as to review the evidence for former identifications.

In *I. G.*, II², 2413, which Hondius (*ad S. E. G.*, III, 142) classified as a *diaitetai* or *klerouchoi* list, Kirchner as a register from Pandionis and Leontis, and Gomme (*The Population of Athens*, p. 51, note 2) as a *bouleutai* list, the names are arranged under five demotics: [...⁵...] *ιείς* (with 1 name),² *Κυθήριοι* (2), *Κυδαθηναίς* (12), *Αιθαλίδαι* (2), and *Ποτάμοι* (*Δειραδιῶται*) (1 + ?). The restoration which suggests itself for line 1 is [*Παιαν*] *ιείς*,³ and, indeed, it is known that *Παιανιὰ καθύπερθεν* regularly had one representative in the *boule*.⁴ Four of these demes are definitely established as members of the tribe Antigonis,⁵ so the conclusion seems inescapable that the fifth, Kytheros, concerning whose tribal affiliation in the period 307-200 B. C. nothing has been known, must now be identified as a part of that same tribe. The inscription, then, is a fragment of a *bouleutai* list and may be provisionally dated in the year 304/3 B. C., when one of its number is already known to have held one of his two eligible councillorships.⁶

¹ See Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 220-221 and Glotz-Roussel-Cohen, *Histoire Grecque*, IV, p. 330, note 79. Cf. also Wilhelm, *Anatolian Studies Presented to W. H. Buckler*, pp. 348-349.

² The spacing is in accord with the transcription in *I. G.*, II, 1024.

³ Cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 53, note 2.

⁴ See *I. G.*, II², 1740, lines 44-45, and Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁵ Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 444-447.

⁶ *Εὐχρόνιος Ἐπιμηδέδου Κυδαθηναίς* (line 11) is known from *I. G.*, II², 486, lines 8-9; *I. G.*, II², 597 *add.*, lines 4-5 (= Robert, *Collection*

Similarly, in the case of *I. G.*, II², 2437, which is dated in the second half of the third century B. C., the extant fragment preserves a list of names arranged under five demotics. Four of these demes, Oion (Kerameikon), Kothokidai, Hippotomadai, and Phyle, are assigned with certainty to the tribe Demetrias.⁷ It follows, therefore, that the fifth, Potamos, was also from Demetrias and that the inscription is to be recognized for the first time as a portion of a bouleutai or prytany list.⁸ Whether this Potamos is to be identified as καθύπερθεν or ὑπέπερθεν cannot be determined from the number of councillors (2). Before 307/6 B. C., Potamos καθύπερθεν was regularly represented by two councillors; Potamos ὑπέπερθεν by one.⁹ But after the creation of the two new tribes, it appears from *Prytaneis*, no. 36 and *I. G.*, II², 2437 that both might be represented by two. It is to be noted that Potamos Deiradiotes was assigned to Antigonis, Potamos καθύπερθεν or ὑπέπερθεν to Demetrias, with the other third remaining in Leontis. It has formerly been held that all the demes of Demetrias with the special exception of Diomeia were taken from the last six (V-X) of the original tribes,¹⁰ but, as appears below, this rule no longer applies.

The evidence for the composition of the two Macedonian tribes is presented below. The table is based on those of Schoeffer in *R.-E.*, s. v. *Δῆμοι* and of Dinsmoor in the *Archons of Athens*, pp. 444-447, but there are many additions. The name of the deme is followed by its original tribal affiliation and its trittys location. Next is given the evidence for its assignment to Anti-

Froehner, no. 3; cf. Klaffenbach, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1937, pp. 1682-1683) and *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 297, lines 9-10, to have been a councillor in 304/3 B. C.

⁷ For Kothokidai and Hippotomadai, see Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 445; for Oion and Phyle, see the table below.

⁸ The original left edge of the stone is said to be preserved, and in the case of bouleutai lists Tribe II was usually placed in the second column. On the other hand, the presence of small demes in the leftmost column militates against the interpretation of the document as a prytany list. The absence of patronymics does not afford a clue, for their omission is the exception in both bouleutai and prytany lists of the fourth century. Sundwall (*Eranos*, XXV [1927], p. 192) had noted that the deme representation in this fragment was identical with normal bouleutic representation, so he conjectured that the inscription contained praise for a committee of the boule.

⁹ See Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹⁰ See Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

gonis or Demetrias; then, its probable representation in the boule so far as this is known. The assignments are corroborated in many cases by the secretary cycle (for the latest table, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, VII [1938], pp. 131-139), but this has been built up, for the most part, on the evidence of deme affiliation, so it has not been included in the following.

ANTIGONIS

IDENTIFICATIONS CERTAIN.

Agryle B. From Erechtheis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 832. *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8).
Bouleutai 3.

Aithalidai. From Leontis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 665; 770; 1706, line 95; ¹¹ and 2413, line 19.
Bouleutai 2.

Eitea A. From Akamantis. Inland-deme (?).

I. G., II², 665, line 44. Bouleutai ?

Gargettos. From Aigeis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 478, line 38; 681, lines 8-9; 912, line 21 (see Dow, *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 189); 1704, line 1; 1706, line 55. *Hesperia*, VII (1938), no. 20, line 41. Bouleutai 4(?).

Ikaria A. From Aigeis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 766, lines 22-23 (see Kirchner, *ad loc.* and Bates, *The Five Post-Kleisthenean Tribes*, p. 10); 912, line 22.
Bouleutai 4 or 5.

Kydathenaion. From Pandionis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 665, line 46; 912, line 11; 1706, lines 15, 141, and 155; 2413, line 6. *Prytaneis*, no. 32(?). Bouleutai 12.

Kytheros. From Pandionis. Inland-deme.¹²

I. G., II², 2413, line 3. Bouleutai 2.

Lamptrai A. From Erechtheis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 681, line 10; 792, line 18; 852, line 5; 1706, lines 35 and 43(?). *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos. 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8).
Bouleutai 5.

¹¹ All references to *I. G.*, II², 1706, are to Dow's publication in *Hesperia*, II (1933), Plate XIV.

¹² So Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas*, p. 108. Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 58) classifies it as a town deme.

Paiania καθύπερθεν.¹³ From Pandionis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 378, line 7 (= *Hesperia*, VII [1938], p. 99); 478, line 34; 2413, line 1. Bouleutai 2.

Pergase A. From Erechtheis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 912, line 22. *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos. 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8). Bouleutai 2.

Potamos Deiradiotes. From Leontis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 488, lines 5-6; 2413, line 22. Bouleutai 1 or 2.

IDENTIFICATION UNCERTAIN.

Deiradiotai. From Leontis. Coast-deme.

This deme must be assigned to one of the Macedonian tribes in accord with *I. G.*, II², 1706, line 105. Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 448) has favored Antigonis, because Potamos Deiradiotes, with which Deiradiotai was closely associated, was assigned to it, and he has been followed by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177).

Bouleutai 2.

IDENTIFICATIONS INCORRECT.

Ankyle B. Aigeis.

The only evidence for the removal of this deme from Aigeis was offered by Kirchner in *Rhein. Mus.*, LIX (1904), p. 299, on the basis of *I. G.*, II², 678, lines 20-21 (third century), where Ankyle furnished only one prytanis for Aigeis as against two in *I. G.*, II², 1747 (ca. 350 B. C.) and 1749 (341/0 B. C.). This transfer has been accepted by Schebelew, Dinsmoor, Gomme, *et alii*, although variations of one representative for a deme are numerous in the prytany and bouleutai lists. See below.

Phegaia A. Pandionis.

The assignment of this deme to Antigonis has been rejected by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 189) in the light of his new reading for *I. G.*, II², 912, line 24.

DEMETRIAS

IDENTIFICATIONS CERTAIN.

Anakaia B. From Hippothontis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 96; see below p. 193. Bouleutai 2(?).

¹³ See Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 12, note 1.

Atene B.¹⁴ From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 502, line 8; 1706, line 135. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 12.
Bouleutai 3(?).

Daidalidai. From Kekropis. Inland-deme.

Hesperia, IX (1940), no. 10. Unpublished Agora prytany list
(Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870).
Bouleutai 1.

Diomeia. From Aigeis.¹⁵ Town-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 1 (see Dow, *Hesperia* III [1934], p. 180).
Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 11.
Bouleutai 1.

Hagnous. From Akamantis. Inland-deme (?).

Stephanos of Byzantium, *s. v.* *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 11.
Bouleutai 4 +.

Hippotomadai. From Oineis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 681, lines 16 and 17; 1706, line 52; 2437, line 13.
Hesperia, IX (1940), no. 11. Unpublished Agora prytany list
(Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870).
Bouleutai 1.

Koile. From Hippothontis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 665, line 51; 681, lines 12 and 13; 838, line 8. *Hesperia*,
VII (1938), no. 20, line 45; IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.
Bouleutai 1.

Kothokidai. From Oineis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 681, line 14; 697, line 7; 1706, line 25; 2437, line 10.
Bouleutai 2.

Melite. From Kekropis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 488, lines 6-7; 665, line 49; 792, line 21; 1704, line 2.
Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.

Bouleutai in fourth century 17.

Oion Kerameikon. From Leontis. Inland-deme (?).

I. G., II², 2437, line 8. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 11. Unpublished
Agora prytany list (Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870).
Bouleutai 1.

Phyle B.¹⁶ From Oineis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 143 (see below); 2437, line 15. *Hesperia*,
IX (1940), no. 10.
Bouleutai 4.¹⁷

¹⁴ For the division of Atene, see below, pp. 192-193.

¹⁵ See Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 143, note 1.

¹⁶ For Phyle being divided, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76.

¹⁷ Sundwall (*Eranos*, XXV [1927], p. 192) states that a demotic was inscribed in line 20 of *I. G.*, II², 2437. This gives the number of four for the bouleutai of Phyle B, as against three for the undivided tribe in the period before 307 B. C.

Poros. From Akamantis. Town-deme (?).

Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.

Bouleutai ?.

Potamos καθύπ. or ὑπέν. From Leontis. Town-deme (?).¹⁸

I. G., II², 2437.

Bouleutai 2.

Thorai. From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 832, lines 6-7; 1706, lines 36 and 45. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 10.

Bouleutai 4(?)

Xypete. From Kekropis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 478, line 33; 681, line 15. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 10.

Bouleutai ?

IDENTIFICATION UNCERTAIN.

Amphitrope B. From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

Assignment to Demetrias was made for the first time by Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 447) on the basis of *I. G.*, II², 1492, line 96. This evidence was earlier questioned by Bates (*op. cit.*, p. 17). During the period of twelve tribes Amphitrope had four prytaneis from Antiochis and after 200 B. C. it continued to be represented by four. Bouleutic representation of Amphitrope B, then, may be estimated at 1.

IDENTIFICATION INCORRECT.

Bate. From Aigeis. Town-deme.

This deme was assigned to Demetrias by Kirchner (see *ad I. G.*, II², 2362), Schebelew, and Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 57) because of its omission from a register of prytaneis now published as *Prytaneis*, no. 10. Omission of demes from complete prytany lists¹ is sufficiently well attested (Dow, *Prytaneis*, p. 28, and Pritchett, *Hesperia*, IX [1940], pp. 124-126), so Kirchner's assignment is not justified in the light of present evidence.

As noted above, there is no valid evidence for the assignment of the deme Ankyle B to Antigonis. The archon Archelaos with his secretary Μόσχος Μοσ[χίωνος 'Α]γκυλῆθεν (*I. G.*, II², 844, 848; cf. *Prytaneis*, no. 36) has been assigned by Ferguson (*Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 27) and Meritt (*Hesperia*, VII [1938], p. 138) to the year 212/1 B. C., which requires a secre-

¹⁸ So Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 59) and Kirchner (*ad I. G.*, II², 2362). Solders (*op. cit.*, p. 90), however, locates it near Gargettos and Erchia, which are both inland demes. This would place Potamos some distance from the other demes which comprise the inland trittys of Leontis (see the map in Hommel's article in *R.-E.*, s. v. Trittyes, col. 369).

tary from Antigonis (I), although Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 218) has noted that the only reason for this assignment has been based on the requirements of the secretary cycle. Beloch, Roussel (*Ξένα*, pp. 86-88), and Wilhelm (*Beiträge*, p. 78), on historical grounds, dated this archon very soon after the date when Athens received her freedom from Macedonia, and, indeed, the year 222/1 B. C., which requires a secretary from Aigeis (IV), is otherwise unoccupied and may now be assigned to Archelaos.¹⁹

In the year of Diokles (215/4 B. C.), it has hitherto been assumed that the tribe Aigeis was represented by two archontes (see Dow, *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177); this being the only example of double representation in the list of Athenian archontes published as *I. G.*, II², 1706. The first thesmothetes of the year was from Aigeis, and the reading for the demotic of the Polemarch was read in Dow's text (*Hesperia*, II [1933], Plate XIV, line 143) as Φγγ[ού], although he stated on page 445, and repeated the following year (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 180), that the readings on the stone favored Φλα. In the photograph published in *Hesperia*, II (1933), p. 439, and on the squeeze, it appears that the second letter may equally well be an upsilon, and in the fifth letter space there is preserved the upper part of a sigma. The demotic is Φυλάσ(ιος), and the Polemarch was from Demetrias, which was not otherwise represented in the archonship of Diokles. Furthermore, this new determination settles the problems of the division and allocation of the demes Atene and Anakaia and of the supposed irregularities in the order of the archontes in the year of Menekrates (220/19 B. C.).²⁰ As a result of the assignment of the Polemarch of 215/4 B. C. to the tribe Demetrias, this official's cycle of allotment, which began in 223/2 B. C.,²¹ requires a tribe other than Demetrias for 220/19 B. C. The Polemarch of this year is known to have been from Atene (*I. G.*, II², 1706, line 93), so it

¹⁹ Less satisfactorily, the year 209/8 B. C. might be suggested; see Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 36, note 7. For the removal of Euthykritos from 222/1 B. C., see Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LX (1939), p. 260.

²⁰ For the date, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 138.

²¹ See Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 177. Cf. Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, pp. 50-53, and Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76. Since it is now established that the Polemarshs of 224/3 and 220/19 B. C. came from the same tribe, Antiochis, the cycle must have begun after 224/3 B. C.

follows that a part of Atene remained in Antiochis. In turn, the elimination of the possibility of the Polemarch of 220/19 B. C. being from Demetrias permits the assignment of the second thesmothetes of this year, from the deme Anakaia (*I. G.*, II², 1706, line 96), to the second Macedonian tribe, and indeed the tribal order so requires. With some reason, Dow had supposed in *Hesperia*, III (1934), pp. 177 and 180, and reaffirmed in *Prytaneis*, p. 133, that Atene was not divided and that the archontes of the year of Menekrates were not arranged in the tribal order. But the new evidence does not support this, so the earlier allocations of Dinsmoor (*Archons*, pp. 447-448) may be followed.²²

In conclusion, the following statistics may be noted: Antigonis was made up of demes taken from Erechtheis (3), Aigeis (2), Pandionis (3), Leontis (3?), and Akamantis (1); Demetrias of demes taken from Aigeis (1), Leontis (2), Akamantis (2), Oineis (3), Kekropis (3), Hippothontis (2), and Antiochis (2 or 3). The bouleutic representation for the various demes of Demetrias, roughly computed from fragmentary bouleutai and prytany lists as well as Gomme's figures for the fourth century, gives a total of approximately 50 and suggests that the roster of Demetrias is complete; that of Antigonis, on the other hand, totals only about forty, and suggests the possibility of unassigned demes for this tribe.²³

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT.

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²² Cf. Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76, note 14.

²³ In Dinsmoor's recent volume, *The Athenian Archon List in the Light of Recent Discoveries*, received after this article was in final proof, he argues (pp. 55-57) that within the period to which he wishes to assign *I. G.*, II², 477, on historical grounds there is no place for its secretary (from Potamos) in his revised Ferguson-Meritt scheme of secretarial tribal cycles (Scheme A on page 54). He posits that the secretary must be assigned to Antigonis (I) and the inscription to 278/7 B. C. As a result of our new information concerning Potamos (I, II, and VI), this particular argument against the Ferguson-Meritt scheme no longer applies. Dinsmoor's return (pp. 160-161, 232) to the archonship of Ergochaes (now assigned to 226/5 B. C.) as the date for the creation of the tribe Ptolemais would leave unexplained the break in the archontes' cycle which it is now demonstrated occurred after 224 B. C. (note 21 above) and will be reexamined elsewhere.

THE ATHENIAN CLERUCHY ON SAMOS.

Sundwall was the *editor princeps* of the naval record published in the *Editio Minor* as *I. G.*, II², 1609. His conclusion about the date of this inscription is expressed in these words: "Die Kleruchen-Sendung, welche vor 361 wohl am ehesten in Frage kommt, ist die nach Samos, die Beloch ins J. 365/4 verlegt (*Griech. Gesch.*, II, 274, 2). Unsere Urkunde wäre also ein Auszug aus dem Rechenschaftsbericht der Werftaufseher d. J. 365/4."¹ He had already observed that the inscription must ante-date the year 361/0 when Kallistratos went into exile (*loc. cit.*, pp. 50, 55). That the cleruchic expedition mentioned in lines 88-111 was destined to go to Samos was for Sundwall only a mere conjecture.² Fraenkel (*Ath. Mitt.*, XXXXVIII [1923], pp. 21-2) could not accept his date on the grounds that Pasion, a contributor of naval equipment in this text, was dead in 370/69. Sundwall (*loc. cit.*, p. 54) had been aware of this difficulty, but he had assumed that the heirs of Pasion had paid back his defalcations. Fraenkel replied that, had Pasion's heirs returned the equipment which was still owed, the text would have said so. His objection seems valid, since in such cases the text is specific in recording the names of all parties concerned (cf. *I. G.*, II², 1622, 359-64). Fraenkel's argument and date have been accepted by Kirchner in his new edition, *I. G.*, II², 1609. I believe, however, that there is evidence that Sundwall's conjecture about the date of *I. G.*, II², 1609 is correct. But before we consider this evidence it will be necessary to study a passage from another epigraphical text.

There follows an excerpt, lines 3-12, of *I. G.*, II², 1952:

[Ἐρχθ]ηίδος
 -----ης
 5 -----ος Καλλίο
 -----ς Εὐνόμο
 -----ης Λυσιμάχο
 [Λαμπτρ]ῆς καθύπερ
 [-----β]ολος Ἰσχυρίο

¹ *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXV (1910), p. 50

² His conjecture was accepted by Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 1266, note 1.

10 -----ς Ἰσχυρίο
 -----ας Φιλίνο
 [Δαμπτρ]ῆς Πάραλοι

It is part of an inscription containing a list of names of Athenian cleruchs. Their destination, like that of those named in *I. G.*, II², 1609, has remained problematical, because the stone is broken away at the place where the name of the colony must have been inscribed. The letter-forms are typical of the fourth century B. C., especially of the decade 370-60. For this reason the various editors, Koehler (*I. G.*, II, 960) and Kirchner (*I. G.*, II², 1952) were disposed to assign the text either to the cleruchy of Samos or to that of Potidaea.

In the above lines the demes are clearly part of the tribe Erechtheis. An investigation will show that two names therein, namely, Kallias and Eunomos are known to have been members of the deme Euonymon. Aeschines mentions Antikles, son of Kallias of Euonymon, who sailed as a cleruch to the island Samos (I, 53). This Kallias has been identified as the hellenotamias of 410/09 (*P. A.*, 7864). Eunomos would be an ancestor, probably a grandfather, of the hieropoios of about 322 B. C. (*P. A.*, 5869). I can find no evidence about the third member of this deme.

It cannot be a mere coincidence that a Kallias of Euonymon should be known from literary evidence to have been father of a cleruch sent to Samos in 361/0,³ and that a Kallias, also of the tribe Erechtheis and probably of the deme Euonymon, was father of a cleruch sent forth at about the same time. From these indications it would seem probable that both these men are one and the same. This identification would show that *I. G.*, II², 1952 is concerned with Samos.

³ Aeschines (I, 53) says of Antikles: οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀπεστίν ἐν Σάμῳ μετὰ τῶν κληρούχων, and the scholiast observes: εἰς Σάμον κληρούχους ἐπεμψαν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Ἀθήνησι, Νικοφύμον (361/0 B. C.). The scholiast on this passage does not present independent evidence for his date of the cleruchy, but he bases his observation on the narrative of Aeschines. Soon after Antikles' departure to Samos as cleruch, Timarchos became acquainted with Hegesandros just back in Athens from the Hellespont where he had served as tamias under Timomachos in 361/0 (Aesch., I, 56; Beloch, *Attische Politik*, p. 297). An earlier dispatch of cleruchs had been sent to Samos in 365/4 soon after its capture, and another was sent in 352/1 (Glotz-Cohen, *Hist. Grecque*, III, 1, p. 189, note 48).

This interpretation receives confirmation from another name in the same passage of *I. G.*, II², 1952. In line 11 we find [-----]as Φιλίνο of whom Kirchner says "eius frater videlicet n. 1609, 91." The man named in line 91 is Philinos of Lamptrai, a trierarch in the cleruchic expedition of *I. G.*, II², 1609. Since *I. G.*, II², 1609 and 1592 are closely contemporary, both these men named Philinos are identical. The word "frater" should be corrected to read "pater." Philinos, I believe, accompanied his son as trierarch in the fleet which carried the cleruchs to Samos. We now have two bits of evidence from independent sources which show (1) that the cleruchs of *I. G.*, II², 1952, through the connection with the speech of Aeschines, are members of the cleruchy on Samos, and (2) that the cleruchic expedition mentioned in *I. G.*, II², 1609 is also connected with Samos through its link with *I. G.*, II², 1952.

The excerpt quoted above I would now restore as follows (lines 3-7):

[Ἐρεχθ]ηίδος
[Εὐωνυμ]ῆς
[---⁴⁻⁵---]ος Καλλίο
[---³⁻⁴---]ς Εὐνόμο
[---⁴⁻⁵---]ης Λυσιμάχο

I have added the approximate number of missing letters in each name.

We must now return to Fraenkel's chief argument against a date in 365/4 for *I. G.*, II², 1609. The phrases describing Pasion's contributions and obligations are (lines 85-6): ἀγκύρας δ[ύο αἰ Πασίω]ν Ἀχαρ εἰσήγηγκεν, and (line 87): σχοινία αἰ Πασίων Ἀχαρ ἀπέδωκε. Fraenkel assumed that these goods were "contributed" and "paid back" in the year of the inventory. Rather, these phrases only designate specific equipment such as "the two anchors which Pasion contributed" or "the hawsers which Pasion gave back" with no indication of the date. Pasion certainly returned his equipment before his death in 370/69, but his equipment was still in use in 365/4.⁴

⁴ Fraenkel suggested the years 372/1-370/69, and especially 372/1, as the date of this naval inventory (*loc. cit.*, p. 22). This in itself is highly improbable, because Timotheos in 372/1 was away in Egypt in the service of the King of Persia (Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, III, 1, pp. 159,

There were three cleruchic expeditions to Samos: 365/4, 361/0, and 352/1. The evidence adduced from Aeschines shows that Antikles, son of Kallias of Euonymon, went to Samos in 361/0. Kallistratos' exile in the autumn of 361 and his death *ca.* 355 make it impossible to date *I. G.*, II², 1609 after the year 365/4. Therefore, since *I. G.*, II², 1609 and 1952 must be dated in the same year because of the close link between Philinos (the trierarch on a cleruchic expedition) and his son (a cleruch sent to Samos), *I. G.*, II², 1952 must also be dated in 365/4. It will be noted that Kallias had two sons, one of whom [—⁴—⁵—]os went to Samos in 365/4, while the other, Antikles, went to Samos in the second installment of cleruchs in the year 361/0.

The phraseology used in certain lines of the naval record *I. G.*, II², 1609 is significant. Trierarchs in this text are found only with their demotics; generals need no demotic where they are mentioned in their official capacity. For example, in lines 116-117: Χάρης· οὗτος παρέλαβεν καὶ ἐπέπλευκεν ἔ[χων . . . ^{navis} . . .] ἧς Μόσχος Ἀγγε καὶ Εὐθυμος Παλλην [τριηραρχοῦσι].⁵ Here Chares is distinguished from his trierarchs by his lack of demotic; he needs no title, and this is true also of Chabrias in line 116. Although both Chabrias and Timotheos are generals in 365/4, in lines 100 and 95 where they are mentioned as trierarchs they receive their demotics; but, as was noticed above, Chabrias in his official capacity as general receives no demotic. The reason for the distinction is that they had no connection as generals with the cleruchy to which they were attached as trierarchs, for the cleruchy had its special leaders, the κληρουχάρχοντες.

Phanostratos of Kephisia appears as a trierarch in line 92 of *I. G.*, II², 1609. According to the speech of Isaeus (VI, 27) delivered in 364/3 he had been a trierarch under Timotheos. This trierarchy followed shortly after the death of his brother-in-law, Philoktemon, at Chios. The historical problem of this mysterious battle near Chios has been attacked in many ways (cf. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus*, 1904, p. 512; Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, II², p. 549, note 1), and it has always been pointed out that no conflict in the neighborhood of Chios before that of 357 is elsewhere recorded. I would suggest that during the

212), and could not have served Athens as a trierarch as this text demands (*I. G.*, II², 1609, line 100).

⁵ I have restored here on analogy with *I. G.*, II², 1607, line 4 *et passim*.

ten-month siege of Samos a skirmish occurred near Chios. This is not improbable, for we know that another city close by, Erythrae, is in some way concerned in the official report of Timotheos made after his capture of Samos (*I. G.*, II², 108). By this interpretation not only Samos was involved, but also Chios and Erythrae, in the expedition of Timotheos. Philoktemon, then, was killed in 366/5 near Chios during a sea-battle. Shortly thereafter, Phanostratos, his kinsman, sailed out as trierarch in the cleruchic expedition to Samos (*I. G.*, II², 1609, line 92). This would have to be the expedition "under Timotheos" which is mentioned in Isaeus. This receives confirmation from Sundwall's restoration in lines 81-2 of *I. G.*, II², 1609 of [Χαιρέστρ]ατος Κηφι, for Chairestratos had served only once as trierarch before 364/3 (Isaeus, VI, 60) and was too young to have served in the Theban war. In my opinion the dating of *I. G.*, II², 1609 helps to date these disputed events in the aforementioned speech of Isaeus, as well as the cleruchic inscription *I. G.*, II², 1952. To conclude, we have in the fragmentary inscription *I. G.*, II², 1952 a partial list of Athenian cleruchs dispatched to Samos in 365/4; the cleruchic expedition mentioned in *I. G.*, II², 1609 is concerned with Samos and dates that naval record in 365/4, and the battle near Chios mentioned in Isaeus, VI, is connected with the siege of Samos conducted by Timotheos in 366/5.

EUGENE SCHWEIGERT.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

O. MICH. I, 24.

In his great edition of Michigan ostraca Professor Leiv Amundsen¹ has published as number 24 a brief text of seven lines which recalls such considerably longer lists as *B. G. U. IX*,² 1893, and *Berl. Leihg.*³ 3 and 4 Verso. The text looks very much like an excerpt from a ledger in which public dues on grain land were recorded; the ostrakon may have served as a receipt. The person concerned is Marcus Titianus Val . . . ,⁴ who held land of various categories—hieratic, catocic, *epibolé*—at Phil . . .⁵ in the second century A. D., and *O. Mich.* 24 fixes his obligations, and probably payments, with respect to it. Since a recent examination has thrown additional light on the arithmetic of the ostrakon, a new edition may not be unwelcome.

The dues as printed in Amundsen's edition present the following scheme:

Type of land	Charge	Extra charge	Total
hieratic	4 1/4 art. +	2/3 1/6 1/12 art. =	4 1/2 art.
<i>epibolé</i>	1 1/2 1/3 " +	1/4 1/12 " =	2 1/6 "
hier. <i>epib.</i>	2 2/3 1/6 1/12 " +	1/3 1/12 " =	3 1/3 "
hieratic	2 " +	1/3 " =	2 1/3 "
catocic	1/12 " +	1/24 " =	1/6 1/12 "
			<hr/>
			12 1/2 1/12 "

When the account is checked, no discrepancy appears between the grand total and the five partial totals, but the first and fifth partial totals are found to be obviously incorrect. $4 \frac{1}{4} + \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{6} \frac{1}{12} = 5 \frac{1}{6}$, not $4 \frac{1}{2}$; $\frac{1}{12} + \frac{1}{24} = \frac{1}{8}$, not $\frac{1}{6} \frac{1}{12}$. A second feature of the account contributes more subtly to a reader's uneasiness. In the measurement of artabas, the

¹ *Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection*, Part I (Ann Arbor, 1935).

² Heinz Kortenbeutel, *Steuerlisten römischer Zeit aus Theadelphia* (Berlin, 1937).

³ Ture Kalén, *Berliner Leihgabe griechischer Papyri* (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, 1932, Filosofi 1).

⁴ Amundsen prints Οὔα(λ) and records Οὔά(λνς) as a suggestion made by Prof. Sam Eitrem.

⁵ The ostrakon has Φιλ(), which suggests Philadelphia; but other place-names in the Fayyum begin similarly. In his *Geographical Index* (p. 210) Amundsen recognizes the strong claim of Philadelphia, but naturally refrains from a positive identification.

combinations $1/6 \ 1/12$, which occurs here three times, and $1/4 \ 1/12$ are contrary to good usage. $1/6 \ 1/12$ is normally given as $1/4$; $1/4 \ 1/12$ as $1/3$.⁶ A third and most serious difficulty arises from the relation of the extra charges to the principal sums. In payments of the kind recorded on this ostrakon, the extra charge is normally $1/7$ of the principal in the calculation of rents; $1/6$, in the calculation of taxes.⁷ On this basis, even after allowance has been made for the use of $1/24$ as the smallest fraction of an artaba,⁸ the extra charge on the first item is much too high, and that on the third item slightly low.

These considerations have led me to reëxamine the ostrakon, and I am now able to offer a revised text which almost wholly eliminates the obscurities of the *editio princeps*.⁹

1. Μάρκ(ος) Τιτιανὸ(ς) Οὐαλ()¹⁰
2. Φιλ()¹¹ ἱεράς γῆς (πυροῦ ἀρτάβας) δη', προ(σμετρούμενων)
βκδ, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) δλγ
3. ἐπιβολ(ῆς) (πυρ. ἀρτ.) αλγκδ,¹² δκδ,¹³ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) βς

⁶ See the interesting remarks of Kalén, who has shown extraordinary skill and acuteness in unraveling the arithmetic of tax papyri, in *Berl. Leihg.*, p. 232; cf. Ulrich Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912), I, p. lxix, for the combination of fraction systems in measuring artabas.

⁷ *Berl. Leihg.*, pp. 235 f., 238; *B. G. U.* IX, p. 51; S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton, 1938), 38 f.

⁸ Cf. Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1899), I, 749 f.

⁹ My readings have had the advantage of a careful check by Dr. O. M. Pearl. I should wish no one to lose sight of the fact that the new text, apart from the fractions, remains substantially as published by Amundsen. The hand is a difficult one, and I am fully conscious of my indebtedness to Amundsen's unusual expertness in the decipherment of ostrakon texts.

¹⁰ See note 4.

¹¹ See note 5. There is no doubt that Φιλ() is a place-name. The arrangement—place-name, land-category, payment—is exactly that which occurs repeatedly in *B. G. U.* IX, 1893, and *Berl. Leihg.* 3 and 4 Verso.

¹² αλγ Amundsen; *gamma*, however, is clearly followed by a numeral, which, on arithmetical grounds, can be only $1/12$ or $1/24$. Comparison with the style of γιβ in line 4, which follows the pattern of the same combination in *B. G. U.* IX, 1893 (pl. 2), has convinced me that γκδ is easier to accept in line 3.

¹³ π(ροσμετρούμενα) δλβ Amundsen. I am unable to see any vestige of

4. $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma \dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\beta\omicron\lambda(\eta\varsigma)$ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\overline{\beta\beta\kappa\delta}$, $\overline{\gamma\iota\beta}$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\gamma\eta'$ ¹⁴
5. καὶ εἰς Μάρκ(ον) Φιλ() λό(ιπογραφουμένων)¹⁵ ζ (ἔτους)
ὁμοί<ω>ς
6. $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma \gamma\eta\varsigma \beta$, $\dot{\gamma}$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\beta\dot{\gamma}$
7. κατ(οικικῆς) $\gamma(\eta\varsigma)$ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\dot{\iota}\beta$, $\acute{\kappa}\delta$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) η' , (γίνονται)
(πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\iota\beta\iota\dot{\beta}$

The account in its new form may be analyzed as follows:

Type of land	Charge	Extra charge	Total
hieratic	4 1/8 art. +	2/3 1/24 art. =	4 1/2 1/3 art.
<i>epibolé</i>	1 1/2 1/3 1/24 " +	1/4 1/24 " =	2 1/6 "
hier. <i>epib.</i>	2 2/3 1/24 " +	1/3 1/12 " =	3 1/8 "
hieratic	2 " +	1/3 " =	2 1/3 "
catoecic	1/12 " +	1/24 " =	1/8 "
			<hr/> 12 1/2 1/12 "

HERBERT C. YOUTIE.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

π. The first fraction is certainly 1/4, but the ostrakon is so badly worn at this point that Amundsen's recognition of the fraction is a real achievement. The second fraction, at first glance, appears to be 1/12, as read by Amundsen. In preferring 1/24 I have been guided by a palaeographic comparison of ϵ and κ in the two fractions and by the arithmetical exigencies of the line. Since the total continues to be 2 1/6 and the principal sum is greater than Amundsen's 1 1/2 1/3, the extra charge cannot be as high as 1/4 1/12. My reading is nevertheless very uncertain.

¹⁴ $\gamma\eta'$ Amundsen. The remnant of the fraction is suitable for either reading. 3 1/8 must be preferred because the new reading of the principal sum, 2 2/3 1/24, is beyond doubt.

¹⁵ εἰς Μάρκ(ον) Φιλ() λό(γον) Amundsen. Φιλ() is a place-name (notes 5 and 11), and decidedly awkward between Μάρκ(ον) and λό(γον). I have therefore preferred the accusative of the person after εἰς—a common construction with names of account (e.g. *B. G. U.* IX, pp. 118, 148), and the resolution λό(ιπογραφουμένων), "for arrears." Presumably, lines 2-4 contain payments for the current seventh year, although no date is given, while lines 6-7 record payment of arrears for the sixth year. For similar combinations of current payments and arrears see *Berl. Leihg.* 4 Verso, *passim*.

VALERIUS MAXIMUS IN CERTAIN EXCERPTS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY.

For many ancient authors the importance of epitomes, excerpts, adaptations, and versifications for the study of the text has been all too slowly recognized. Their value can be very great in the case of a writer like Valerius, whose moral exempla are so admirably suited to quotation and whose text as constituted at present is not satisfactory. From the early epitomes of Paris and Nepotianus down through the excerpts of Heiric, the versification of Tortarius, the contributions of a host of lesser excerptors and epitomizers who were busy through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and who are as yet nameless and unnoticed, and the references in such writers as John of Salisbury, Peter of Blois, and Vincent of Beauvais the popularity of Valerius is well attested. Paris, Nepotianus, Tortarius, and others have already proved their worth;¹ we cannot always expect such finds, as I shall demonstrate below, and there are obvious dangers, but it is highly necessary that the mass of material be examined and that we convert to our use whatever, with sufficient authority, supplements or refutes readings in the extant manuscripts of the full text of Valerius.

I treat here citations from Valerius in two manuscripts of the twelfth century.² Vaticanus latinus 1869³ (x), a parchment codex of 210 folios, size 0.328 x 0.234 meters, written in two columns, contains the works of various ancient and mediaeval authors, mainly historians, some in full, some epitomized or excerpted. Included, e. g., are the *History of Alexander the Great* by Curtius Rufus, the *Chronicles* of Freculphus, a compendium of the *Res Gestae* of Alexander by Julius Valerius,

¹ For recent work cf. *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), pp. 35-46; *C. P.*, XXXII (1937), pp. 70-72, 349-359; *Speculum*, XII (1937), pp. 516-518. These articles will define the relationships of certain manuscripts mentioned here, as L (Laurentianus 1899), A (Bernensis 366), G (Bruxellensis 5336), and Γ (Gudianus latinus 166).

² I have examined these manuscripts personally and also possess photostats of certain portions.

³ Cf. Sanford, *T. A. P. A.*, LV (1924), p. 228 and Nogara, *Codices Vaticani Latini*, III (1912), pp. 309 ff.

and certain *Letters* ascribed to Alexander. The manuscript is of interest in connection with the transmission of the Alexander story in the Middle Ages. Folios 209-210 contain excerpts from the story drawn from such authors as Pompeius Trogus, Gellius, and Seneca. Interspersed with these are two passages assigned to Valerius Maximus in the margin and a third, not assigned, which may have some connection with our author.⁴ Unfortunately they are all more or less free adaptations and of no great service in our study of the text of Valerius. The first, from VII. 2 ext. 10, adds a detail not included in the Valerius version. The second, from IX. 5 ext. 1, is closer to the text than either of the other two, but still somewhat garbled. The third, which relates the episode of VIII. 14 ext. 2, may perhaps more readily be referred to those verses in Juvenal beginning at *Sat.*, X, 168 which are found quoted at the end of this manuscript.

With Monacensis 22004⁵ (w), of the same century, the picture is entirely different, and a more extended treatment of this manuscript will therefore be in order. It is a large parchment codex of 174 folios, measuring 0.475 x 0.315 meters, and bound in thick boards which have been covered with a white skin tooled in diamond shapes. In addition to the present number the back bears a yellow slip of paper with the indication *Wess.* 4 and an

⁴ Since these passages are very short, and not printed elsewhere, I quote them here:

I. Phylippo vero ipsum quadam die increpante quod eos quorum amicitiam muneribus comparaverat sibi fideles estimaret respondit, "A liberalitate," inquit, "istud mihi, pater, provenit."

II. Sic igitur virtus ac felicitas Alexandri tribus insolentie gradibus exulavit (it is of interest to note that A² reads *exulavit* as against *exultavit*, cf. Kempf's second edition of Valerius [1888], p. 442; citations by page and line in this article unless otherwise indicated refer to this edition): fastidio nanque Phylippi Iovem Hammonem patrem ascivit, tedio morum et cultus (*morem excultus* LA¹) Macedonici vestem et instituta Persica assumpsit, spreto mortali habitu divinum emulatus (*aemulatus*, *aem* in ras. A *caput latus* L¹ *captatus* L²) est. Ob hoc suis magis odibilis, quod patrem, quod civem, quod hominem demum exuere pudori non erat.

III. Eique videbatur totius orbis angusta possessio que deorum omnium sufficit domicilio; unum illud, unus Pelleo iuveni non sufficit orbis. Estuat infelix angusto limite mundi. Igitur insatiabilis laudis et glorie. . . .

⁵ Cf. Halm-Meyer, *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibl. Regiae Monacensis*, II, 4 (1881), p. 17.

orange square of paper reading *Kr. 2*. Beneath the papal bookplate on f. 1 are two hexameters⁶ which further show that the manuscript was at some time at the Benedictine abbey of Wessobrunn in Upper Bavaria. The text begins in two columns on the verso of f. 1 with a Latin version of the *Bellum Judaicum* of Josephus in brown ink, with titles and initials in red. In a darker ink but probably in the same hand there follow on ff. 168v-172v the *Excerpta de Libro Valerii Maximi Dictorum Factorumque Mirabilium*. Folios 172v-174 contain portions from the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius.

The excerpts from Valerius cover portions of the entire nine books and occur as follows:⁷ I. 1 ext. 3; 5. 9; 7 ext. 8; 8 ext. 15, 17, 16; II. 4. 2; 6. 10; III. 2. 11, 19; 3 ext. 3, 4; 7. 1c; IV. 3. 1; V. 1. 10; 3. 4; 6 ext. 1, 4; VI. 3. 9; 4. 1, 2, 4; 5 ext. 3, 4; 9 ext. 1; VII. 2. 1, ext. 1, 4, 6, 11; *III. 7 ext. 1*; *IV. 1 ext. 1*; VII. 3. 2, ext. 1, 7; *IX. 2 ext. 1*; *3 ext. 3, 4*; VII. 5. 2; 6. 2, 3; VIII. 7. 1, 2, ext. 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16; IX. 12. 1, 2, ext. 2, 6, 9; 13. 2, ext. 2, 3, 4; 14. 1, ext. 1.

A comparison of readings reveals interesting relations with other manuscripts of Valerius. Our *w* will stand with LA in some cases: p. 12. 14, *epydauriae w epidauriae L¹A epidauri L²G*; 42. 24 *somnio wLAΓ somno G*; 116. 14 *os wLA ore G*; 120. 11 *dimicamus wLA dimicandum est GΓ*; 294. 6 *quod wLA quo GΓ*. It does not appear, however, to be narrowly allied with either one of these manuscripts. With G there are striking parallels, and in both Γ and *w* we can almost see the excerptors at work as they strike out those passages which are not essential to their narrative: 24. 16 *inconsiderantius wGΓ inconsideratius LA*; 42. 17 *somnium wGΓ somnum LA*; 54. 25 *oculis—admirabilius om. wΓ*; 55. 3 *et om. wΓ*; 55. 4 *modo om. wΓ*; 68. 19 §3 *om. Γ* §3-II. 6. 9 p. 79. 23 *om. w*; 120. 7 *ordine wGΓ ordo LA¹ ardore A²*; 132. 24 *oportunum locum w oportum locum Γ oportunum LAG*; 178. 2 *accersitis wΓ arcessitis LAG*; 221. 18 *quam praeclarum—inhumatum iacuisset 222. 1 om. wΓ*; 222. 2 *quoque om. wΓ in ras. G*; 237. 27 *sed ut—transgrediar om. wΓ*; ⁸ 258. 13 *sequitur—*

⁶ Wessofontani proba sum possessio claustrī,
Heus! Domino me redde meo: sic iura reposcunt.

⁷ I have italicized those which depart from the normal order.

⁸ Cf. here 387. 9 *atque ut—actum transgrediar* and 430. 12 *trans-*

exemplum om. wΓ; 289.23 *magno scelere—causa qui*] *metellus w magno—concitata est* and *longe—causa qui* om. Γ; 290.3 *sobrietatis* wΓ *sobrietati* LA; 292.15 *cum* om. wΓ; 351.1 *autem* om. wΓ; 355.14 *potius* om. wΓ; 439.1 *pars* om. wΓ *pars*] *urbs*, in ras. A; 458.9 *singularem fati—sepulcrum habet* 13 om. w §1 om. Γ. There are in addition passages where one portion will be omitted by *w* and a larger or smaller portion by Γ, as 68.11 *quae inchoata—senatus consulto* 14 om. w *quae—cautum est* 14] *cautum est etiam senatus consulto* Γ; 120.15 *ceterum ut—III. 3 ext. 2 p. 132. 18 om. w ceterum ut—exequamur* om. Γ; 238.15 *invalidae ad—V. 6. 8 p. 257. 9 om. w §5 om. Γ; 257. 10 sunt—exempla* om. w *sed ut attingam* Γ *propositi*] *add. attingam* G; 257. 25 *ab eodem—V. 6 ext. 3 p. 258. 12 om. w ab eodem—manavit* 26 om. Γ; 290. 7 *horridum C.—fracta cessit* VI. 4. 1 p. 292. 13 om. w *horridum C.—supercilium nam* 8] *gallus quoque sulpicius* Γ; 465. 19 *supplicium irato—finis fuit* 22 om. w *Alexander enim Thebe* 22] *quem tamen eadem w cuius timoris* 21—*interemit* 23 om. Γ. But although both Γ and *w* are twelfth century, *w*, on the basis of readings alone, cannot come from the more extensive epitome, nor does it derive from eleventh-century G: 12. 1 §3 om. Γ; 24. 12 *adnotatu dignum—sub quo* om. Γ; 24. 13 *occiderit* om. Γ; 42. 25 *victor* om. Γ; 116. 10 §11 om. Γ; 143. 15 *percunctatus* wLAΓ *percontatus* G; 160. 9 *proximum etsi—potest experimentum* 10 om. Γ; 257. 22 *obiectum w obiecit* L² AGΓ *obiectae* L¹; 258. 14 *magnitudine w magno* L¹A *marusini* L³ *marginē* G *modo* mrg. A e Par. Γ; 292. 15 *omnium consensu—eumque sub* om. Γ *omnium consensu—sub excusatione* 16 om. G; 317. 3 *rediens*] *repetens* Γ; 334. 11 §2 om. Γ; 355. 2 *voluerunt w voluistis* LA¹ *voluisti* A²G *coegit* Γ; 439. 3 *in puerili—valuit namque* 4 om. Γ; 458. 8 §1 and *vix veri* 15—*idem valuit* 16 om. Γ.

Of very great interest to scholars has been the work done by the second hand of A. Our manuscript demonstrates three centuries later a knowledge of this hand: 160. 9 *adeoque* wA²G *adaeque* L *adeaque* A¹; 317. 2 *cum* wΓ om. LA¹ *suprascr.* A²; 458. 22 *non* wA²Γ om. A¹G. This knowledge cannot have been gained through G or Γ, as witness 160. 10 *experimentum*] *add.*

grediemur nunc—rubor inest 13, where only *w* omits these passages which are clearly mere transitions.

tamen wA²; 388. 5 *dixit* w *edixit* A² *edidicit* L (Kempf erroneously reads *edidit*) GA¹ *edicat* Γ⁹. Agreement with A² is, however, by no means uniform.

In conclusion I cite readings in which *w* departs entirely from the tradition as we have it in manuscripts so far collated. These readings vary in value. Future work alone will reveal whether they are conjectures by the scribe or are descended from another tradition of which there are traces elsewhere: 42. 18 *ut*] *quod in* w; 68. 17 *remissioni*] *propter remissionem* w; 68. 18 *gentis*] *genti* w *nota*] *innata* w; 79. 25 *memoria*] *memoriae* w; 79. 26 *dedisse* w *datas* LA¹G *datos* A² *dare* Γ; 238. 12 *sarcina*] *sarcinatus* w; 238. 14 *succurrit*] *occurrit* w; 329. 1 *adstricta*] *affectata est* w; 334. 22 *peractis*] *factis* w; 339. 22 *imperasset*] *imperavit* w; 343. 2 *timensque*] *add. ne* w *dare*] *daret* w;¹⁰; 343. 3 *avertit*] *armavit* w; 355. 1 *atque* w *aeque* L¹AG *eque* L²; 384. 15 *didicit*] *didicerit* w; 384. 20 *cogitur*] *congregaretur* w; 439. 9 *ordinem*] *add. composuit* w; 458. 20 *nuntio*] *add. accepto* w.

DOROTHY M. SCHULLIAN.

ALBION COLLEGE.

⁹ There are a few cases of erasure perhaps involving A²: 159. 24 *et* om. w eras. A; 339. 21 *ante* w in ras. A om. LGΓ; 458. 18 *mater* w in ras. A e Par. om GT. I hope at a later date to show a relation with a manuscript of Valerius as yet unnoticed.

¹⁰ Paris, whom A² knew, has *timens ne—daret*, and this reading was adopted by Halm in his edition of 1865.

A NOTE ON THE NEW INSCRIPTION FROM SAMOTHRACE.

In a recent number of *A. J. P.* (LX [1939], pp. 452 ff.) G. Bakalakis and R. L. Scranton have published an interesting inscription from Samothrace, a decree in honour of Epinicus, commander of Maronea in the name of the king Ptolemy. The most interesting feature of this inscription is the almost complete coincidence of its lines 15 ff., i. e., of the part where the usual formulae of the honorary decrees come to an end and the enumeration of real facts begins, with the lines 7 ff. of the well known inscription of Hippomedon, the governor of Hellespontus and Thrace of Ptolemy Euergetes I, also found at Samothrace (*I. G.*, XII, 8, 156; *S. I. G.*³, 502). This coincidence in the substantial parts of the two decrees, I mean those parts which relate to military and financial assistance given to the city for protecting it in difficult times, makes it very probable that the two decrees are contemporary and refer to the same events. We know little of the hierarchy of the officers and officials of the Ptolemies, but it is fair to suggest that the commander and governor of Maronea was a subordinate of the governor of the Hellespontus and Thrace.

The forces which defended Samothrace consisted of two parts: detachments of the Ptolemaic army, including artillery, and a detachment of mercenary soldiers hired by the city for protection. For these last the Samothracians had no money and asked the Ptolemaic officers to advance it to them. These mercenaries have an individual name (like all mercenaries). It is one and the same in the two inscriptions. In Hippomedon's decree it was read by the first editors [τοις] βραδέων and this word is restored by the editors of the Epinicus' decree (line 26: βραδέων), the most important letters of the word being mutilated. Now, βραδέων gives no sense in the connection in which it stands. It has been explained as mercenaries "late in coming," which is pure nonsense. Bakalakis' and Scranton's "in later times" I simply do not understand. Now, several years ago L. Robert (*B. C. H.*, LIX [1935], pp. 425 ff.), who saw the impossibility of βραδέων, consulted G. Klaffenbach on this subject, and with the help of a squeeze read with certainty instead of βραδέων—

Τραλέων, the name of a Thracian tribe very popular among the Hellenistic rulers as a source of mercenary soldiers. I have no doubt that a careful examination of the photo and squeeze of the Epinicus inscription will confirm the reading of Robert.

As regards the problem against whom Euergetes through his generals defended Samothrace, the new inscription eliminates the possibility that the enemy was Antigonos Doson. The aggressors were barbarians, that is to say, either Thracians or the Celts of the kingdom of Tyle under their king Cavarus. I cannot enter into the discussion of this problem and refer to the quite recent paper of Chr. M. Danov in *Bull. Inst. Arch. Bulg.*, XII (1939), pp. 216 ff. and 253 f. (German resumé). It is well known how heavy was the pressure of Cavarus on Byzantium about this time.

M. ROSTOVITZEFF.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ADDENDUM.

It seems possible to correct the reading of the editors at another point also. In lines 27 ff. they read and restore as follows:

βουλόμενος ἀκόλουθα
 πράττειν τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως αἰ-
 ρέσει καὶ τοῖς προὔπερεμένοις
 [τε] κα[ὶ] τ[ο]ῖς [φ]ιλανθρώποις πρὸς
 [τ]ῇ [πό]λ[ιν] τῆς [ἰκετ]είας τε ἀπο-
 σταλείσης πρὸς αὐτόν, κτλ.

I suspect that an examination of the photograph of Mr. Bakalakis would show that it was possible to read rather

καὶ τοῖς προὔπηγμένοις
 [πα]ρ' α[ὐ]τ[ο]ῖς [φ]ιλανθρώποις πρὸς
 [τ]ῇ [πό]λ[ιν] τῆς [ρεσβ]είας, κτλ.

This would bring the passage rather in conformity with the usual expressions of inscriptions of this type and period.

C. B. WELLES.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ANOTHER LITERARY PAPYRUS IN THE FITZ- WILLIAM MUSEUM, CAMBRIDGE.

In addition to the fragment of the *Medea* of Euripides, which was published by Mr. D. Page in *Class. Quart.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 45 f.,¹ a small papyrus fragment, *Pap. F. M. 2* (measuring 1.8 x 4 cm.), was given to the Fitzwilliam Museum in 1933. The groups of letters which survive are written by two different hands in the "Zierschrift" of the late first or the early second century A. D.,² and read as follows:

Recto (first hand) :	λθν μν̄ ωστ θεκ
Verso (second hand) :	μου υοε σειτ μ̄μα

Recto line 2: The line of abbreviation which begins over μν was originally prolonged over the second ν.

Verso line 3: σειτ is a possible reading.

The groups of letters in recto lines 1 and 2, and in verso lines 2 and 4 are not common; but the fragment is too small to be interpreted with certainty. An attempt, however, may be useful. In considering possible clues as to the nature of the fragment, it occurred to me that the following four pairs of verses of Euripides and Sophocles, and, as far as I could see, only these pairs, might be restored:

Recto: Eur., *Hecuba*,

503:	[Τα]λθν[βιος ἦκω Δαναϊδῶν ὑπηρέτης]
504:	[Ἀγαμέ]μν(ο)ν[ος πέμψαντος ὃ γύναι μέτα]
20:	[τροφαῖσιν,] ὥστ[ις πτόρθος, ἠξόμην τάλας]
21:	[ἐπεὶ δὲ Τροία]θ' Ἐκ[τορός τ' ἀπόλλυται]

¹ This text now has the signature PAP. F. M. 1. It belonged, perhaps, to the same roll as Pap. Rendel Harris No. 38. Cf. *Journ. Egypt. Arch.*, XXIV (1938), p. 94.

² Cf. W. Schubart, *Griechische Palaeographie* (1925), pp. 116 f., figs. 76-78 and 81.

Verso: Eur., *Iph. A.*,

790: [τῖς ἄρα μ' εὐπλοκά]μογ [κόμας]

791: [ῥῦμα δακρ]υόε[ν τανύσας]

Soph., *Ant.*,

689: [λέγει τις ἢ πράσ]σει τ[ις ἢ ψέγειν ἔχει]

690: [τὸ γὰρ σὸν] (ὄ)μμα [δewὸν ἀνδρὶ δημότῃ]

It should be noticed that these verses have a kind of alphabetical order. Recto lines 1 and 2 begin with τ and α, lines 3 and 4 with τ and ε, verso lines 1 and 2 with τ and ρ. Verso lines 3 and 4 are not alphabetical, but introduce a new author. Did Alexandrian or local Egyptian scholars try to compile a verse index of Euripides, Sophocles (and Aeschylus?), so as to be able to look up passages they read or heard without knowing the actual source? In any case it is worth mentioning that the writer of the recto left so much space before recto lines 1 and 3, and the writer of the verso before lines 2 and 4 that there must have been a reason. This space could, in the present writer's opinion, have been easily used for inserting notes to indicate poet, play, and place of verses, and, perhaps, for adding short scholia. The abbreviations³ of recto line 2 and verso line 4 point similarly to a grammatical purpose for the text.

F. M. HEICHELHEIM.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

³ Bilabel, *R.-E.*, II A, 2296, s. v. "Siglae." I wish to thank Dr. W. Morel and Mr. I. G. Tait for allowing me to discuss the readings and problems of the difficult text with them.

REVIEWS

Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester. Volume III. Theological and Literary Texts (Nos. 457-551). Edited by C. H. ROBERTS, M. A., with an introductory note by HENRY GRUPPY, Librarian. Manchester, at the University Press, 1938. Pp. xvii + 217; 10 plates.

After an interval of twenty-three years, during which time most of the texts here published were secured, this, the third volume of the P. Ryl., is added to its valued predecessors. One notes with pleasure that the fourth volume, destined to contain documents of the Ptolmaic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, the last mentioned group of which had originally been assigned for publication by the late Dr. A. S. Hunt as Vol. III of the series, may be expected to appear in the near future.

Of the ninety-five texts here presented, only three have been published, no. 457 (St. John's Gospel, xviii, of the first half of the second century, the earliest record of the existence of this much discussed work); no. 458 (Deuteronomy, xxiii-xxviii, from the unprecedentedly early date of the second century B. C.); and no. 460 (Fragment of a Testimony Book, from the fourth century). These need not concern us, therefore, except to note that, of course, advantage has now been taken of several valuable reviews and articles dealing with the original publications.

One point only might be noted, and this is the suggestion (repeated from the earlier publication), on the basis of a calculation of the average number of letters in each line, that the name Jesus was not abbreviated, as one should expect. But since occasionally abbreviations in three letters are found, and even, though rarely (H. A. Sanders, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XIX [1926], pp. 215 ff.), four letters, a deviation of no more than two or three letters in a line varying from 28 to 35 letters is perhaps too slight upon which to base such a proposal. One might observe that the lines containing the name written out in full have but 33 and 35 letters, and if the forms were abbreviated they would contain presumably at least 30 or 31 letters, while two other perfectly full lines contain the much smaller number of only 28 letters. Similarly, in the Deuteronomy fragment the word for Lord is written in full, in a line of 28 letters; but if this were reduced to its ordinary short form of two letters, the line in question would still have one more letter (24) than the fourth line below it, which has only 23. Here also, therefore, it

would seem preferable to assume the existence of the contracted form; at all events there is no substantial reason for suggesting the contrary. Finally, while the writing in general is pretty regular, considerable spaces between words, or even between letters within words, are left in the *recto*, lines 2 and 3, and in the *verso*, lines 1 and 2, a circumstance which further vitiates any precise calculations based merely upon the average number of letters in a line. In one instance also (*recto*, 2) the scribe clearly leaves a small space before the beginning of a separate clause after εἶπεν, and the possibility that this same thing might have been done often, if not always, as also in the fragment from Deuteronomy, constitutes still another objection to basing any inherently improbable hypothesis on a precise calculation of letters—especially when even this calculation fails to prove quite all that is expected of it. Again, on no. 458, line 1, the note reads: "This line as it stands is rather longer than the rest," whereupon certain hypotheses are proposed. But as a matter of fact this line contains no more letters (30) than two others, and actually fewer letters than at least three others (31, 31, 32). Hence if σου were retained in the phrase ταῖς χερσίν σου the line would, indeed, be longer by one letter than any other; yet if τῇ χειρί be read, then σου can be retained without changing the length at all. In such uncertainties the *ars nesciendi* might be more safely practiced.¹

459. The commentary on l. 3, speaking of a "new verse," rather than the beginning of a new sentence or clause, unfortunately seems to suggest that "verses" were recognized and marked in the early MS tradition.

463. Part of a hitherto unknown apocryphal *Gospel of Mary (Magdalene)* has fortunately been compared with a Coptic version, covering much the same ground, reported by Professor Carl Schmidt, of Berlin.

465, l. 33. ἀξ[ιολογίαν] proposed by Mr. E. C. Radcliffe seems not to occur in older Greek, but the liturgy at this point apparently deviates from the normal phraseology. The word is correctly formed, and it actually appears in Modern Greek (although as a technical term in philosophy and ethics).

409, 34. For the extremely rare μυσάγματα see also Euseb., *Vita Const.*, 3, 26 (*P. G.*, 20, 1088 A 1).

¹ A good illustration of the danger of drawing conclusions from the mere number of letters in lines of varying length is that of Milne, who from a slender fragment of a speech by Lysias inferred that there was no room for τὰ before τοιαῦτα, an emendation of Herwerden's, in § 47; but when the remainder of the very same column came to light (here no. 489), τὰ actually appears there, because this particular line is, as a matter of fact, some two or three letters longer than any other in the entire text.

472, 3. Although *manduco* be "rare in classical Latin," it was doubtless common in vulgar speech (cf. the *Manducus* of the *Fab. Atellana*) from which it must have risen to the surface again in Christian literature.

472, 6. This is interesting for an instance of punctuation with a period at a full stop in a Latin MS from *ca.* 300 A. D.

473 brings a new fragment of the *Histories* of Sallust, but unfortunately the (in any event quite trivial) incident cannot be precisely placed. So extraordinary is the unparalleled expression *irae et doloris in / talibus sociis amissis*, where one would expect *e talibus*, if it be a prepositional phrase at all, that I feel tempted to suggest something like *ia[m]*, for the traces of the last letter might just as well, perhaps, represent an A as an N.

477, a considerable fragment, from the fifth century, of Cicero's *Divinatio*, is especially disappointing in that so early a testimony to the text of a work known otherwise only from late and relatively poor MSS, makes no positive contribution to the question of textual criticism other than the already long familiar conclusion that large numbers of the errors in late MSS existed also in the common book-trade tradition during classical times no less. The additional words *modo altercandum* in l. 45 are almost certainly genuine, partly as furnishing in a clearly intended climax an admirable intermediate term between the colorless *disserendum* and the extremely energetic *omni ratione pugnandum certandumque*; and partly on Clark's principle that the longer of two forms is a little more likely, *ceteris paribus*, to be genuine than is the shorter.² Here the longer is not only stylistically superior, but its omission through similarity of forms (the word *modo* occurring thrice within a series of five words, and the other two having the last four letters identical) is quite readily explicable.

478 adds a considerable specimen of a Greek word-by-word, or phrase-by-phrase, translation of Vergil to pieces already known from Milan (in part from the very same book), Vienna, Florence, and Oxyrhynchus, and the fragments recently found near Gaza and shortly to be published by the competent hands of C. J. Kraemer and E. L. Hettich. To me it is a pleasure to observe that the emendation by Emil Baehrens at *Aen.*, 1, 646 (*caro* for *cari* of the MSS), which, though a distinct improvement in sense, has been quite uniformly passed over in silence by nearly all subsequent editors (Ribbeck alone excepted, I believe) is supported by the Greek version (the Latin being lost at this point). Baehrens was really a great critic, whose very excesses (and they were frequent) are apt to be more illuminating than the timidities of lesser men.

² In this connection it is also noteworthy that the papyrus elsewhere contains two words that Hirschfelder had proposed to delete.

Nos. 482-521 contain the "New Classical Texts (Greek)," all but the first dozen being tiny scraps that defy identification. On the others a few miscellaneous comments may be made. The bits from Comedy are relatively unimportant.

482 is a fragment of presumably fifth century tragedy, dealing, most likely, with the legend of Telephus. In line 3 the supplement at the end remains uncertain. From the fairly clear context it appears that Telephus (?) is being (a) urged (4. 6), (b) to descend (3), (c) from a cliff or promontory (12), (d) at night (5. 12), and therefore secretly, and (e) say something to sailors, skippers, or a fleet in general (4. 6. 7), (f) in the hope eventually of sailing under convoy (17), (g) to enter boldly the presence of some prince in his palace (10). *πέργαμα* might be used, apparently, of citadels other than that of Troy, but the expression here would be difficult in view of (e). Page's suggestion of *πελάγια* is hardly suitable, since the fleet is probably anchored, as normally at night, with the personnel on shore. Nearly a dozen other supplements have occurred to me, most of them requiring a somewhat metaphorical use of language, indeed, but tropes, of course, in tragedy are characteristic of the general style, and particularly prominent in lines 11, 12, and 15. *πεδάρσια* suffers from the same defects as *πελάγια*. *περίρρητα* would imply that the fleet was anchored among a group of islands, which, though possible, seems hardly likely. *περιφανῆ*, *περιφερῆ*, and *περίσταδον* might be too inconsistent with (d). *περίτομα* goes poorly with (c). *πέυκινα*, "the structures of pine wood," might conceivably be a bold trope for "ship" (cf. Eurip., *Med.*, 4, where the *πέυκη* is taken as the typical material of a seagoing vessel, and similarly Aristoph., *Eq.*, 1310); *πέισματα*, "the stern-cables," with which ships were made fast to the land, might suggest vividly enough the bivouac of a fleet on shore; and, similarly, the same general idea could be conveyed with *περίβολα* "the precincts" or "encampment," or even *περίπολα*, "the patrollings" or "patrols," although I know of no supporting parallels for such usages. *πεδιακά*, "the open plain," is not inconsistent with (c), for a man naturally descends from a cliff to level ground, and a fleet would certainly anchor along a plain, rather than beside a precipice, if it were at all possible. This word has also the advantage of being used by Lysias in that sense, and is thus supported after a fashion. On the whole, therefore, I should be inclined to propose either *πεδιακά*, or better, *πέισματα*, for the latter, even though without exact parallel known to me, is a lively expression for a fleet at anchor along shore, and in addition does not require a resolved foot, something that occurs nowhere else in these 12 lines, except, of course, in the not quite certain supplement of the first half of this same line.

486 is from a second-rate epyllion on Hero and Leander.

487 is interesting as based closely on the *Odyssey*, but differing markedly in detail from the account of Homer. It seems to be a local Egyptian product of relatively late date, possibly no more than an exercise in composing verse.

489 besides containing the immediate remainder of a fragment of the first oration of Lysias (at London), has what would amount to half a dozen paragraphs from the beginning of a wholly new speech, an *Ὑπὲρ Ἐρυξιμάχου μείναντος ἐν ἄστει*, which confirms, in the main, what was already known about the confused times following Lysander's occupation of Athens. The only new word in the vocabulary of Lysias (judging from the Index by D. H. Holmes, in the Papyrus fragments) seems to be *χρηστότητα* (line 64). This is noteworthy as being, apparently, the very earliest instance in the best Attic prose (for the greatest prose authors of the fourth century avoided it), and the second recorded instance at all, of a word (coined possibly by Euripides) which, though twice in Isaeus, and occasionally in Middle and New Comedy, was relatively late to secure general recognition.³

490. A highly abbreviated epitome (presumably) of an anonymous history of Philip, though written within a century of the events recorded, is unhappily too summary to offer any new evidence on the campaigns of Amphissa and Chaeroneia, which it principally treats, with a touch on a Thracian campaign at the beginning and a word about a palace-revolution in Persia at the close. The whole account of the Amphissa campaign covers no more than 12 short lines, and that of Chaeroneia about 30 (i. e. ± 6 and 15 lines respectively of an ordinary text).

Similarly a fragment treating the Second Punic War (no. 491) is extremely brief, and though written presumably not more than 70-80 years after the event, deals with only a minor diplomatic manoeuvre. The editor considers the possibility that we have here a fragment of Polybius, but the unrecorded word *αἰχμαλωσία*, and *σύν* (extremely rare), make difficulties, as is properly noted. The suggestion of Sosylus is not quite satisfactory, either, since his one considerable fragment (Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, 2B, pp. 903-5) shows a nervous and rhetorical coloring, which is natural enough in a man who taught Hannibal Greek (Nepos, 13, 3), and hence was presumably a professional rhetor, but is quite alien to the simple and even jejune style of the present fragment. One might, therefore, not unreasonably conjecture that we have here a bit from Silenus, who covered the same ground. To be sure we do not possess even a single

³ The pap. seems to read *τοίχων* in l. 107 referring to the Long Walls. Here Mr. Roberts is undoubtedly right in correcting to *τειχῶν*, because of (a) the catachresis involved, (b) the extensive and uniform usage of Lysias himself elsewhere (Holmes lists 23 examples of *τείχος* against none of *τοίχος*), and (c) the fact of two other itacistic misspellings in the same fragment (*κάλλειον* and *πυλειῶν*).

specimen of his actual diction, but the remark of Cicero about him (*De Divin.*, 1, 49: *is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutus est*) is probably significant, since most of us when we praise painstaking diligence and let the matter rest there, generally mean to hint that there is relatively little to be said for literary attractiveness.⁴

492, a fragment touching on the Persian War, is deplorably mutilated, since the style seems sober and modest. Hiatus may have been avoided, for I notice only one instance in addition to the inevitable one in the fixed phrase *γῆς καὶ ὕδατος*. If so, the work presumably belongs to the fourth century, or later. Since the technical phrase, thrice used in Herodotus (7, 32, 131 and 133, and only here in his work), is *ἐπὶ γῆς αἵτησιν*, it might conceivably be that in lines 63-4 one should supply *ἐ[π' αἵτησιν γ]ῆς*, for these letters would seem to fill the necessary space pretty well.

493, Aesop's Fables, a MS from the first half of the first century, consists of five recognizable tales, equipped each with a promythium, and at least one other with an epimythium, artistically put in the lips of the last speaker. My colleague, B. E. Perry, who is highly conversant with this whole range of literature, kindly contributes the following brief comments:

"103 ff.: *Γλαῦξ καὶ ὄρνιθες* is essentially the same as *χελιδὼν καὶ ὄρνιθες* (Chambry, 350), except that the *χελιδὼν* thereafter lives with men. Phaedrus has the same version (*Aves et Hirundo*, app. 12) as class I, except that the flax plant is there substituted for the oak and the *ἰξός*. 74 and preceding: As the editor points out, this epimythium probably belongs to Chambry, 132. The same idea is also in 262, as already observed; but 132 in the MSS comes immediately before *Hercules and Plutus*, which in the papyrus starts with l. 75. Mr. Roberts reports incorrectly the order in the MSS, no doubt because he assumed that their order was identical with Chambry's, whereas it is the reverse. Hence these two fables appear in both the papyrus and the Class I MSS in exactly the same order. . . . In contents the papyrus agrees more closely with the anonymous prose fables of Class I than with any other collection or author. It represents, so far as we can judge, the same general corpus of fables as Class I, though in an independent textual recension. The variations here indicate that in antiquity, even more than in Byzantine times (11th-14th cent.), great liberties were taken in stylizing such *litterarisches Gemeingut*. Aesop, in fact, seems never to have been actually quoted, but each time the story

⁴ The reversal of the words "peace" and "war" in the translation of the last section must be a mere slip, since the correct situation is clearly recognized in the introduction.

is told anew in different words or variations of detail. The substance of Class I, even where it differs slightly from the papyrus, has presumably an equal claim to antiquity, since the variants are found also in ancient authors (Phaedrus, Babrius, Dio). The variants on the first fable in the pap., Aesop, Class I, Aristotle, and the Bodl. Paraphrase (Babrius) indicate that Class I is here not dependent on Babrius but goes back of him. Although the text of the papyrus differs widely from that of Class I, the fundamental similarity in style, the manner, the color, is impressive. Certainly the papyrus version resembles Class I far more than it does Class II, III (Accursiana), or the Bodleian paraphrase. In detail one might note that the fable is here uniformly called *λόγος* as in Class I, not *μῦθος*, as predominantly elsewhere in the tradition both direct and indirect (the technical rhetoricians). The promythian formula here, *πρὸς . . . ὅδε λόγος ἐφαρμόζει*, has a close counterpart in a recurring type of epimythian formula in Class I: *οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀρμόσειεν ἂν πρὸς . . .* (Cham., 150. 165. 224); *οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀρμόττει πρὸς . . .* (41. 293); *πρὸς . . . ὁ λόγος ἀρμόζει* (109. 156); *πρὸς . . . ὁ λόγος ἀρμόδιός ἐστιν* (322).

ἀτάρ, which occurs thrice in the pap. is familiar in Class I in the phrase *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς* in the epimythia (10 times in Class I, but nowhere else). Note *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ὁ π* [. . . in line 125, where possibly *ἡμᾶς* or *ἡμεῖς* should be supplied; cf. Chamb., 86, *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὃ παῖδες* etc., which, just as in the pap., is not the epimythium, although it contains the moral, but the final utterance of one of the characters. In view of the formulaic nature of this phrase and its normal occurrence at the end of a fable, it should probably be restored in lines 143 and 151 of the papyrus (perhaps without *καὶ* in 151). The presence in Class I of 8 or 10 recurring, stereotyped epimythian formulae (three of which, including *οὗτως* in l. 73 are used in this papyrus), may possibly indicate that the Class I corpus was made up on the basis of almost as many different ancient editions of the fables, each of which editions, like the papyrus and the Bodleian paraphrase (here simply *ὅτι*), had its own thoroughly standardized pattern of epimythium or promythium. In l. 131, *οὕτως* is probable on the analogy of l. 73: both are epimythia after a familiar pattern of Class I. The use in the pap. of both epimythia and promythia, at times apparently within the same fable, is well paralleled by Phaedrus. Contrary to the editor's implication on p. 126, the Bodl. paraphrase, which he cites in Cham., 144, places the moral always at the beginning, i. e. has only promythia. Chambry, however, transfers these morals to the end. The asyndeton in l. 58, instead of being 'harsh even for this type of literature' (Roberts) is quite common in Class I

(e. g. Cham., 4. 14; 3. 6; 17. 4; 267. 3 and 5), as also in the *Life*. But as much as anything else, it is the simple, rapidly moving sentences of the narrative which make me feel that the papyrus collection typifies the conventional style of the fables in Class I, and, if that be so, we must regard this stylistic convention, hence Class I, as ancient. What we *know* to be Byzantine is quite different. Indeed the chief significance of this papyrus, as I see it now, is that it tends, by strong analogy, to support the hypothetical antiquity of Class I."

Lines 74 f.: [ἀμαρ]τάνων ἕκασ[τ]ος αἰτιᾶτα[ι θεούς], (or Τύχην) comes so close to being a perfect trimeter, as it stands, that one is tempted, in view of the large number of hidden verses in certain prose fables⁵ to suggest that αἰτιᾶται may have been intended to scan as three long syllables with synzezeis of the second and third (a variety of that metrical device, which, though rare, is well established [W. Christ, *Metrik*², pp. 29 f.; P. Maas, *Griech. Metrik*, § 120], and, if tolerable anywhere, might surely be so in verse at this general level). Lines 77 f.: εἰσρία is practically certain, from the parallel in Chambry. If ἀνεδέξατο is felt to be too long (but even then it makes a line no longer than the quite certain one, 75), one might suggest, with an easy change of subject, ἀπεδήμει, which is shorter by one letter, and there are at least three other lines here of that same length. One wonders if, conceivably, due to the similarity of sound in itacism, the two phrases ὡς εἰς θεούς of the papyrus, and ἰσοθεωθεῖς of the MSS (ἄπαξ in any event) may not have had a common origin, and the latter form perhaps be due to a desperate attempt to make sense out of some such reading as that in the papyrus, which had become slightly corrupted. If so, then Class I and the papyrus would be drawn still closer together. Line 138: σφυρα might just about as well be σφυρά as σφῦρα, and if so, suggest a quite different context, although I find nothing in Aesop to correspond. And yet Aesop 346 (Chambry) is not the only fable to treat of a blacksmith shop. Ignatius 8 (condensed to the point of obscurity) does the same, as also Aesop 77 (Chambry) and especially 117 (Chambry), where the snake going into the smithy asked (ἦται) and received (λαβών) gifts of food from all the other tools (παρὰ τῶν σκευῶν), among which the hammer could not possibly have been omitted, since it is the smith's tool κατ' ἐξοχήν. If this suggestion be at all plausible, then in lines 132-3 one might propose ἔρανον λήψ[ειν προσδοκούσα] (the animal in question here seems to be feminine, perhaps an ἔχιδνα rather than an ἔχis, and, incidentally, in the modified variant given by

⁵ As in the Crusius ed. of Babrius, pp. 234 f.; Phaedrus is wholly in senarii; and compare the thousands of verses in the collections of the closely related fable and gnome.

Phaedrus [4.8] it is a *viper*), comparing ἔρανον and λαβών in fable 117; in 136-7 ἔπειτα τὰ ἄ[λλα σκεύη], comparing παρὰ τῶν σκευῶν; in 138-9 αὐτῇ ἐδίδου[αν, comparing δοῦναι, διδόναι and λαβών; εἶπεν corresponds with an εἶπεν (the file speaking), in the same relative position in the fable; with ἐγὼ μέ[ν . . . (c. 19) . . . λαμβάνω compare οὐ διδόναι ἀλλὰ λαμβάνειν παρὰ πάντων εἶωθα, which suggests ἐγὼ μέ[ν οὐ διδόναι εἶωθα ἀλλὰ] λαμβάνω [παρὰ πάντων . . .

494-521 are miscellaneous unidentifiable scraps of verse and prose, any one of which may suddenly acquire significance if and when adjoining pieces of the same work come to light elsewhere, as will probably be the case with one or another of them.

507 *recto* may possibly derive from some comments upon the ὁμώνυμοι, numerous notes upon whom appear in the scholia, especially those to Homer. There were three such with the name Orestes in the *Iliad* alone, and of course two famous ones with that of Aias. In this direction seem to point αὐὸς Αἴας; Αἴας δέ; and ἕτεροι. One might, then, supply ἀπ[ὸ Ναρούκας or Λοκρίδος or Σαλαμίνος, or something of the sort; ἐγνώκ]αμεν πολλούς . . .; [τελαμῶν]ος ἕτεροι . . .; ὡς Ὀρέστην [μὲν τὸν τοῦ . . .; and, since one Orestes was called πλῆξιππος (E 705), even divide in line 6 καθ' ἵππ[ων or ἵππ[είαν or ἵππ[ασίαν *vel simile quid*—all of which remains, of course, highly problematical.

522, a fragment from Ptolemy, once more shows how readings previously supposed to be interpolations from a later date (this time the recensions of Pappus and Theon) now appear in a text within a century after the author's death. Νικοτεραι (l. -τερα; cf. my article in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Nikotera," 554) in line 36 is the only mention of the place in Greek, and, although the editor rightly regards its interpolation here as due to a confusion with Nikaia (Nizza), whose longitude is ascribed to it, the fact that Nicotera was known at all to an Egyptian of this period shows that the town must have been of considerably more importance (perhaps a port of call for the Egyptian grain trade), at least at this time, than the few references to it might otherwise suggest.

523, an astronomical table, is especially interesting to me in giving several new examples of an omicron, with an ornamental line above it, probably representing an expanded upsilon for the abbreviation οὐ(δέν) (so suggested first by Dr. F. E. Robbins on P. Mich. [1936] 3, 151 and independently by Dr. J. G. Smyly here on p. 149), which is used for zero, as is a simple omicron in MSS of Ptolemy (cf. T. L. Heath, *Manual of Greek Mathematics* [1931], p. 23), but restricted there to the notation of sexagesimal fractions. In these other papyri, however, the ο or ου stands for zero degrees and has nothing whatever to do with fractions. This looks very much like an independently Greek

origin for the symbol which is identical with our own zero, and this already familiar usage presumably helped in getting zero adopted, in a position-value system, for the absence in a number of a particular denomination (units, tens, hundred, and the like). The papyri in question all date from the third or early fourth century.⁶

Several astrological and medical fragments of minor interest follow; then an almost contemporary bit of Harpocration (but why not under "Extant Greek Authors"?), which in line 7 confirms an emendation by Sauppe, but a few lines below supports the text of Theopompus against modern proposed alteration; a couple of fully elaborated conjugations of ποιεῖν and πλεῖν, as elsewhere νικᾶν and γράφειν, but not the τύπτω or λύω of Byzantine and modern Grammars; a grammatical fragment where the rather timidly suggested correction of a γ to a ρ is really certain, because there immediately follows a typical example of the σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν; welcome addition to the knowledge of the *Scholia Minora*, the scholia called D, and similar valuable work on Homer, which richly deserves a new and complete edition, where I should suggest at lines 1 and 2 ἡκ][ον]ημένους ὀδόντας (several lines are longer than this, and the particular form is attested from a verse in Plutarch); an Homeric glossary; and what is doubtless a schoolboy's table in the Roman money system.

Under "Extant Greek Authors" we find considerable fragments of both the eccentric and the vulgate tradition of Homer. In 539 the new line for 100 of *Iliad* A ends εθελῃσιν. Since elsewhere in the *Iliad* this form occurs at the end of the line only in the formula αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσιν, and since a condition of some kind is here implied (as also in the vulgate reading), I suggest that supplement here. The rest of the line might then be reconstructed in several ways, one of which I offer *exempli gratia*: [καὶ τότε λογιγὸν ἀπόσει Ἀπόλλων, αἶ κ'] ἐθέλῃσιν. Similarly for verse 110 from which the papyrus differs utterly one might venture to supply something like the following, again *exempli gratia*, which, in bitterly casting a doubt upon the validity of the claim to speak for Heaven, would seem to fit the general situation

⁶ The last word, apparently, has not yet been said on the origin of the symbol for zero in a position-value system. The old story that it was a relatively early Hindoo invention diffused by the Arabs is now viewed a bit sceptically, and it can hardly be shown that the Hindoos actually employed zero in this way before ca. 500 A. D., which is some three and one-half centuries after Ptolemy, and at least two full centuries after the papyri in question. See J. Tropicke, *Geschichte der Elementar-Mathematik*, I (1930), 17, 20-26, 40 f.; and O. Neugebauer, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, I (1934), 5, 11, 42 f., 78, both influenced by the important critical studies of G. R. Kaye. Since the above was written I have noticed that Abel Rey (*Rev. des Études Grecques*, XLVIII [1935], pp. 527-33) argues for the origin of the zero-symbol in the initial letter of οὐδέν. M. Rey depends considerably upon an article by G. S. Colin, *Journ. Asiatique*, CCXXII (1933), pp. 193-215.

quite as well as the somewhat colorless recapitulation of the MSS: *εἰ δ[ὲ θεός σου] ἔδωκεν [ἔπος νημερτὲς ἐπισπεῖν]*.

In editing the complete text of 540 it might have been well to indicate in the *apparatus* the correct readings (like Ἑλλάδα for Αλλαδ[α] in 683) even though these corrections had been made by Milne in the earlier publication; and this has been done in the edition of the prose summary.

A few relatively unimportant shreds from extant texts of Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Pseudo-Demosthenes, and Lycurgus bring one to the elaborate indices and the plates.

In general the book is beautifully and accurately printed (two or three trifling blemishes that will disturb no one are all that I have noted). The editorial workmanship maintains in erudition, ingenuity, and judgment the very highest standards of performance by the author's celebrated fellow-countrymen, and may well be viewed with pride by that distinguished scholar, Wilhelm Schubart, to whom, as teacher and friend, the volume has been dedicated.

W. A. OLDFATHER.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

M. POHLENZ. *Hippokrates und die Begründung der wissenschaftlichen Medizin*. Berlin, de Gruyter, 1938. Pp. 120. RM. 6.

This book is a new vindication of the doctrine of Hippocrates and his work in opposition to recent and earlier scepticism. The system of the founder of scientific medicine is reconstructed from the two Pre-Alexandrian testimonies still available (pp. 63-79) and then identified with theories of a few of the so-called Hippocratic writings (pp. 79-80), especially with those of *Airs Waters Places* and *Sacred Disease*; the latter treatises are analyzed at great length in the first part of Pohlenz' book (pp. 3-62). Finally Hippocrates' importance for later generations and his influence on them are evaluated (pp. 81-96). An appendix containing the footnotes and a short survey of recent literature (pp. 97-120) complete the work.¹

Pohlenz' main problem is the determination of Hippocrates' system; all the other inquiries made are either supplementary to this or based on its solution. The question as to how the testimonies of Plato (*Phaedrus* 270 C) and of Aristotle's pupil Meno (V, 35 ff.)² are to be interpreted, therefore, must be the chief topic of this review also. Like Pohlenz, I shall deal first with the later testimony of Meno who relates the Hippocratic ex-

¹ In the meantime Pohlenz has given a summary of his views in *Die Antike*, XV (1939), pp. 1 ff.

² *Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis Iatricis Menoniis et aliis Medicis Eclogae*, ed. H. Diels, *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, III, 1 (1893).

planation of diseases and then consider that of Plato, the earlier witness, who describes the Hippocratic method only (cf. Pohlenz, p. 75).

Pohlenz claims that the account given in the *Meno-Papyrus* has never been analyzed before as it should have been; for the original words of Meno have not been clearly distinguished from later additions on the part of the doxographer who made the excerpts from Meno's history of medicine (p. 65). The text, as it stands, so Pohlenz says himself, unmistakably attributes to Hippocrates an explanation of diseases by the *φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττώματων*, "Gase, die sich aus den Perittomata entwickeln" (p. 66). Yet, according to Meno, Pohlenz maintains, Hippocrates spoke of *φύσαι* alone (p. 67) and explained diseases through the air taken into the body with nutrition (p. 68). The concept of the air excreted from the remnants of food is an interpolation of the doxographer (p. 67) which must be eliminated so as to make the text intelligible and consistent (p. 68).

It seems strange that Pohlenz should charge the doxographer with having altered Meno's words. For the report in question, at the beginning (V, 36-37) and at the end (VI, 42), is expressly characterized as the opinion of Aristotle, i. e. of Meno. The doxographer disagrees with this opinion, so much so that he adds his own views concerning Hippocrates' doctrine which he outlines in accordance with some of the so-called Hippocratic writings (VI, 43 ff.). Why, then, should he have changed Meno's account? And if he did, why has he interpolated a concept which he himself later on does not ascribe to Hippocrates? Or has the later description of the Hippocratic theory, so utterly at variance with the previous one, been added by somebody else? Pohlenz, who does not enter into these questions at all, seems to believe that not only the doxographer but also a third person may have participated in the preparation of the excerpts as they are preserved (p. 65).

However these difficulties may be accounted for, Pohlenz thinks that he can prove the probability of the assumed alteration by two facts: the doxographer, he says, has classified all the theories with which the Hippocratic doctrine is grouped under a term originally foreign to them, namely that of *περιττώματα* (p. 65); besides, he has introduced into the summary of the Platonic theories a concept which is not to be found in the Platonic text (p. 66). I am not prepared to decide whether Hippocrates himself could use the word *περιττώματα*. That, in the sense of remnants of food, it occurs for the first time in Diocles' fragments does not prove that it was not used before (contrary to Pohlenz, pp. 65-66); the material preserved from earlier writings is too scanty to allow such a conclusion.³ It is, however, the less

³ I note that Ilberg, in his copy of Diels' edition of the *Meno-Papyrus*, now in the Institute of the History of Medicine at the Johns Hopkins

necessary to discuss this question since Pohlenz himself in his argumentation puts all emphasis on the alleged misrepresentation of Plato's views: "... wie unbekümmert . . . der Doxograph nicht nur formal umstilisiert, sondern auch sachlich umgestaltet, können wir in einem Fall (*scil.* in the Plato-report) noch mit Händen greifen," he says (p. 66).⁴

I shall not insist that the doxographer, if he is not correct in his description of the Platonic doctrine, need not necessarily be incorrect in his representation of the Hippocratic dogma. I rather ask whether he really misrepresents Plato's theory. Pohlenz claims that the doxographer ascribes to Plato, as he does to Hippocrates, an explanation of diseases by the *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων* (XVII, 46-47); this term, however, does not occur in the *Timaeus* on which the résumé is obviously based; the doxographer, then, has falsified his source (cf. Pohlenz, p. 66). But the text of the Plato-report reads thus (XVII, 44-47):

παρὰ [δὲ]
τὰ περιττώματα συνίστα[νται τριχῶς]
αἱ νόσοι, ἢ π[α]ρ[ὰ τὰς] φύσας [τὰς ἐκ τ(ῶν)] πε-
ριττωμ[άτ(ων)] ἢ παρὰ χολήν ἢ φλέγμα.

It is then, first of all, not the doxographer who, as Pohlenz says, speaks of air excreted from the *περιττώματα*. The concept of the *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων* is a conjecture of the editor of the papyrus. If the words, as restored, do not correspond to the Platonic text, the editor has erred, not the doxographer.⁵

But one may object: even if *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων* is a conjecture, the words *φῦσαι* and *περιττώματα* (cf. also XVII, 14) are preserved in the papyrus, and yet neither of them is to be found in the *Timaeus* (cf. Pohlenz, p. 66). Does this difference not suffice to prove a misunderstanding of Plato's views and, consequently, to cast suspicion upon the correctness of the representation of Hippocrates' views? To be sure, Meno speaks of *φῦσαι*, whereas Plato speaks of *πνεῦμα* (*Timaeus* 84 D). But it is

University, refers (Index s. v. *περισσώματα*) to E. Howald, *Hermes*, LIV (1919), pp. 187 ff. and G. Méautis, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, XLV (1925), pp. 184 ff.; both authors endeavour to prove the early occurrence of *κάθαρσις* and *περιττώματα*.

⁴K. Deichgräber (*Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse [1933], Nr. 3, p. 153) was the first to assume this inaccuracy of the report on Plato. Diels (*Hermes*, XXVIII [1893], p. 425), however, had already asserted the methodological value of the Plato-account, because it affords a check on Meno's reliability. For other minor divergencies cf. A. Rivaud, *Platon, Œuvres Complètes*, X (1925), p. 115, n. 4. Cf. note 13 *infra*.

⁵It is misleading, it seems to me, for Pohlenz in quoting the papyrus (p. 66, n. 2) not to indicate the lacunae and emendations. Especially if an argument is based on such a text, the reader is entitled to be informed about what is preserved in the original and what is modern conjecture.

the air that has entered the human body with which Plato is concerned, and this air is commonly called *φῦσα* or *φῦσαι* by physicians.⁶ Plato himself was aware that the term which he uses was antiquated and that, already in his time, *φῦσα* was the more common medical expression (cf. *Republic* 405 D).⁷ The change in terminology made by the doxographer is, then, certainly no falsification of Plato's opinion. Moreover, it is true that Plato does not use the expression *περιττώματα*. Yet, the second cause of illness which he mentions is phlegm, the third bile (*Meno*, XVII, 47; *Timaeus* 85 A ff.). These qualities, in Aristotelian language are named *περιττώματα*.⁸ The third class of diseases (*Timaeus* 84 C) which *Meno* is paraphrasing comprises then two species which are correctly referred to by the term which *Meno* introduces.

But what about the *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων*, if this is the correct restoration of the lacuna? Pohlenz is right in pointing out that in *Timaeus* 84 D Plato is discussing the air which the human being breathes (p. 66). Yet, in *Timaeus* 84 E, a passage which, strangely enough, is not quoted by Diels, who in his notes refers only to *Timaeus* 84 C-D, the first way in which illness arises is characterized thus: *πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι διακριθείσης σαρκὸς πνεῦμα ἐγγεγόμενον καὶ ἀδυνατοῦν ἕξω πορευθῆναι* This Martin takes to mean: "Souvent aussi, la chair se trouvant raréfiée dans quelque partie du corps, il s'y engendre de l'air, qui, n'en pouvant sortir . . ." ⁹ Such a sense, however, could well be epitomized by *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων*. For disintegrated flesh is the material from which, according to Plato, bile, phlegm, etc. are produced.¹⁰ Moreover, *Meno*, in consequence of the importance of the *περιττώματα* in all three cases, would with some justification have subordinated them to the general heading *νόσοι παρὰ τὰ περιττώματα* (XVII, 45).

Of course, one cannot decide whether *Meno* understood the

⁶ Cf. *Breaths*, chap. 3 (*Hippocrates*, ed. J. L. Heiberg, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, I, 1 [1927], pp. 92, 20; 95, 15, etc.); cf. Pohlenz, p. 67, n. 2, and p. 67 where he himself understands *φῦσα* as air breathed in by the human being.

⁷ I was reminded of this passage by H. Cherniss.

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 511 b 9; Pohlenz (p. 66, n. 2) also refers to this passage, yet, in his interpretation of the Plato passage, takes the word to mean remnants of food, a meaning which it cannot have either here (XVII, 45) or before (XVII, 14), although in the Hippocrates-account it is used in the limited sense of remnants of food (cf. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium* 724 b 26; Pohlenz, p. 65, n. 3).

⁹ Th. H. Martin, *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, I (1841), p. 225. Already Marsilius Ficinus translates: *Saepe etiam intra corpus discreta et rarefacta carne innascitur spiritus: qui cum foras egredi nequeat* . . . (quoted from Plato, ed. I. Bekker, III, 2 [1817], p. 126). With Martin's translation agree R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato* (1888), and F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (1937).

¹⁰ Cf. *Timaeus* 82 C, and A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (1928), p. 591.

Plato passage as do Martin and others. It is also possible to translate the words in question differently: "And often, when the flesh is disintegrated, air which is enclosed in the body and is unable to pass out. . . ." ¹¹ Such an interpretation is suggested as the right one by the fact that in 84 D, too, it is not air alone which, according to Plato, brings about illness; it is air combined with some other substance, with *ρεύματα* which are produced from phlegm (cf. *Timaeus* 85 B, and for the expression *ρεύματα* again *Republic* 405 D). If the lungs are filled with these rheums, the usual passage of the air is hindered, and it is for that reason that diseases are caused. If in 84 E Plato is also referring to the air coming from outside, the discussion of air as cause of diseases would be uniform. In both cases, as distinguished by Plato, air would be harmful only together with some other substance, with rheums or with disintegrated flesh in Platonic terms, with phlegm or bile, or in Aristotelian categories with *περιττώματα*. Meno, then, may have spoken of *φῦσαι μετὰ περιττωμάτων* ¹² and he would have been equally justified in calling the third class of diseases *νόσοι παρὰ τὰ περιττώματα*. The advantage of such an emendation is that in his summary, then, he does not omit the explanation of diseases brought about by air from outside (84 D), although one must not forget that his résumé as a whole is not exhaustive and that he leaves out other points also.

At any rate, whatever restoration is adopted, the trustworthiness of the Hippocrates report cannot be disproved on the evidence adduced by Pohlenz. Many other instances, moreover, confirm the correctness of the data given in the papyrus (cf. Deichgräber, *op. cit.*, p. 159). It is true that sometimes the account is enlarged by the addition of similes ¹³ and that the language is colored by later terminology, but the basic facts, it seems, are authentic. What Meno relates about Hippocrates,

¹¹ Plato, *Timaeus etc.*, with an English translation by R. G. Bury (The Loeb Classical Library), p. 229; cf. Taylor (*op. cit.*, p. 601) who interprets: ". . . whenever an abnormal 'division' or cavity is formed within the flesh, wind collects to fill it, and is unable to find a proper outlet." Cf. also A. Rivaud, *op. cit.*, p. 217: "Souvent aussi, la chair se disjoint à l'intérieur du corps; de l'air s'y enferme et, ne pouvant pas en sortir. . . ."

¹² Cf. *Timaeus* 83 E *μετὰ πνεύματος αἷμα*; 83 B *ξανθὸν χρώμα μετὰ τῆς πικρότητος*. According to the above interpretation I propose to read in the papyrus:

παρὰ [δὲ]
τὰ περιττώματα συνίστα[νται] τριχῶς]
αἱ νόσοι, ἢ π[α]ρ[ὰ τὰς] φύσας [τὰς μετὰ] πε-
ριττω[μάτ(ων)] ἢ παρὰ] χολήν ἢ φλέγμα.

¹³ For instance in the Plato report (XVI, 24 ff.); cf. Diels, *Hermes*, *loc. cit.*, and note 4 *supra*. That the simile given in the Hippocrates passage can be original (Pohlenz, p. 67) I do not deny (cf. *R.-E.*, Supplement VI [1936], 1323). The probability, however, is not increased by the observation that similes are added in other places.

therefore, has to be accepted as it stands; it cannot be reinterpreted as Pohlenz proposes to do. Hippocrates, according to Meno at least, has explained diseases by the air excreted from the remnants of food, and well he may; there is no reason either to assume that Meno was mistaken in his description of the Hippocratic dogma.¹⁴ For similar theories are known from other great physicians of Hippocrates' time; the importance of food for the development of diseases, the influence of digestion is stressed over and over again in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*. The doctrine that it is air, not a liquid which is excreted from the remnants of food (cf. e. g. Meno, V, 12 ff.) would be the specifically Hippocratic modification of a more common dogma.

As I cannot agree, then, with Pohlenz' interpretation of the Meno-Papyrus, I cannot follow him in his interpretation of the *Phaedrus* either. This second and most important testimony on Hippocrates Pohlenz takes to mean that, according to Plato, Hippocrates found it impossible to understand the nature of the body without the nature of the cosmos (*ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως* 270 C), and, consequently he ascribes to Hippocrates a thorough observation of the seasons, of the air, etc. (p. 78; cf. pp. 4-5). That in Plato as well as in other writers τὸ ὅλον may mean "cosmos" is certain; Pohlenz (p. 75, n. 1) gives additional proof for such a sense. It is equally certain, however, that the word, especially in the Platonic dialogues, signifies the whole, the logical or organic unity, a usage for which Pohlenz does not cite any parallel. The problem is not whether τὸ ὅλον can be understood only in the one way or in the other, it is rather which of the two meanings of the word is implied in the passage in question.¹⁵

¹⁴ This was, for instance, the belief of Diels, *loc. cit.*, pp. 424-434; cf. the introduction to the edition of Meno, p. xvi. That Meno had an adequate knowledge of ancient medicine seems now generally assumed. That his account of Hippocratic views is consistent (contrary to Pohlenz, p. 68) has been shown *R.-E.*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ Already in antiquity the opinion of the interpreters was apparently divided; Galen (*Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, V, 9, 1 [1914], p. 55, 16; cf. p. 53, 26) understands τὸ ὅλον as cosmos; Hermias (*In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. P. Couvreur [1901], p. 245, 5) takes it to mean the whole body (cf. *R.-E.*, *loc. cit.*, 1319). Of modern interpreters L. Robin (*Platon, Œuvres Complètes* [Collection Budé], IV, 3 [1933]) sides with Galen; cf. also Wilamowitz, *Platon* (1929)³, p. 462, and W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocrates with an English Translation* (The Loeb Classical Library), I, p. xxxiii. Hermias' interpretation is upheld by B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato translated into English*, I³ (1892), p. 479, but already proposed as the only satisfactory solution by W. H. Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato* (1868), p. 124. Cf. L. Edelstein, *Περὶ ἀέρος und die Sammlung der Hippokratischen Schriften, Problemata*, IV (1931), pp. 129-135; G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (1935), p. 213, n. 1. P. Shorey (*What Plato said* [1933], p. 205) refers to *Lysis* 214 B and *Charmides* 156 B ff.; he seems to understand τὸ ὅλον as cosmos and as the whole of the body; so does W. Nestle, *Hermes*, LXXIII (1938), p. 18.

Socrates claims that the procedure of medicine and that of rhetoric are identical; in both arts it is necessary to give a diaeresis of the object concerned (*διελέσθαι φύσιν* 270 B).¹⁶ He, then, asks whether it is possible to understand the nature of the soul, the object of rhetoric, without the nature of the whole (270 C). Phaedrus answers with a reference to Hippocrates who holds it impossible to acquire even medical knowledge without such a method (*ἀνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης* *ibid.*). Whereupon Socrates, who is not satisfied with Hippocrates' authority before inquiring into the validity of the argument, tries to explain what kind of investigation Hippocrates and right reason demand concerning nature (*περὶ φύσεως* *ibid.*). They demand, he says, for the understanding of every nature (*περὶ ὅτου οὖν φύσεως* 270 D) two things: first an investigation as to whether the object is simple or multi-form, and then a division of the object into its parts together with a determination of the relation of these parts to each other and to the factors influencing them (*ibid.*). In other words, they demand definition and diaeresis; that these two processes are inseparable has been stressed even before (e. g. 265 D-266 B); each diaeresis involves a conception of the whole which is to be divided into its parts. The nature of the whole, then, which, as Socrates says, is presupposed by every right understanding, must be the comprehension of the particulars into one idea;¹⁷ the method which Hippocrates follows also in medicine must be the general definition of its object, the human body.

Socrates discusses the identity of the methods used in rhetoric and medicine so as to explain what he said before and what Phaedrus did not understand. *Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως περὶ· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνοον τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ τελειουργὸν ἔουκεν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εἰσιέναι* (269 E-270 A), Socrates claimed and then exemplified his statement by the relation of Pericles to Anaxagoras. Does Socrates, by speaking of *μετεωρολογία φύσεως περὶ*, refer to "Meteorologie" or "Himmelsspekulation," that is astronomy and mathematics, and is the word chosen by Plato in order to indicate his agreement with Hippocrates who by the same term expressed the belief

¹⁶ I doubt that *Laws* 946 B *κλήρω διελόντας τὸν νικῶντα*, the passage to which Pohlenz refers (p. 75, n. 1) has the same meaning as *διελέσθαι* in the *Phaedrus*. At any rate, the division of the soul has its analogy in medicine as Pohlenz himself, in spite of his qualifying interpretation of *διελέσθαι* in the notes (p. 75, n. 1), admits in his text (p. 76). For the identity of the dialectical procedure of the *Phaedrus* with that of the late dialogues, the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* cf. J. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* (1907), p. 62.

¹⁷ For this use of *τὸ ὅλον* cf. e. g. Stenzel, *op. cit.*, p. 66 and *R.-E.*, *loc. cit.*, 1318-1320. *Symposium* 205 B and D give a particularly good example of this sense of *τὸ ὅλον* and *εἶδη* (the whole and the parts of a concept) even in a context which is not strictly dialectical.

that astronomy is necessary for medicine (Pohlenz, p. 78)? In the *Republic* (529 A) Glaucon praises the study of astronomy because "it compels the soul to look upwards (*εἰς τὰ ἄνω ὁρᾶν*) and leads it away from the things here to those higher things," but Socrates answers (529 A-530 C): "You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal interpretation on the study of higher things (*τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν*); for apparently, if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason (*νοήσει*) and not with the eyes. Perhaps you are right, and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward (*ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν*) than that which deals with being and the invisible . . . It is by means of problems, then, . . . as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy, too, and we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul."¹⁸ It is, then, certainly not observation of the heavens, not even the usual form of astronomy which Socrates acknowledges as propaedeutics to higher knowledge. What he alludes to in demanding for all great arts *ἀδολεσχία καὶ μετεωρολογία φύσεως περὶ* can only be a study detached from the visible world, "discussion and high speculation about the truth of nature,"¹⁹ of the nature of the object (cf. *περὶ φύσεως* 270 C; *φύσις* 270 B-D), as he says here, of generalisation and diaeresis, as he states later on (270 B ff.). One can hardly conclude from this passage that Plato agreed with Hippocrates who held it necessary that the physician know the influence of the seasons on the development of diseases. The words, understood in their Platonic sense, only confirm that Hippocrates recommended definition and division of the object of medicine, of the human body.

Finally, Plato always regards it as the task of the good craftsman to apprehend the whole of his object, and in particular, as that of the physician, to study the whole of the body and not only its parts. So he says in the *Charmides* (156 C) as well as in the *Laws* (902 D-E; 903 C). Should the great Hippocrates, whom Plato admires, not fulfill the conditions set up by Plato for good craftsmanship? Should he, on the contrary, be inclined to speculations or studies of which Plato himself does not approve? Neither the procedure of diaeresis nor the terminology

¹⁸ Plato, *The Republic with an English Translation* by P. Shorey (The Loeb Classical Library), II, pp. 181-183; 187-189. For a more detailed interpretation of the passage cf. E. Hoffman, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1923-24), pp. 34 ff., and Shorey in the notes to his edition.

¹⁹ I am using Jowett's translation (*loc. cit.*, p. 478). That *μετεωρολογία* may have such a meaning is shown by Edelstein, *loc. cit.* The Platonic doctrine of the *ἄνω* and *κάτω* is outlined by G. Teichmüller, *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe* (1874), p. 391.

used in it are inventions of Plato; they are known to earlier generations. There are no valid historical objections, then, to the assumption that Hippocrates actually demanded definition and division; because he did so, he need not be a Platonist, nor a believer in the Platonic idea (contrary to Pohlenz, p. 75, n. 1). On the other hand, Diocles, the follower of Hippocrates, maintained that it is the whole nature of the body which is responsible for diseases. Moreover the method of diaeresis, Galen says, was an integral part of later medical theories which depended on Hippocrates' system.²⁰

To be sure, if the testimonies of Meno and Plato are interpreted as I think they have to be, Hippocrates is not the founder of the *πνεῦμα* theory (cf. Pohlenz, pp. 73 ff.; 92 ff.) but of scientific medicine in the Platonic sense of the word science (cf. *Philebus* 16 C). Moreover, there is no book among the so-called Hippocratic writings which can be ascribed to Hippocrates himself. That even from Pohlenz' point of view this could not be done, I believe, is certain.²¹ But I do not discuss this question, since I think that the interpretation on which Pohlenz relies in his attempt to establish the authenticity of certain books is not convincing. It is true that after a hundred years of research it is still impossible to claim that the genuine works of Hippocrates have been ascertained.²² But Hippocrates' method, his doctrine are known, though his books are lost. The writings of many great scientists and philosophers have been destroyed, only testimonies concerning their achievements are left. To acknowledge that is no verdict, no negativism; it is a statement of fact.

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XLIX. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. 281.

The forty-ninth volume of the *Harvard Studies* opens with a full account by Professor Carl N. Jackson of the scholarly career of the late Professor Herbert Weir Smyth of Harvard University to whom the book is dedicated. The tribute to Professor Smyth

²⁰ Concerning the diaeresis before Plato cf. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* (1911), pp. 212-246; E. Hoffman, *Anhang zu Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 1 (1922), p. 1073. For Diocles (ἡ δὲ φύσις) cf. Fragment 112 (p. 163, line 2 Wellmann and W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* [1938], p. 29). The Hippocratic diaeresis was taken over by Mnesitheus and Diocles, cf. Galen XI, p. 3 (Kühn) = Mnesitheus, Fragment 3 (H. Hohenstein, *Der Arzt Mnesitheos aus Athen*, Diss. Berlin [1935]).

²¹ Cf. L. Edelstein, "The Genuine Works of Hippocrates," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, VII (1939), pp. 236 ff.

²² Cf. W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

is most appropriate and the detailed story of his achievements shows clearly how he traveled the road from distinguished technical studies in dialectology and the like to a consideration of the larger and more enduring values of classical literature. In this way he avoided the pitfall of allowing the linguistic and the technical to become ends in themselves but rather made them serve as indispensable means to the larger end, namely, the interpretation and appraisal of the masterpieces of Greek poetry.

The second essay by John H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," undertakes to show that certain passages in the dramatist may be used as evidence that Thucydides when dealing with events early in the Peloponnesian War actually reflected not only ideas but also the rhetorical practice current in Athens around 431 B. C. In other words, Thucydides is not projecting back to the earlier period attitudes and practices which did not actually come into being in the Greek world until close to the end of the fifth century. The evidence which Finley adduces is more convincing for its cumulative effect than for the persuasiveness of any individual item. As a result instances which are commonplaces are sometimes cited without specific mention of their commonplace character. Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a certain technique of argument appeared because the ancient writer was formally trained in rhetoric or whether he presented his case in just that way because he possessed common sense, sanity, and a modicum of innate logical power. Finley sometimes argues that Thucydides made a point in such and such a way because of his rhetorical training, whereas one can hardly see how Thucydides could possibly have said it in any other way and still have made sense. There is a certain lack of clarity and sharpness in Finley's writing which tends to obscure the points he wishes to make. His conclusions, however, seem sound enough and should prove to be useful in the general interpretation of Thucydides.

Charles T. Murphy has contributed a well-pointed and carefully wrought article on "Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric." After showing how and the extent to which Aristophanes satirized the art of rhetoric and in particular the new form which it had taken in the years in which he was presenting his plays, Murphy ingeniously demonstrates how Aristophanes actually is influenced by the rules of rhetoric when he is composing the more formal speeches in the comedies themselves. Murphy then submits a full rhetorical analysis of one such speech (*Acharnians*, 496-556) followed by shorter treatments of several others. He concludes, therefore, that Aristophanes' style was influenced by the fact that his youth was passed in Athens when Protagoras and the other sophists were active there, and that there is no reason why Aristophanes should not appear along "with Euripides and Thucydides as a student of and, in some degree, a contributor

to the art of rhetoric" (p. 113). As Murphy points out in a final footnote, his essay can profitably be read in conjunction with Finley's article, for the two together throw a good deal of light on the state of rhetoric in this epoch.

Mason Hammond begins his paper on "Pliny the Younger's Views on Government" with the somewhat apologetic remark that since Pliny was not a profound thinker, the forthcoming discussion cannot be dignified by giving it the title "the political philosophy of Pliny." Hammond characterizes Pliny as a singularly close approximation to the hypothetical average man, and indicates briefly the general social and political stratum from which Pliny derives. In developing Pliny's attitude towards political problems Hammond of course relies heavily upon the *Panegyricus* for evidence, and proceeds rather mechanically to describe *seriatim* Pliny's attitude towards the *princeps*, the senate, the relation between the individual and the state, imperialism, and the like. One cannot refrain from feeling that, if the philosophical implications of some of the passages quoted from Pliny by Hammond (e. g., pp. 124 and 138) had been more thoroughly explored, the conclusions would not have been so descriptive and unanalyzed as they appear to be. In his closing paragraph Hammond says, "Pliny, therefore, speaking for the cultivated opinion of his day, reflects to a larger degree the political ideas which are more thoughtfully expressed by philosophers of the second century." If Hammond had attacked his problem from the point of view of the philosophers, he might well have given us more valuable results. As it is, one finds little new in the paper; Pliny's views on government are just those that any intelligent reader immediately recognizes them to be.

The next article by Paul J. Alexander deals with the "Letters and Speeches of the Emperor Hadrian," in order that we may be "enabled to learn more about the man, the administrator, and the ruler." The writer proceeds carefully, if somewhat woodenly, through his sources and the accumulation of material presents us with an illuminated view of Hadrian. Particularly noteworthy is the way in which Alexander has emphasized (p. 149) Hadrian's competence in military matters and his ability to understand the psychology of the soldier, capacities which he indubitably possessed and which are too often overlooked by scholars. Separate sections of the paper treat the following topics: the emperor's attitude on constitutional problems, questions of legal technique, problems concerning municipalities, his interest in cultural questions, his social and economic policies, and finally his personal affairs. The whole collection and study is most valuable for its rounded delineation of Hadrian as a many-sided, talented, conscientious, wise, and just ruler and man.

Gerald F. Else in an essay entitled "Aristotle on the Beauty of Tragedy" undertakes to reinterpret the doctrine of catharsis in Aristotle's *Poetics*, and offers what he calls new evidence and

a new angle of approach, mainly based on material drawn from Plato's *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. The argument is involved and seems to be curiously infected by various misinterpretations of the sources. For example, on pp. 182-183, Else argues from *Philebus* 63e and 51d that the pure pleasures are those "which are intrinsic in the beautiful object and partake of its nature." It is difficult to see how "pleasure" in any sense of the term can be given the kind of objective status assigned to it by Else. Certainly such an interpretation would play havoc with the argument of the *Philebus*. Or again, the meaning which Else attaches to the very difficult Pythagorean doctrine of the four classes into which τὰ ὄντα can be divided may be open to question in certain respects. For example, to what extent does Plato wish the doctrine to throw light on the degree of reality present in any one of the existences so classified? Furthermore, one can by no means be convinced by Else's theory that Aristotle is alluding to the ζῶον of the *Timaeus* when he writes (*Poetics*, 1450 b 34), τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν κτλ. καὶ . . . καὶ here must mean, as Gudeman says, cum . . . tum. Aristotle hence seems to be referring simply to two classes of objects which may be beautiful, i. e., animate objects and "wholes made up of parts," *artefacta*. That this must be his essential meaning is indicated by his reference again to the two classes in the very next sentence (1451 a 3), ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων. It is hard to explain Aristotle's use here of the plural ζώων if he really has in mind "the meaning of ζῶον in the *Timaeus*." On page 193 when Else comes to consider the definition of tragedy, he argues on the basis of 1452 a 1 and 1452 a 38 that "the 'pity and fear' of the definition are—actions or happenings, πράξεις." Before examining the implications of this conclusion, he takes up Aristotle's theory of οἰκεία ἡδονή. Else, arguing on the evidence he has adduced from the *Philebus*, concludes that there is not one pleasure peculiar or proper to tragedy, and another proper to epic poetry, but οἰκεία ἡδονή is "one that is inherent in and proper to any serious literary work which has a pure and perfect form" (p. 194). Here he assigns to pleasure again this incomprehensible objective status. And he continues this confusion between objective and subjective by making pity and fear objective (i. e., πράξεις) and inherent in the "emotional material" out of which tragedy is constructed. How pity and fear can be objective in any sense is very difficult to understand. But with the argument taking this turn it is no wonder then that catharsis becomes objective; it is "primarily an artistic rather than a psychological process" which "takes place essentially in the tragedy when it is composed" (p. 199). In substance Else's theory amounts to this, if I have understood it correctly: 1) pleasure inheres in the object; 2) pity and fear inhere in the object; 3) Aristotle recommends that one should write a complete and perfect tragedy, which should resemble

the perfect "creature," the ζῷον of the *Timaeus*; 4) catharsis means the purification of the objective pity and fear according to criteria of completeness and perfection; and 5) if the catharsis is effective, there will inhere in the completed tragedy οἰκεία ἡδονή. At bottom the whole argument is completely vitiated by the failure to distinguish clearly between that which is subjective and that which is objective. Else's own summary statement of his theory amply reveals the confusion (p. 200): "they (i. e., pity and fear) are purified in the same moment they are aroused, by their incorporation into the beauty and measure of the perfect whole. In this purified state they are the basis—the indispensable basis—of the pure pleasure which a great tragedy calls forth in the soul." Else's article affords most stimulating reading and, though his conclusions are in my opinion completely untenable, no one can work through the essay without being forced to reconsider and reappraise the central and basic doctrines of the Aristotelian aesthetic.

Alan McN. G. Little's paper on "Plautus and Popular Drama" endeavors to point to those aspects of the Plautine plays which derive not from the tradition of Greek New Comedy but which owe much to the cruder and more transitory forms of popular entertainment. Little examines these several forms, but is of course handicapped by the paucity of evidence. He then turns to the comedies themselves and selects for more detailed treatment certain ones which he contends bear the most obvious signs of the influence of popular dramatic forms. These plays he divides into three categories: 1) the festival play, including the *Persa* and *Stichus*; 2) popularized New Comedy, including the *Casina* and *Mostellaria*; and 3) New Comedy farce, including the *Pseudolus*, *Asinaria*, *Bacchides*, *Miles Gloriosus*, and *Truculentus*. The article as a whole is interesting and throws light on the vexed problems of the literary ancestry of Plautus' plays.

The final article of the volume, "A Fragment of Juvenal in a Manuscript of Orléans," is contributed by Arthur P. McKinlay and Edward K. Rand. The authors tell a fascinating story of their discovery of impressed script on the front and back covers of a manuscript of Orléans. This script had been transferred from leaves once glued to the covers, and when read by the aid of a mirror proved to be a text of Juvenal, *Satire* II, 32-89 and *Satire* III, 35-93. The authors convincingly argue that the fragments derive from "one of the oldest and one of the best representatives of the text of Juvenal" (p. 244). The article is accompanied by a text of the fragments and several photographic plates.

One general observation may be made concerning the volume as a whole. A scholar can attack the most technical problem and at the same time give evidence that he has seen it in a wider perspective and has related it to a larger context. There may be some ground for urging that in several of these articles their

authors could have shown more adequately that they were motivated by the larger aims and goals of classical scholarship, those more humane and critical objectives, to which the dedicatory essay emphatically pointed as the guiding forces in the scholarly career of Professor Smyth.

WHITNEY J. OATES.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

DAVID M. ROBINSON and J. WALTER GRAHAM. *Excavations at Olynthus, Part VIII: The Hellenic House*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1938. Pp. xxi + 370; 36 figs.; 110 plates. \$15.

The eighth volume of the *Excavations at Olynthus* by D. M. Robinson and J. W. Graham affords us the most important material for classical Greece: "a study of the houses found at Olynthus with a detailed account of those excavated in 1931 and 1934." There is in my opinion no doubt that the picture of a Greek town which this volume gives belongs in the main, as the authors contest, to classical times (before 348 B. C.). Though the sub-title "The Hellenic House" seems to me a little pretentious, the material presented in this volume is of the greatest interest in itself and also of outstanding value for everybody who desires thorough archaeological commentaries to our classical texts. In a careful, clear, and well-illustrated description the authors make the material available to both archaeologists and philologists. The chess-board planning of the town, its wall, the technique of its constructions of rubble and mud brick (the authors very successfully combine Vitruvius II, 8, 9 ff.; 16; 18 defending the adobe, pp. 227 ff.), the mural decoration, details of equipment and outfit of the houses, the shops and, above all, the main types of houses are reviewed and made easily accessible by good indices and most useful records. As to the houses, which attract a quite special interest, they are presented both in a description of the individual houses (part II) and in a general survey of plan, rooms, and construction (parts III and IV). In the latter are incorporated, according to the preface, the chief results of Dr. Graham's personal research on domestic architecture in classical Greece.

Thanks to the excavations at Olynthus we have come to know two closely connected types of classical Greek house, conveniently summarized as the *pastas* and *pastas and peristyle types*. They are indeed known also from other places (pp. 147 ff., 179 ff.), but Professor Robinson's work has in a way unified the material discovered for these types just as, for instance, the excavations at Pompeii have unified it for the *atrium* houses. The main characteristics may be summarized in the following way—as

illustrated also in Professor Robinson's valuable article "Haus" in the supplementary volume VII of Pauly-Wissowa's *Realencyclopädie*. Like the *megaron* (*oecus*) houses (Vitruvius, VI, 7), the houses of Olynthos as a rule face south. In obvious contrast to the *megaron* houses, however, these houses have their entrance on the southern long side, which faces the main street. The houses of Olynthos are thus oriented along the street (not with their central axis crossing the street as in the *megaron* houses). Inside these houses the most characteristic feature is a fairly wide room which runs longitudinally through the house like a corridor parallel with the front street (that is in an east-west direction). This "corridor" divides the house into a north and a south part. The north part, facing south, contains as a rule the main rooms and acts as a screen against the north. If the house had two storeys, the second storey was regularly added to this northern half, though it was also sometimes extended over the left and right parts of the southern half of the house. In the centre of the southern part of the house is a court directly accessible from the street by means of a *prothyron*. This vestibule is open to the street. There is no *thyron* of the kind described by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1 behind it. The long room in the centre of the house—always felt to be a dividing corridor even if usually the ends are cut off and used as special rooms—is left open to the court with some three or four pillars in the wide opening. The present authors give convincing reasons for considering this room to be a typical *pastas* (pp. 161 f.) in contrast to a (colonnaded or uncolonnaded) porch of a house of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type. *Prostas* is obviously an appropriate name for the latter, though we must remember that Vitruvius could use the word *pastas* for the porch of a *megaron* house also (VI, 7, 1).

The difference between a *pastas* house and a *pastas* and *peristyle* house is that in the latter the court is transformed into a peristyle with porticoes on the south, east, and west sides in addition to the columns in the wide opening of the *pastas* on the north side. This form probably was influenced by the more elegant type of house described by Vitruvius, *loc. cit.* Among the most important features of the Olynthos houses may also be mentioned the elegant rooms with mosaic floor and antechamber, which were used by the men for their banquets. Robinson and Graham in their careful description (pp. 171 ff.) use the word *andron* for these rooms, while according to them the word *oecus*—as in Vitruvius (VI, 7, 2)—should be reserved for the hall of a house of *megaron* type. In this connection we must also remember the Greek *hibernacula*, described by Vitruvius, VII, 4, 4.

It is one of the most startling defects of Vitruvius' work that in his extreme classicism he concentrates upon what Robinson and Graham call the *prostas* type, that is the *megaron* (*oecus*)

type with its Homeric associations (Vitruvius, VI, 7, 2 = Homer, *Od.*, VI, 305 f.) and its wide local distribution. Robinson and Graham (pp. 151; cf. the article "Haus" in *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, col. 266, 32), on the other hand, show some tendency to underrate its importance. It should not be forgotten that, in addition to what Priene shows us, we can see the influence of the *megaron* (*oecus*) house in widely separated quarters of the Greek world, e. g. in the tombs of Alexandria (Adriani, *La Nécropole de Moustafa Pacha*, pl. XXIX), in the third period of the Palace of Vouni (*The Swedish Cyprus Expedition*, III), in Nippur (*A. J. A.*, VIII [1904], pl. XIV—of course Hellenistic), in the Roman tenement houses discussed by Harsh in *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII (1935), pp. 9 f., etc. In my opinion the *pastas* and *peristyle* type of Olynthos—as I have just remarked—was also influenced by the *gynaeconitis* of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type, described by Vitruvius, *loc. cit.*¹ Both distribution and provenance do indeed make it understandable that Vitruvius could describe it as the Greek house *par préférence*. In addition, the type of house which the excavators at Olynthos have revealed to us no doubt represents a more humble standard than that shown by the developed *megaron* (*oecus*) houses. Robinson and Graham illustrate that: there is no *thyroron* (p. 153), no *mesauloi* and added apartments (p. 168), etc. That may help to explain the fact that Vitruvius could omit this.

As a matter of fact no contribution in the field of domestic architecture can be more welcome than a work which discloses how much Vitruvius has omitted. Luckhard (*Das Privathaus im Ptolemäischen und Römischen Ägypten*, Giessen, 1914) and also Schütz (*Der Typus des hellenistisch-ägyptischen Hauses*, Giessen, 1936, but cf. V. Müller, *A. J. A.*, XLII [1938], p. 319) have given us material from Alexandria. Still more fundamental, however, is the evidence which the eighth volume on Olynthos affords us. It puts it beyond every doubt that from classical times on two quite different types of house existed side by side in the Greek towns. Together with Vitruvius' *oecus* or *megaron* type with its *prostas* (= the Homeric *αἶθουσα*) appear Robinson and Graham's *pastas* houses from Olynthos. The distribution of this latter type outside Olynthos (pp. 147 ff.) excludes the possibility that the type may have been local and exceptional. That idea is indeed as shortsighted and dogmatic as would be the denial of the importance of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type in Hellenic times because of the liberating and new discovery at Olynthos. To summarize, we see clearly in the Greek

¹ Dr. Erik Holmberg's important "Excavations at Asca in Arcadia, 1936-38" (*Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, XLV [1939], pp. 24 ff.) now also gives us a Hellenistic *megaron* (*oecus*) house from the mainland of Greece.

development two parallel basic types, the *pastas* type and the *megaron* (*oecus*) type (*prostas* type, as Robinson and Graham call it), as well as the Hellenistic peristyles, which Vitruvius describes as added to the old Roman and the old Greek house (VI, 3, 7 = VI, 7, 3), and then variations and typical compromises such as the *pastas* and *peristyle* houses at Olynthos. Those are the main working, well-defined types. Whether the *pastas* and the *megaron* (*oecus*, *prostas*) types were originally related (cf. Schütz, *loc. cit.*, p. 12) is a quite different question. It should not confuse the actual situation in historic times. Personally I confess that I rather believe in different origins for both (as also for the *lautiora peristylia* and, of course, for the *atrium* houses).

When we turn to our texts and try to distinguish the types which occur in them, we meet with great difficulties. In my opinion Robinson and Graham have failed to bring that out quite sufficiently. The different types have many very decisive features in common, in spite of great differences in detail and orientation. Both the *megaron* houses and those at Olynthos followed the rule of facing south, *πρόσειλοι*—to use Aischylos' word for this common Greek orientation (cf. Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1). The idea of raising the northern part of the building, which faces the sun and offers protection against the north wind, is typical for Olynthos but belonged also to the peristyle architecture (Vitruvius, VI, 7, 3). Testimonies which only in a general way concern this feature cannot be claimed as clearly belonging to either of the types. The *pastas* and *peristyle* houses also have their peristyles. In a description like *Protagoras* 314 E-315 C it is impossible to say whether Plato speaks of a *megaron* (*oecus*) house or a *pastas* and *peristyle* house. I agree that Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III, 8, 9, perhaps speaks about a house of the Olynthos type, but even there we have to remember the confusion between *pastas* and *prostas* revealed by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1.

In short, despite the great difference between the houses, as we now know them archaeologically, they both have main features and also terminology in common in a way which allows the possibility of great confusion in a short and summary description. It seems clear, therefore, that the testimonies should be used with great critical care and attributed to the different types of house only when it is possible to point out some really distinctive feature. A brief preliminary examination has made it clear to me that the texts in many cases decidedly do *not* permit an identification, although in some it seems, of course, possible to trace one of the types.

This only emphasizes the great importance of the new discoveries. They make a new and thorough revision of all the testimonia about Greek houses necessary. The philologist must

be especially grateful for the new material, presented in such a clear and useful way. The present volume does not give us "The Hellenic House" but a most valuable and stimulating contribution to a great book which is badly wanted, a companion like Mau's *Pompeji* to follow when our texts touch Hellenic and Hellenistic architecture. To that critical unification of archaeological and philological research should belong also a well established terminology. There I would keep classical terms only where it can be proved that they really belong, and otherwise choose modern, neutral terms. For that work the present volume also furnishes many very precious contributions.

AXEL BOËTHIUS.

ROBERT J. BONNER and GERTRUDE SMITH. *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, Volume II.* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. viii + 320.

In the first volume of this work, published in 1930, the authors traced the origin and development of legal processes among the Greeks and used this as a background for the discussion of the Athenian judicial system, treating in particular the machinery employed for administering justice. These chapters by no means exhausted the subject, and the authors promised to deal in the future with the topics omitted at that time. That promise is now fulfilled in the volume under review.

Chapter I (Introduction) discusses the difficulty of discovering the origin of the many suits brought before the Athenian courts. Chapter II (Litigants) deals largely with advocates, both the unpaid advocates of the Fifth and the professional advocates of the Fourth Century. There is an extended discussion of the services rendered by friends and club members in securing evidence and lending financial support. There were, of course, no permanent public prosecutors at Athens. In important cases of interest to assembly, boule, deme, or tribe advocates were selected *ad hoc*. Chapter III (Sycophants) discusses the abuses that arose from Solon's permission for any qualified citizen to prosecute wrong-doers. Attempts to control the sycophants by legislation had little success in Athens. Chapter IV (Special Pleas) explains the means by which the defendant might object to the admissibility of a suit. ἀντιγραφὴ was the earliest and fell into disuse early in the Fourth Century; διαμαρτυρία was used only in inheritance cases and γραφαί; παραγραφή, used originally only in suits brought in violation of the amnesty act of 403/2 B. C., was later extended to all δίκαι except inheritance cases. The authors hold that παραγραφή could be used in arbitration; this is a correction of the view of Lipsius. Chapter V (Arbitration)

discusses at some length the much debated question as to what cases were subject to arbitration, and decides that the only cases which could be arbitrated were those which came before the Forty directly or through the medium of the polemarch. Chapter VI (Witnesses) contains one of the best short statements of the difference between procedure in the Athenian and Anglo-American courts which this reviewer has ever seen: "In Athens the dicasts looked to the speaker for the law and facts and to the witnesses for corroboration; with us the jury looks to the witnesses for the facts and to the judge and counsel for the law and an integration of the results of examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. The litigants appear only as witnesses" (p. 123). Witnesses were of less importance at Athens than with us. They were not cross-examined. The state did not compel the witness to come to court, but a litigant might proceed against a recalcitrant witness by a *δίκη λιπομαρτυρίου*. There is a full treatment of the competence of women, children, and slaves. Chapter VII (Oaths) divides oaths into "promissory" (e. g. made by magistrates on entering office) and evidentiary. The latter are divided again into "wagers" and "confirmatory" oaths, which might be taken either by a litigant or a witness. It includes an extended account of "oath helpers"; of these there were two kinds, 1) those who swore to their confidence in the oath of the principal, 2) those who in conjunction with the principal swore to a fact. Chapter VIII (Homicide) deals only with disputed details, since the procedure in homicide trials was presented in the first volume. Punishment for murder was regarded as *πουνή*. The doctrine of pollution must have appeared very soon after the Homeric period. The authors hold, without positive conviction, that purification after *justifiable* homicide was a religious practice rather than a requirement of the law. In addition to action in the regular homicide courts it was possible to prosecute for murder by a *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* and by *ἀπαγωγή*, and doubtless by other procedures. Slaves could not give evidence in murder trials. Chapter X (Appeals, Pardons and New Trials) discusses the meaning of *ἔφεσις*. It denotes 1) an appeal by the loser from one judicial body to another, 2) the compulsory reference of a case by a judicial officer to a dicastery. Solon's *ἔφεσις εἰς δικαστήριον* was a real appeal. Appeal to a dicastery was also permitted from the decision of arbitrators. That is if the arbitrator were unable to effect a compromise he rendered a judgment, becoming in so far a *δικαστής*. On the other hand, the *ἔφεσις* of the *βουλή* in cases which exceeded its competence was an instance of the meaning "compulsory reference." There was no appeal from a decision of the *βουλή* in a case which fell within its competence. *δοκιμασία* of the nine archons and members of the *βουλή* had to be referred to a dicastery. Here, too, *ἔφεσις* meant "compulsory reference." The same is true of *ἔφεσις* when used in connection with the Athenian Empire. Crimes punishable by death, banishment, and

disfranchisement had to be sent to Athens for trial. Pardons were granted at Athens by the *ecclesia*. The doctrine of *res judicata* prevailed at Athens in spite of some apparent exceptions. Little is heard of new trials as a result of the discovery of fresh evidence. A conviction for perjury might, in certain cases, open the way for a new trial. Finally, a case lost by default could on good and sufficient reasons be reopened within two months. Chapter X (Execution of judgments): Collection of damages after judgment was left to the litigant. Corporal punishments were inflicted by the state. Imprisonment was recognized as a form of punishment. In early times capital punishment took the form of throwing the criminal into the *barathron*. Later *apotypanismos* was used. This is considered by the authors to be a form of strangulation. Later still, drinking hemlock became the normal method of execution, although *apotypanismos* might be ordered by the court in certain cases. Chapter XI (Estimates of Athenian Justice) quotes opinions of Athenian justice from both ancients and moderns, and adds the authors' own judgment—in the main favorable.

The book, save for the last chapter, is highly technical; the subject is legal procedure, for which the evidence is frequently contradictory, and always scanty. Most of the chapters are, therefore, controversial rather than descriptive. This needs to be said, not as a criticism, but as a plain statement of fact. The work is not a textbook for beginners, nor a complete collection of all the facts about Athenian legal practice, but rather a detailed and complete investigation of some important problems. It will be of interest and use chiefly to those who already know the field thoroughly.

An exhaustive treatment of such a book would require an analysis of each chapter which would far exceed the limits of a review. In brief it may be said that for the most part the conclusions seem to be well supported by evidence, and to show a sound and discriminating judgment. Only one or two points may be selected at this time for special consideration.

In the discussion of Sycophants it seems to the reviewer that the authors fail to take into account that practically all the denunciation of sycophants at Athens comes from the wealthy and aristocratic opponents of democracy. Criticism from one source should always be suspected by the historian. It can hardly be disinterested. It was certainly not disinterested at Athens. As Bonner and Smith elsewhere point out, under the Athenian legal system practically the only way in which malefactors could be brought to justice was by private prosecution. If the Athenian democracy was to enforce its decrees, if contracts were to be honestly carried out and public moneys were to be spent for the purpose for which they were appropriated, volunteer prosecutors would have to bring "malefactors of great wealth" to account. This system of volunteer prosecution was probably more effective

in checking abuses than our system of public prosecutors. It is as unfair to accept the opinions of Aristophanes and the "Old Oligarch" about sycophants as it would be for a future historian of America to conclude that all Labor Unions are communistic because it is the fashion in some quarters to denounce Labor leaders as "Red." Certainly the examples of sycophancy from the Fifth Century do not show anything but an attempt to enforce the law: the sycophant in the *Acharnians* was merely enforcing the law against importation of Megarian goods: the sycophants whom Crito offered to "fix" would have only been enforcing the law if they had prosecuted Crito for assisting in the escape of Socrates. No doubt insistence by ill-mannered democrats that the upper classes should obey the law was unpleasant, but it may have been salutary. Unfortunately there was another side: the freedom of prosecution opened the door to unfounded suits brought by the kind of sycophant who was the ancient equivalent of our shyster lawyer with his ambulance-chasing and nuisance suits brought in the hope that the defendant will find it cheaper to settle out of court than to fight the case. That there was a good deal of this kind of sycophancy at Athens, there can be no doubt—human nature being what it is—but this should not blind us to the equally obvious fact that a good deal of what modern historians accept as heinous crime was really such only in the eyes of the aristocratic victims of democratic law-enforcement.

In the last chapter the authors have considered—with some misgiving, they say—the merits and demerits of the Athenian judicial system. They need have no misgivings; it is an excellent chapter. Their judgment on the whole is favorable, along the lines indicated in the last paragraph, and enunciated long ago by Grote, that the jury system with all its faults was well adapted to the purpose of Periclean democracy—to protect the humblest citizen in his rights. It must be said, however, that this was done at the price of stability; no one could feel secure in his property at Athens and very few could be secure in their persons.

In view of the inevitable comparison between Attic and modern systems of judicial procedure which the reader is led to make it might be well to add a few words to what the authors have said. Anglo-American procedure is the result of a long development of successive checks on the Crown which were devised in order to protect the individual from oppression. Our legal system throws every possible protection about the defendant in a criminal case, and gives him decisive advantages in civil suits. The Athenian system on the other hand made things hard for the defendant. In the first place, if Bonner and Smith are correct, there was, at least in the Fifth Century, no complete disclosure of the prosecution's evidence at the preliminary hearing or *ἀνάκρισις*. The first time that the defendant heard the case

against him in its entirety was in court, and he had to make his reply immediately. We need not wonder at the commonplace that the prosecution had had a long time to prepare the case, and the defendant but a short time. Furthermore the lack of any thorough cross-examination opened the door to a good deal of hard swearing, or at least to evidence which may not have been actually false, but was by clever wording designed to produce the effect of falsehood. When we add to this the shortness of time allowed for the trial, and the lack of appeal from the judgment of the dicastery, it is plain that the lot of a defendant caught by a clever prosecutor was hard indeed. A comparison of the results of the two systems can be made as follows—a few years ago Professor E. M. Borchard published a book entitled *Convicting the Innocent*, a telling indictment of the failure of our criminal law. Yet in all his search of records he found no case in the United States in which an innocent person had been executed. Could Athenian law show as good a record?

The reviewer feels inclined to protest against the use of such terms as "criminal and civil," "public and private" suits to describe *γραφαί* and *δίκαι*. Such terms have a certain sanction of custom in English but are out of place in a work as technical as this, and are confusing in any case. The distinction between criminal and civil in Anglo-American law corresponds only in part to the distinction between *γραφαί* and *δίκαι* at Athens. E. g. "theft" would be considered a criminal case under our law, but there was a *δίκη κλοπῆς* as well as a *γραφή*, and an action for murder was regularly a *δίκη*. "Public and private" is little better, for squandering one's patrimony (*κατεδηδοκέναι τὰ πατρῶα*) would be a ground for "private" action with us, but in Athens it was handled by a *γραφή*. Sound practice would seem to require the use of the Greek terms *γραφαί* and *δίκαι* exclusively when referring to suits.

A similar protest might be lodged against the anomalous *Archon Basileus* and *King Archon* which have become fixtures in our philological language. The authors use both but sometimes adopt the correct form *Basileus*.

The spelling of proper names is inconsistent as is frequently the case nowadays. Cleisthenes and Teisias get *ei* for *ei*, but in other names the diphthong is transliterated by *i*.

On p. 82 there is a confused paragraph about the amnesty law of 403/2. It is stated that Andocides "is manifestly wrong when he says that Meletus, who assisted in the arrest of Leon of Salamis, was safe from a charge of homicide or *βούλευσις* at the hands of the sons of Leon *ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος*. His immunity depended upon the fact that only those who murdered *αὐτοχειρία* could be tried for murder." But could he not be tried for *βούλευσις*? One difficulty with this seeming contradiction is that Andocides has been misquoted.

What he says is that τὸν βουλευσάντα has always been held liable to the same punishment as the actual doer of the deed. This is sound law in Greece or in America, and would have made Meletus liable to a charge of murder if the amnesty act had not given him immunity. Apparently Bonner and Smith have in mind the statement of Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.*, 39, 5) that murder αὐτοχειρία was not exempted in the amnesty act, implying that βούλευσις φόνου was, and that therefore at that time actions for βούλευσις φόνου were severed from those for murder αὐτοχειρία, and that murder trials were left with the Areopagus but βούλευσις φόνου assigned to the Palladium (*ibid.*, 57, 3). But there is something wrong with this statement of Aristotle's, because actions for βούλευσις φόνου were brought before the Areopagus after the amnesty act in 403/2. An example is Lysias, κατὰ Θεομνήστου A (x), 31, ἐπέξῃλθον τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ. This action was for the execution of the speaker's father by the Thirty but must have been for βούλευσις φόνου. Cf. also Lysias, κατ' Εὐάνδρου (xxvi), 12 and Demosthenes, κατὰ Κόνωνος (liv), 25. The question is certainly open to more doubt than is expressed in the text.

Among minor inaccuracies may be noted:

P. 3: The action for κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου is said to be a δίκη, but on p. 27 it is stated correctly as γραφή. P. 28: *Chaereus* should be *Chaereas*. P. 28: It is implied that Wilamowitz was the first to regard the Trial of the Dog in the *Wasps* as a burlesque of the trial of Laches. This idea really goes back to the Scholiast. P. 28: Cleon's deme was *Cydatthenaeum*, not *Cydatheue*. P. 165: It was the battle of *Arginusae* not *Aegospotami* which was followed by the trial of the generals. P. 289: For *Socrates*, read *Strepsiades*.

HARRY M. HUBBELL.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

B. E. PERRY. *Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop. (Philological Monographs, VII.)* Haverford, Pa., American Philological Association, 1936. Pp. xvi + 240; 6 plates.

In this volume Professor Perry presents studies preliminary to an edition of the Life and Fables of Aesop on which he has been working for some time. In 1933 (*T. A. P. A.*, LXIV, pp. 198-244) he published an exhaustive study of the manuscripts that contain the so-called Westermann recension of the Life (W), and discussed briefly the relation of that version to the one contained in the lost manuscript Grottaferrata A. 33, which had recently been rediscovered as Cod. gr. 397 in the Pierpont Morgan Library. This new manuscript proved to be of such

importance that it has enabled Perry not only to throw much light on the transmission of the *Life*, but also to alter many of the existing views as to the transmission of the *Fables*.

The book falls into two main parts. In the first Perry describes in detail the Morgan manuscript of the *Life* which he refers to as *G*. Although we regret the lack of the texts which he proposes to publish, particularly since the Westermann edition is very rare, he has to a considerable extent compensated for this want by long quotations from *G*, and by a clear exposition of the relationship between the two recensions. He demonstrates that *W* is an abbreviated version of *G*, lacking many details that provide the motivation of incidents common to both, and that it is deprived of many interesting features of style through syncopation and paraphrasing.

Comparable to *G* are the other ancient versions found in the papyri, which represent different recensions varying from *W* as *G* varies from it. Perry has republished all the known papyrus fragments with restorations based on the fuller text available in *G*. The suggestion that the Berlin and Golenischeff papyri represent possible sources of the interpolations in the SBP group of manuscripts of the Westermann *Life* is particularly interesting, although the evidence is too scanty to furnish proof.

In the second part of the book, the author considers the manuscript tradition of the *Fables*. The history of the two texts, the *Life* and the *Fables*, follows the same line, and one can be studied in the light of the other. Nevertheless, in dealing with the *Fables*, the complications are greater both because of the lack of continuity in the subject matter, and because of the number of manuscripts involved. Perry has clarified the relationships between the different classes of manuscripts, and between the individual manuscripts within those classes, but his most important contributions lie in establishing beyond doubt the ancient origin of Class I (the *Augustana*), and in making known a new group of manuscripts containing a recension intermediate between Class I and Class II. Arguing against the views of Hausrath, he shows that the *Augustana* recension is neither Byzantine in origin nor rhetorical in style, and he points out that the *Aphthonian* preface, which is united to the *Fables* in most manuscripts of Class I, did not originally belong with this collection. The *Fables* in *G*, the earliest and most complete manuscript of Class I, are accompanied by the old *Life*, and there are definite indications that another representative of the same class, *Parisinus suppl. 690*, *Chambry's Pa*, although it has substituted the *Aphthonian Preface*, was copied from a manuscript that also contained the old *Life*.

From new manuscript evidence Perry has been able to show that Class II of the *Fable* manuscripts is identical with the SBP family of manuscripts of the Westermann *Life*. Just as

the SBP recension is not directly derived from G, so Class II is not derived directly from Class I, but is based on an intervening recension, represented chiefly by Monacensis 525 and to some extent also by Mosquensis 436.

The cogency of the arguments which Perry adduces for the Planudean authorship of both the *Life* and *Fables* of the Byzantine recension known as the *Accursiana* may not be universally admitted, since they depend mainly on a personal evaluation of style. More convincing is the evidence he brings forward that the collection was the work of one man, based on various sources, and containing originally at least one hundred and twenty-seven fables.

The book is a very clear and satisfying exposition of a complicated textual problem. Particularly commendable are the tables and diagrams, in which the points the author has discussed in the text are graphically exhibited, and the concise summary at the end, in which he has recapitulated the main outlines of the Aesopic tradition as he has developed it.

ELINOR M. HUSSELMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

ZDZISŁAW ZMIGRYDER-KONOPKA. *Le Guerrier de Capestrano*. (*Hermaion*, Fasc. 3.) Lwów, Filomata, 1938. Pp. 26; 7 plates. Swiss Fr. 4.00.

Those who follow the progress of archaeological excavation in Italy know that since 1934 we have had a statue, large as life, of *il duce* (*antico*) *Abruzzese*, the so-called "warrior of Capestrano"; and, in fact, photographs of the face of the statue (see Plate III in Zmigryder-Konopka) do show a remarkable likeness to photographs of *Il Duce* himself—perhaps that is merely a coincidence. The "warrior of Capestrano" is already the subject of a considerable literature. We may add to the references given by Zmigryder-Konopka at least these two: G. Bordinelli in *Atti della R. Acc. d. Scienze di Torino*, Cl. d. Sc. Mor., Stor., e Filol., LXXI (1936), pp. 463-474, and G. Moretti in *Bull. di Paleontologia Ital.*, N. S. I (1936-37), pp. 94-112. Zmigryder-Konopka attacks the view, advanced by Moretti and in general accepted by others who have written on the subject, that the statue represents a native Italic warrior or hero. It was found within a necropolis at Capestrano (in the country of the Vestini), the character of which is beyond question Picene ("della civiltà sabellica-picena," Moretti). It is, with the fragment of another (female) statue found at the same place and time, far more important, viewed as an early attempt at Italic sculpture in the round, than the gigantic torso of Bel-

monte Piceno (see *PID*, II, p. 229); and it bears an "East Italic" inscription, the text of which I gave, without discussion, in *Classical Philology*, XXX (1936), p. 195 (*PID*, no. 355 bis). A long discussion of the inscription may be found in Moretti's official publication (*Opere d'Arte*, Fasc. VI [Rome, 1936], pp. 17-18, issued by the R. Istituto di Archeologia e Storia dell'Arte).

Briefly, Zmigryder-Konopka's thesis is that the person represented by the statue was not Italic at all, but Etruscan. He possessed the *imperium militiae*, as witness his axe—if only he had had the *fascies* too the fascisti might have claimed him for their own! And he was (pp. 25-26) "un chef étrusque qui, étant arrivé au pays des Vestins avec son équipe guerrière, comme cela avait été le cas de Caile Vipinas parvenu sur le territoire de la ville de Rome, subit lui-même l'influence du nouveau milieu quoiqu'il organisât l'armée en se basant sur le principe de l'*imperium* et sur celui des légions." He was, if not dictator, at any rate (p. 22) *dicator*. Zmigryder-Konopka supports his view with his "translation" of the inscription itself, with arguments drawn from the armament of the warrior, and with what support can be drawn from the little that is known of the most ancient political and military organization of the Italic tribes. In all this he shows much learning and power of argument. But the fatal flaw is the impossibility of believing that there was an Etruscan overlordship firmly established in the country of the Vestini in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. And my own instinct for the present, in all that pertains to the statue, is to follow the counsel of Epicharmus: *νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν*.

J. WHATMOUGH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

JOACHIM SCHARF. Studien zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Rheinlande auf epigraphischer Grundlage. (Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Band 3.) Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938. Pp. 174. RM 7.70.

Here is further evidence of the active work being done by German scholars on the history of the peoples who lived in the valley of the Rhine. In this monograph some 6,000 inscriptions from *C. I. L.* XIII are examined, and from them the author deduces the relative proportions of Celtic, Germanic, Italic, and other elements in the population of Gallia Belgica and Upper and Lower Germany during the first three centuries A. D.

Part A, the introduction, defines the problem and outlines the method. Part B discusses the dating of inscriptions; apart

from criteria generally applicable in Latin epigraphy, a number that are of particular utility for the Rhine area are given. Part C deals mainly with criteria for determining whether a name is Celtic or Germanic. This determination is sometimes difficult on linguistic grounds in regions where Celts and Germans had lived side by side for some time. When reliable linguistic determination is impossible, membership in a known Celtic or Germanic military unit, or dedication to an identifiable deity, is often helpful.

Part D applies the method. The author is rightly cautious in distinguishing between Gallic and Italian Julii. The Lingones are shown to have been Celtic, and Scharf would therefore settle an old question by assigning them to Gallia Belgica and not Upper Germany (p. 34). The Treveri were predominantly Celtic (pp. 62-3). Among much other interesting data, one notes that in the first century the racial proportions in the territory of the Ubii were 23.2% Celtic, 35.4% Italian, 13.3% German, but that in the third century the German element had risen to 83.3%. As Scharf points out, these figures reflect the presence of Italian soldiery in the first century, and the increasing Romanization and attendant literacy of the natives (pp. 145-6).

Part E, the conclusion, is a brief general history of the *Bevölkerung* of the Rhine valley. On the basis of Scharf's evidence, the movements which resulted in the formation of the Belgae—a fusion of Celtic and Germanic elements apparently none too sharply distinguished—can hardly have occurred later than the third century B. C. This will shed additional doubt on the Hawkes-Dunning theory (*Archaeological Journal*, LXXXVII [1930], pp. 150-335) that the movement took place at about the middle of the second century B. C. This final section could have been made much more graphic by the inclusion of a map, even a rough one.

As Scharf admits (pp. 8-9), his epigraphical material represents only a cross-section of the society in question, and the top section at that; we must assume that what is true of the top is also true of the whole society. This is an assumption that may trouble the reader who is concerned with the statistics of epigraphy. Leaving the assumption aside, however, the method is acceptable; and even if Scharf's conclusions give information only about the epigraphical stratum, so to speak, they will be useful to students of the period and the area in which the history of western Europe was so largely predetermined.

NORMAN J. DEWITT.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH. *The Principal Uncial Manuscripts of the New Testament*. University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xiv + 34; 76 plates. \$10.

This book makes its chief appeal to New Testament students, but the author ventures the hope that the general reader interested in the history of Greek handwriting and in the transmission of the New Testament will also find much of value. I feel sure that he will not be disappointed. Seventy-six different samples of Greek uncial writing reproduced in magnificently legible plates are a contribution that can be neglected by no scholar interested in Greek writing. This is a first step only, but a great one, toward the desired end, which should bring us similar collections of facsimiles of Old Testament uncials and of non-Biblical manuscripts of the same type. Such a collection will serve as the natural extension into earlier centuries of *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200*, by K. Lake.

The book begins with a brief bibliography, but sufficient for beginners, which is followed by a brief and well written introduction in the main abbreviated from the standard works on palaeography. In this are included such subjects as papyrus, vellum, paper, roll and codex, writing utensils, ink, columns, quires, and styles of writing. This concise treatise is enriched by many valuable and interesting notes. Each plate is preceded by a brief description and the most essential bibliographical notices. The addition of a transcript of the text would in many cases be helpful to the beginner.

I trust that the mention of a few points in which I differ from the author will not be considered as in any way condemnatory of the work as a whole.

On p. 7, ll. 27 ff. the impression is given that early parchments were in roll form; the evidence is strongly for the codex form; see *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 1938, pp. 99 ff.

The statement on p. 12, l. 11, that there was an intermediate period between the papyrus roll and the parchment codex, in which the papyrus codex was much used, especially by Christians, applies only to Egypt; see article just cited.

On p. 18, note 2, it is a little surprising to see Gregory's old explanation of *τρισά* and *τετρασά* revived.

In the description of Plate X reference to *Jour. of Bib. Lit.*, LIII, pp. 371 ff., would help explain the character of the text and Hoskier, *Codex B and its Allies*, I, xi, should be mentioned for Plate XI.

In the description of Plate XIV, Codex Vaticanus, I miss the statement that the entire manuscript was reinked by a late hand.

Plates XX and XXXI should be brought nearer together, as both belong to the same school of writing and are not widely separated in time.

For the date of Codex Bezae, Plate XXII, Lowe should be

cited. For manuscripts in America I miss a reference to K. W. Clark, *Catalogue of New Testament Manuscripts in America*, Chicago, 1937. For this work it is more helpful than De Ricci's *Census of Mediaeval Manuscripts*.

The author is to be commended for inserting two plates of the Sinaiticus and three of the Alexandrinus so as to show the writing of the different scribes, though contemporary. A second plate to show the writing of the first quire of John in the Freer Gospels is even more necessary, for this he dates seventh or eighth century. A comparison with the other plates of this date might be helpful.

H. A. SANDERS.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

G. F. BENDER. *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides*. Würzburg, Konrad Triltsch Verlag, 1938. Pp. 114.

This diligent monograph devotes more than a hundred pages to analyzing Pericles' well-known definition of the statesman (γνώναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων, II, 60, 5) and to proving the somewhat obvious thesis that, of the four qualities there designated, Nicias possessed the last two, Alcibiades the first two, and Hermocrates all. The problem of political leadership undoubtedly concerned Thucydides greatly, being to his mind the fundamental factor in Athens' defeat (II, 65). One may doubt, however, how much light is cast upon his total thought by any such attempt to isolate a single part of it. Thus the author, in his absorption with the idea of leadership, wholly neglects the fundamental contrast between Athens and Sparta and nowhere suggests that those qualities of vigor and self-reliance by which Athens achieved her position derived not merely from her leadership but, as the Funeral Oration shows, from her institutions. Again, Thucydides remarks that Athens failed at Syracuse not only through lack of the right leader (II, 65) but also because there for the first time she opposed a democratic city as energetic and resourceful as herself (VII, 55, 2; VIII, 96, 5). In short, when the author speaks of "jene lebendige Einheit von Führer und Volk, für die auch unsere Zeit wieder hellhörig geworden ist" (p. 24) and then in his interest in the *Führer* forgets the qualities of the *Volk*, he seems hardly just to the thought of Thucydides. In addition, he fails to note any connection between Thucydides' ideal of political oratory (ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, II, 60, 5) and the more realistic analysis of personal and political motives which became widespread with the sophistic movement. Perhaps his most useful contribution is the parallels which he quotes from Solon to the definition of the statesman.

JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

HEINRICH DÖRRIE. *Passio SS. Machabaeorum*. Die antike lateinische Übersetzung des IV Makkabäerbuches. (*Abh. der Gesell. der Wissen. zu Göttingen*, Dritte Folge, Nr. 22.) Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1938. Pp. viii + 147. RM. 10.

This is a small masterpiece. Dörrie has investigated the extensive manuscript tradition of this text, proved the existence of two main types, one full, one shortened, and traced the various sub-types. The argument includes material of general interest: we see how a Carolingian copy of the longer text was rediscovered in the eleventh century (which is what almost certainly happened to [Apul.] *Ascl.*) and how in and after that century some copyists emended boldly. (Was this particularly liable to happen in a newly discovered text, like the unabridged *Passio*, and [Apul.] *Ascl.*?)

Dörrie proceeds to date the translation and by several converging lines of reasoning—including the resemblances which (without dependence on either side) exist between the *Passio* and Ambrose *De Jacob et vita beata*—places it at the end of the fourth century. This seems to me conclusive. (Incidentally, in the course of his discussion he has many illuminating remarks on the modifications made by the translator, in particular “eine Steigerung des Inhalts” [p. 28], which can be a coarsening [p. 41] and again affords a parallel for the *Asclepius*.) The text follows, with an apparatus the fulness of which makes it useful for the study of the development of variants under the conditions in question, and then we have a *sermo in natale Machabaeorum* (probably of the eighth century), a descriptive list of the MSS of the *Passio*, and an *index verborum*.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RUDOLPH PFEIFFER. *Die Netzfischer des Aischylos und der Inachos des Sophokles*. Munich, Beck, 1938. Pp. 63.

This monograph is a painstaking treatment of the text, metre, meaning, and dramatic technique of two papyrus fragments from the tragic masters. The *Inachos* was previously known as a satyr-play; the *Dictyoulkoi* is so classified by Pfeiffer on the ground that its metre is too free for tragedy. On the other hand, the fragment exhibits a call for help which, as Pfeiffer points out, is surely the cue for the chorus' entrance; but those summoned are all human neighbors, and if satyrs then appeared, it must have been surprising. In the *Ichneutai*, Apollo mentions

the satyrs in issuing a similar call. One wonders if the metre should be regarded as decisive.

With this possible exception, Pfeiffer's work is admirably sound and thorough. The fragments do not yield much of interest, except that the bit of the *Dictyoulkoi* is clearly part of the prologue, and that there is stichomythy here; Pfeiffer points out that prologue-stichomythy used to be regarded as a dubious peculiarity of the *Prometheus* (possibly also found in the *Phrygians*), as far as Aeschylus is concerned. Every student of tragedy will find Pfeiffer's work of value in piecing out our knowledge of Greek drama.

ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

CARL CLEMEN. Lukians Schrift über die syrische Göttin. (*Der Alte Orient*, XXXVII, Heft 3-4.) Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1938. Pp. 57. RM. 2.10.

Clemen presents here a German translation of the famous tract and a valuable commentary. The commentary is not in the usual form of a series of disjointed notes on passages *seriatim*, but, much more useful, is a group of five essays: 1. The Phoenician Sanctuaries; 2. The Stories of the Origin of the Temple in Hierapolis; 3. The Site and Appointments of the Temple in Hierapolis; 4. The Cult in the Temple in Hierapolis; 5. Other Usages Customary in Hierapolis. These are brief, but excellent to introduce a student to the religion, and for the scholar of great value since so much recent archaeological evidence is used in discussing Lucian's statements. New contributions are matters of detail rather than of general reconstruction, but no one working in the field can afford to neglect the book.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

MARIE DELCOURT. Stérilités mystérieuses et naissances maléfiques dans l'antiquité classique. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. LXXXIII.) Liège, 1938. Pp. 112.

The writer discusses the belief in the god-sent character of the failure of the crops, both of grain and of living creatures, and in the portentous, ill-omened significance of monstrous births. Chapter I (pp. 9-28) is devoted to the "scourge" with special attention to the Sophoclean *Oedipus Rex*; chapter II (pp. 29-65)

discusses the monstrous births; chapter III (pp. 66-76) remedies for the scourge; chapter IV (pp. 77-82) its origin; and chapter V (pp. 83-90) the Sicilian scourge at the time of Empedocles. Five appendices (pp. 94-112) are given respectively to the Theban version of the scourge, ill-omened twinbirths, Philoctetes and the taboo of the ill, the occurrences of similar beliefs among non-Greek and Roman peoples, and the connection of the names Labdakos and Labda.

Miss Delcourt herself sums up her work (pp. 91-93) and states that the Greeks feared the extinction of the human race and were terrified by any abnormality in the young of both animals and human beings. In contrast to the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans considered such abnormalities as always unlucky—exceptions are ascribed to the fawning of an interpreter on the mighty. There is this difference between Greek and Latin that the former avoided (from superstitious fear) speaking of such occurrences, while the Latins rather dwelt on them. The significance always extends to the whole country or city where it occurs.

While there is really little in this thesis that is new, we ought to be grateful to the author for having brought together in easily accessible form the pertinent material. Her book will form a welcome pendant, particularly from the Greek side, to the forthcoming treatment of the *prodigium* by St. Weinstock in the Wissowa-Kroll *Encyclopädie*.

From another angle, though, Miss Delcourt's treatment contains a great deal of controversial matter. She is greatly concerned in trying to prove that *loimos* has not the meaning of pestilence or plague which is usually given to it. I am surprised that in discussing Herodotus, III, 65 she has passed over that part of the narrative which would most strongly support her, namely that Cambyzes died without leaving any offspring whatever. Herodotus, VI, 139, on the other hand, is not germane to the question; the fact that no plague appears here is due to the thought that the punishment must fit the crime; hence only famine and sterility ensue. We should also reject, I think, her interpretation of Aeschylus, *Persae*, 715, where she states that *loimos* is identical with famine. Similarly, her explanation of Aeschylus, *Supplices*, 630-680 should be denied: no *loimos*, so the prayer runs, shall empty the state of men (659) nor shall there be slaughter in civil war (I accept Weil's *στάσις*; *δόρυ* is a mere unfounded guess of Mazon's—war had been mentioned in 630-638 and would be repetitious here—; *θυμέλαι* is not "salle," but altar). Just as in 674 ff. crops and births are tied together (*τε-τε*) so in 680 *λοιγός*, "epidemic" and *νόσος* "ordinary illness" are parallel (*μηδέ-δέ*). The mention of Apollo Lykeios is natural because he is the chief god of Argos. That Thucydides, as Miss Delcourt well observes, avoids the word *loimos* in his description of the great plague is significant for his style; but

it is without bearing on the meaning of the word, for its use in II, 47, 3 emphatically refers to the epidemic (τοσούτος) character of the plague (cf. also Steup's note on the passage). Plato, *Symposium* 188 B distinctly classes *loimos* as an illness (ἀλλα . . . νοσήματα) and the word is identified with νόσος in 201 D. Miss Delcourt is correct in saying that *Leges* 906 C contrasts the two words, but that means no more than a restriction of *loimos* to major diseases, as becomes plain from a comparison of ὥραις ἐπὼν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς with *Symposium* 188 B. Δοιμώδης νόσος, finally, seems to me merely to identify illnesses of an epidemic character.

Our author's chief concern is with the passage of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, ll. 25-30 and the choral passage 151-188; this is indeed the starting point of her investigation. I can see here no "sterility" but only "illness." The ears of grain have already begun to form, when they drop off, and cattle and women become pregnant, but their offspring are born dead or die soon afterwards. Lines 27-29 are not a mere summary of the preceding line but refer to an epidemic illness. Similarly, I cannot accept her interpretation of the choral passage. There is a *double entendre* in πρόπας στόλος νοσεῖ: the whole people is either ill or affected by grief and care. ἄλλος ἄλλῳ must refer to the dying who enter on their westward journey and includes all who are victims of the *loimos*, not infants and *puerperae* only, as the author wants to take it. The very fact that both wives and gray-haired mothers are mentioned proves that husbands and grown sons are among the victims. Of course, I do not mean to say that sterility is excluded from the affliction; it belongs to every *loimos* and pestilence: see e. g. *Revel.*, VI, 5-8. The argument (p. 22) about the advisability of speedy burial during a plague is refuted by a careful perusal of Thucydides, II, 47-52, of which Miss Delcourt has quoted only ch. 50; but see 51, 5, where τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις . . . οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἀνέκαμον must be compared with the νηλέα and ἀνοίκτως of the *Oedipus Rex* 180-181. In that case γένεθλα need not be taken as "children." The emphasis on νηλέα ἀνοίκτως proves to me that we deal with corpses and not with monstrous births exposed alive. For in this case wailing would not be permitted.

I have dwelt on these lines so extensively because here is the kernel of Miss Delcourt's new and startling conception of the punishment inflicted on the Thebans by the irate gods. There are other controversial points in the discussion, such as the interpretation of Homer, *Il.*, I, 43, 53, where I think it important to notice that Apollo had the epithet *Loimios* (*RE*, II, 16, 58; XIII, s. v.). Also the use of the imperfect tense in line 52 seems to me to point to a plague. If the author (23) stresses the point that the deaths ensue immediately, we may answer that e. g. during a cholera epidemic,—and I remember vividly that of 1892,—the suddenness of the fatal outcome was one of its most

terrifying characteristics. Of course, there are also many good and appealing observations. Here I would count the emendation of Cicero, *Leg.*, III, 19: *delatus* for *legatus* (*defero* is used of the transport of the bag in which a parricide is sewed up).

In conclusion I want to say that the book, in spite of its brevity, will deservedly call forth much comment by other scholars. The author has done signal service in raising her point, even if ultimately the decision should be against her.

ERNST RIESS.

SCARSDALE, N. Y.

WILHELM NESTLE. Der Friedensgedanke in der antiken Welt. (*Philologus*, Supplementband XXXI, Heft 1 [1938].) Pp. 79. RM. 7.25.

The author asks whether it is true that the ancient world, contrary to the modern, regarded war as the normal state of international relations. He has transferred a statement found in a discussion of international law to the field of idealistic philosophy and poetic imagination, and pursues his point by collecting, apparently quite thoroughly, the passages in ancient philosophy and literature, but not in history, that praise peace and condemn war as folly and a perversion of nature. The conclusion is that the ancient world was no less pacific than the modern. This may be the truth, but the present treatise is too superficial to be an important contribution on the subject. An adequate discussion would have to include historical actuality and also *Kriegsgedanke* in its survey.

The most interesting aspect of the work is its relation to present political tendencies, especially in the authoritarian states. The views cited and quoted from ancient authors are plainly at odds with the propaganda that issues from the ministries of Germany and Italy. The author abstains from appreciation or interpretation of his material as well as from references to contemporary affairs, until the very end, where he suddenly belittles post-war pacificism and exalts the "tragisch-heroische Auffassung des Lebens": εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης.

AUBREY DILLER.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

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